Smart Grid vs. The NERC CIP

Similar documents
Securing the Smart Grid. Understanding the BIG Picture 11/1/2011. Proprietary Information of Corporate Risk Solutions, Inc. 1.

OpenWay by Itron Security Overview

Cyber security for digital substations. IEC Europe Conference 2017

ДОБРО ПОЖАЛОВАТЬ SIEMENS AG ENERGY MANAGEMENT

LESSONS LEARNED IN SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY

OpenWay Security Overview

Realizing the Smart Grid - A Solutions Provider's Perspective David G. Hart July Elster. All rights reserved.

Designing Secure Remote Access Solutions for Substations

i-pcgrid WORKSHOP 2016 INTERACTIVE REMOTE ACCESS

CIP Cyber Security Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments

A. Introduction. Page 1 of 22

CyberArk Solutions for Secured Remote Interactive Access. Addressing NERC Remote Access Guidance Industry Advisory

CyberArk Solutions for Secured Remote Interactive Access. Addressing NERC Remote Access Guidance Industry Advisory

Interactive Remote Access FERC Remote Access Study Compliance Workshop October 27, Eric Weston Compliance Auditor Cyber Security.

90% 191 Security Best Practices. Blades. 52 Regulatory Requirements. Compliance Report PCI DSS 2.0. related to this regulation

Critical Asset Identification Methodology. William E. McEvoy Northeast Utilities

CIP Cyber Security Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments

THE SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY LAB

CIP Cyber Security Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments

Pillar 4: Be Accountable: Implement your Privacy & Data Protection (PDP) Measures Legal Basis: Sec. 20.a-e, 22 and 24 of the DPA, Sections of

Access Control and CIP 10/20/2011

Cyber Security Update. Bennett L. Gaines Senior Vice President, Corporate Services, CIO, FirstEnergy 2012 Summer Seminar August 5-7, 2012

Cloud Computing Lectures. Cloud Security

Industrial Defender ASM. for Automation Systems Management

Standard Development Timeline

RISK MANAGEMENT IBERDROLA S CASE

Managing SCADA Security. NISTIR 7628 and the NIST/SGIP CSWG. Xanthus. May 25, Frances Cleveland

CIP Cyber Security Systems Security Management

Cyber Security for Renewable Energy Systems

Strategy Consulting Digital Technology Operations. Transmission Distribution SCADA Separation 2017 EMMOS Conference

Security Challenges in Smart Distribution

Standard CIP-006-3c Cyber Security Physical Security

Security in grid control centers: Spectrum Power TM Cyber Security

Who s Protecting Your Keys? August 2018

Cyber Security For Utilities Risks, Trends & Standards. IEEE Toronto March 22, Doug Westlund Senior VP, AESI Inc.

OPUC Workshop March 13, 2015 Cyber Security Electric Utilities. Portland General Electric Co. Travis Anderson Scott Smith

Smart Grid Standards and Certification

Digital Wind Cyber Security from GE Renewable Energy

Potential Mitigation Strategies for the Common Vulnerabilities of Control Systems Identified by the NERC Control Systems Security Working Group

DUKE ENERGY OHIO SMART GRID / GRID MODERNIZATION. Don Schneider GM, Smart Grid Field Deployment May 24, 2012

Kenna Platform Security. A technical overview of the comprehensive security measures Kenna uses to protect your data

Cisco Smart Grid. Powering End-to-End Communications. Annette Winston Sr. Mgr., Product Operations Customer Value Chain Management

CIP Cyber Security Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability AssessmentsManagement

NERC CIP VERSION 6 BACKGROUND COMPLIANCE HIGHLIGHTS

N-Dimension n-platform 340S Unified Threat Management System

Welcome to the webinar! We will start within a few minutes

Standard CIP-006-1a Cyber Security Physical Security

HAN Device Validation Program. March 31, 2015

Standard CIP Cyber Security Systems Security Management

Cyber Security and Substation Equipment Overview

Disclaimer Executive Summary Introduction Overall Application of Attachment Generation Transmission...

