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CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) A Generic National Framework for Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 2nd WSIS Action Line C5 Meeting ITU Headquarters, 14-15 May 2007 Manuel Suter

Introduction: Why a Generic National Framework Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) is a complex and multi-faceted task: The threat spectrum is very wide and rapidly evolving. CIIP involves various actors: governmental agencies from different ministries as well as private companies. Different perspectives: technical, business, law-enforcement, national-security. For states that are only starting to develop their own CIIP policy, it is quite hard to identify best practices. National models for CIIP organizations are not necessarily applicable to other countries, because of their complexity and their country-specific configuration. Many of the existing solutions are fairly resource-intensive.

Introduction: The aim of the Generic National Framework The generic national framework aims to offer a few building blocks for an efficient and effective CIIP organizational unit. By concentrating on the most essential task, cooperation between various stakeholders, flexibility, and adaptability, one may develop a relatively inexpensive solution that can be further tailored to country-specific needs. The generic framework is an amalgamation of different existing CIIP models, but most closely resembles the Swiss CIIP model.

Essential Tasks: The Four Pillars of CIIP

Essential Partners: The Cooperation Model Hub/clearing house (governmental agency) Analysis capacity (intelligence community) Technical center of expertise (CERT)

Organization of the CIIP Unit Special Task Force for Information Assurance Government Agency Intelligence Service Head of CIIP unit CIIP unit CERT Team Leader of the Situation Center Leader of the CERT- Team Analysts Scientific Staff

The Network of the CIIP Unit In order for the CIIP unit to be successful, each sub unit needs to be embedded in a broad network of national and international partners. National Units World-Wide Cooperation Operators of Critical Infrastructure CIIP Unit CIIP Network / Policy-Makers Intelligence Service High-tech crime unit CERT Other national CIIP units Intelligence community Other national high-tech crime units, Interpol Other national and international CERTs, Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST)

The Two Customer Bases of the CIIP Unit Most importantly, the CIIP unit must address the owners and operators of CII. However, in the fight against cyber-crime, it is also vital not to neglect private users, SMEs, and other large businesses that are not operating CII. In consequence, the CIIP unit serves two customer groups: the Closed Customer Base, which should include the operators of nationally critical infrastructures; and the Open Customer Base, which includes all other companies (in particular SMEs), as well as home computer users.

The Two Customer Bases of the CIIP Unit Customer base Closed Open Members Selected operators of critical infrastructures (limited membership) SMEs Citizens Number 2-4 representatives of each member Open Trust Strong Trust Weak Trust Build-up of Trust Within the whole costumer base (regular meetings, interactive network), and in particular within each sector. Media, internet, exhibitions - with the help of partners.

The Closed Costumer Base Membership of the CCB is restricted to operators of CII.

Products and Services for the Closed Customer Base Assistance in case of incident: 24/7 on-call service One-stop-shop Distribution of exclusive information: Early warnings, situation reports, background information, perpetrator profiles. Online platform, newsletters. Workshops, meeting, exercises: Sector-specific workshops: reinforcing knowledge of specific issues. Cross-sectoral workshops: increasing awareness of interdependencies.

Information-sharing and classification levels Considerable know-how can be gained through exchanges of experiences. Companies are competing with each other. Information-sharing in the area of information security can be an extremely sensitive matter for companies. Strong mutual trust is an absolute condition for any information-sharing effort. Each company should be able to decide with whom it wants to share information.

The Open Customer Base The Open Customer Base: private users, SMEs, large businesses that are not operating CII. Services and products for the Open Costumer Base: Awareness-raising: increasing basic knowledge on information security. Warnings and advices: filtering the bulk of warnings Assistance in case of incident: providing hints on problem resolution, answering technical questions. Partnership with other actors (Media, private associations, other governmental agencies).

The CIIP Unit in Practice: A (Fictitious) Case Study

Conclusions It is possible to form effective and efficient CIIP units without allocating a great deal of resources. The following features were considered to be the key elements for such a unit: Concentration on the essential tasks Cooperation with all relevant stakeholders Information-sharing with the private sector National and international contacts The presented framework should not be understood as static solution. The CIIP unit must constantly take into account the various interests of its partners, as well as the fact that different events may demand different alliances.

Contact Information Thank you! Manuel Suter Center for Security Studies ETH Zürich WEC Weinbergstrasse 11 8092 Zurich Switzerland +41 (0)44 632 63 49 suter@sipo.gess.ethz.ch