PROTECT NETWORK EDGE WITH BGP, URPF AND S/RTBH. by John Brown, CityLink Telecommunications, LLC

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Transcription:

PROTECT NETWORK EDGE WITH BGP, URPF AND S/RTBH by John Brown, CityLink Telecommunications, LLC

About Me Based in Albuquerque, NM US Will travel for packet$, food, and good Scotch.! MikroTik Trainer CityLink does Fiber/Wireless to Business and Home Ran IANA s L-Root DNS for 3 years Built several global ATM networks while in SV CityLink has around 800 BGP peers LAX, SJC, ASH, AMS-IX(soon) We offer 1Gig for $595 and 10Gig for $1995

What can we protect? We can protect the Edge We can protect the Core We can protect based destination address We can protect based on source address We can prevent source spoofed IP addresses!

Protecting Other Networks First, lets help protect other people s network Source Spoofed Packets BCP 38 https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp38 http://www.bcp38.info/index.php/main_page Some people don t do it n Some think its to hard n Some don t know JUST DO IT! J

Where to Prevent Source Spoofed Where do you have control over this? Access Edge? Distribution Network? Inter-Provider Edge? Peers? Transit?

How do we prevent bad packets? ACL s You can write ACL s (Filters) and apply them to each interface in your network. Place them on the access edge Easy to maintain even when you have 100 s of routers (NOT) Is there a better way??

Are there easier, better ways? BGP Blackhole based on destination Remote Trigger with BGP Peers urpf (https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3704.txt) Typically done in hardware Very low impact to CPU Has some interesting side benefits

BGP Blackhole, how it works You and your BGP peers (transit, peers) agree. Special community tag will signal routes to BH Say Community 666:666 You send your BGP peer a route with 666:666 They then adjust next-hop for that route to be BLACKHOLE, or NULL, etc (vendor dependent) Traffic won t goto that prefix anymore. You ve pushed the problem upstream. But your victim can t get ANY traffic!! Lesser of two

BGP Blackhole Use BGP to tell others (peers, transit) to drop traffic towards a particular prefix. So your customer is getting DDOS d and its impacting the rest of your network. You can use blackhole to tell peers to drop towards the victim. POOF. Victim is now really a victim, but rest of network is now happier.

How does urpf Work Routers typically make decisions based on Dest IP With urpf, router now also looks at Source IP. Two Modes (Strict and Loose) Router looks at Source IP and then the routing table. If source is reachable via the input interface, then good, else drop (Strict) If source reachable via any route in routing table, then good, else drop. (Loose), except null.

Filtering Spoofed from your customers Enabling urpf Strict on your single homed customers Will prevent spoofed packets from entering your net Will prevent your customers from participating in DDOS Will keep The NET cleaner Will SAVE YOU MONEY!! Less wasted bandwidth Will help your wireless network, Less wasted bandwidth MAKE SURE YOU TEST THIS IN A LAB FIRST MAKE SURE YOU UNDERSTAND IT! You CAN break your network, if not careful.

But I can t drop everything! If I drop all traffic my special customer will be dead. Can t I just write an ACL?? Sure, can you write one fast enough for 3000 random spoofed source addresses?? And can you apply it to 4 core routers fast enough? And what will you do if hacker changes SRC_IP?

Use urpf LOOSE Feature What you can do is use a part of urpf/loose Inject route into your FIB (Forward Info Base) Have the next hop o that route be BLACKHOLE urpf/loose will see NxtHop is Blackhole and DROP. So you inject the Src_IP s of the bad traffic with NxtHop as Blackhole and Poof, traffic FROM (Source) goes away at your edge. You can use tools to real-time create these injects

Use BGP to Inject You can use BGP to inject sources you want to drop Have a Injector Machine Put routes you DO NOT want to receive from (Sources) Tag those routes with two communities NO-EXPORT and Say 65000:666 Your BGP production routers will peer with Injector The have a a bgp-in filter from your injector that sets next hop to BLACKHOLE / NULL, etc Route is updated at Injector, all of your BGP edge drops from that source.

CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION You *MUST* (https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt) Make sure you do NOT redistribute these SOURCE prefixes to other Peers / Transit. DANGER DANGER DANGER Make sure your BGP-OUT filters DROP all prefixes with your 65000:666 community tag.

What can I use as Injector My favorite is exabgp https://github.com/exa-networks/exabgp/wiki Its FREE It WORKS It supports cool things like JSON It has an API You can control it via many methods You can run it on something simple / low cost

Data sources for injectors NetFlow (nfsen, etc) Lorenzo Busatti http://mum.mikrotik.com/presentations/eu16/presentation_3049_1456752471.pdf Bro https://www.bro.org/index.html Suricata https://suricata-ids.org/

THANK YOU Congratulations to all the new Mikrotik Trainers Thank you MikroTik for an awesome product and awesome people! Shout Out to Tom Smyth, my inspiration for presentation! Shout Out to Lorenzo Busatti, inspiration for Tik FlowsJ I can be reached at: mum2016@citylinkfiber.com +1.505.938.6309 PGP FINGERPRINT: 5A6126CF