The five questions I am being asked by National Policy Makers and Utility CEOs; My Best Answers; And Where the Questions Don't Have Answers

Jim Brenton Regional Security Coordinator ERCOT Electric Reliability Council of Texas

Standard CIP-006-4c Cyber Security Physical Security

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard becomes effective.

PCI DSS and VNC Connect

Submitted on behalf of the DOE National SCADA Test Bed. Jeff Dagle, PE Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (509)

ISO/IEC TR TECHNICAL REPORT

Methods for Reducing Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of Power Substations Using Multi-Vendor Smart Devices in a Smart Grid Environment

Verizon Software Defined Perimeter (SDP).

Cyber Security of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs)

Integrating Distributed Resources into Distribution Planning and Operations R&D Priorities

Loss of Control Center Functionality: EOP-008-1, CIP-008-3, CIP September 30, 2014

IoT & SCADA Cyber Security Services

Standard CIP Cyber Security Critical Cyber Asset Identification

CIP Cyber Security Electronic Security Perimeter(s)

Securing IEDs against Cyber Threats in Critical Substation Automation and Industrial Control Systems

NERC CIP Information Protection

Security

Critical Infrastructure Protection Version 5

SmartGrid. Implications of Cloud Computing. New Technology in the Utility Environment

Standard CIP Cyber Security Critical Cyber Asset Identification

Digital Substation Unrestricted Siemens AG 2017 siemens.com/digital-substation

Distributor Thoughts on Smart Grid

Iberdrola USA: Central Maine Power

Standard CIP 005 2a Cyber Security Electronic Security Perimeter(s)

Iberdrola USA: Central Maine Power

SOC-2 Requirement Solution Brief. EventTracker 8815 Centre Park Drive, Columbia MD SOC-2

NERC-CIP CAN-0024: Securing Critical Cyber Assets with Data Diodes

Security Standards for Electric Market Participants

Inventory and Reporting Security Q&A

Network Planning for Smart Grid

Evaluation of Business Cases for Smart Grid Solutions Kenny Mercado, Senior VP Electric Operations

ISO/IEC Solution Brief ISO/IEC EventTracker 8815 Centre Park Drive, Columbia MD 21045

1. SAR posted for comment on January 15, Standard Drafting Team appointed on January 29, 2014

Firewalls (IDS and IPS) MIS 5214 Week 6

Altius IT Policy Collection Compliance and Standards Matrix

Evolving Standards in Security. Michael Garrison Stuber

Standard CIP Cyber Security Physical Security

Standard CIP 007 3a Cyber Security Systems Security Management

Security Policies and Procedures Principles and Practices

Virtual Machine Encryption Security & Compliance in the Cloud

The Common Controls Framework BY ADOBE

Proven results Unsurpassed interoperability Fast, secure and adaptable network. Only EnergyAxis brings it all together for the Smart Grid

playbook OpShield for NERC CIP 5 sales PlAy

SECURITY ON AWS 8/3/17. AWS Security Standards MORE. By Max Ellsberry

Jim Brenton Regional Security Coordinator ERCOT Electric Reliability Council of Texas

Name of presenter Title. Date

Standard CIP Cyber Security Physical Security

November 29, ECE 421 Session 28. Utility SCADA and Automation. Presented by: Chris Dyer

Transcription:

Smart Grid vs. The NERC CIP Tobias Whitney, MBA GE Smart Grid Center of Excellence 1

First The Bottom Line Security & Privacy are paramount Smart Grid concerns of regulators and the public Currently every ARRA approved Smart Grid project requires security, but what are utilities actually doing? The NERC CIP standard does apply to Smart Grid Deployments Smart Grid concepts and technologies have advanced faster than standards and security practices

Market Snap Shot Smart Grid Security IP based interoperable systems will create security challenges for disparate and proprietary vendors products 3 rd party vendors will play a significant role in providing network services. Security ownership is unclear. New standards and regulations will require that many Smart Grid components will address security. Every Smart Grid program will have dollars ear-marked for Security. Security and compliance mandates are unclear.

Do NERC CIP Standards Apply? And we will discuss other standards to be considered.

Cyber Security Risks Smart Grid Systems Level Risks: DA/SA Risks manages Self-healing, microgrid and operational components Meter Risks manages Smart Meter based functions such as reads, AMI network and Head-end functionality Premise Risks manages the interface between the home/business and the utility such as HANs, IHDs and PCTs Operations Risks manages interfaces between traditional SCADA control center apps and other environments Vendor Risks 3 rd party connections managed securely to interface with Utlity based applications (e.g. AMI Head-end and SAS offerings) Back Office Risks manages interfaces with systems such as financial ERPs, MDMS, GIS to Smart Grid related environments

Architecture 1 Meter & Premise Risks Smart Meters have the ability to access and control downstream resources such as IHDs and PCTs within home area network (HAN) environments. The hand shake between the exchange between the Smart Meter and the HAN is critical for the integrity of the AMI network, but also presents a threat to the utility because of the connectivity between HAN systems and the utility s AMI Network. Recommendations: Publish a policy that states that the Home Area Network is the sole responsibility of the end user Alarm tampers for physical access to Smart Meters Utilize industry standard public key infrastructure to authenticate meter control signals and data such as 256 Bit Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Relevant Standards: NERC CIP Standards (for AMI Headend) NISTIR 7628 AMI-SEC Smart Grid Security Guidelines

Architecture 2 DA/SA and Operations Risks Each end-point device on the Automation Network represents a point of access to the Utility network. Two-way communication presents the risk of escalation and customer data compromise and isolated system outages. Recommendations: Encryption of all end-point device communication on Automation network. Consider the following technologies to secure the storage and transmission of meter data: 128 bit AES Encryption 256 EC Encryption Digital Signatures The physical location of gatekeeper or collector devices should be within a physically secured perimeter within a utility control location such as a substation. All devices should possess physical tamper detection and alarm when local access is obtained or when the device has been taken off-line. Each device should possess intrusion detection/protection security system to identify if malicious activity is taking place within the local area of the device. Gateway devices should be able to perform traffic filtering to limit non-essential communication. Relevant Standards: NERC CIP 002-009 NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53, NIST SP 800-82 NISTIR 7628 AMI-SEC Smart Grid Security Guidelines

Architecture 3 Vendor and Back Office Risks EMS/DMS applications perform large scale control and monitoring functions for Distribution system assets. AMI and Distribution Automation data will integrate with NERC CIP related systems and facilities. Recommendations: Security management consoles should be utilized at head-end equipment to manage the security of meters, collector/gateways and HAN devices. The console should provide a full suite of services to manage: Authentication/Authorization Meter and HAN Registration Intrusion Detection Data Network encryption Data encryption Digital Certificates Network traffic filtering User Administration Auditing and Security Reporting Key Management Firewall and intrusion detection systems should be implemented to manage and monitor AMI network interface. All head-end (AMI network interface) equipment will be deemed critical and will be managed to comply with the NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Standards. Relevant Standards: NERC CIP 002-009 NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53, NIST SP 800-82 NISTIR 7628 AMI-SEC Smart Grid Security Guidelines SAR-BOX Privacy & Red Flag

Do NERC CIP Standards Apply?

Yes The NERC Standards Apply Ask the following questions to your Smart Grid Team: 1. Do you have more than 300MW load managed by Smart Meters and AMI. 2. Do you operate a Meter Head-End System? Is the vendor compliant to your standards? 3. Do you perform Direct Load Control? Remote Disconnect? 4. Can multiple DA substations communicate to each other without network filtering? 5. Have we determined each Smart Grid interface to our electronic security perimeter?

Questions?