A Root DNS Server. Akira Kato. Brief Overview of M-Root. WIDE Project

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A Root DNS Server Akira Kato WIDE Project kato@wide.ad.jp Brief Overview of M-Root Assumes basic knowledge on DNS Dr. Tatsuya Jinmei has introduced in Nov 19, 2004

What s Root Servers? Start point of the DNS name resolution process Root servers serves the top node of name tree "." All DNS servers offering caching service Need to know all Root Servers Names of each server IP address of each server Otherwise bootstrap problem happens No DNS names are resolvable! Root servers only provide information of Root servers TLD servers in-addr.arpa servers When queries are sent to a Root Server? At bootstrap (priming in bind terminology) DNS (bind) queries up-to-date list of Root Servers Equivalent to the following command % dig @[a-m].root-servers.net. ns Their IP addresses are described in "root.cache" file It might be obsoluted Old Root still responds correctly or no response Select the destination at random When got a query with an uncached TLD TLDs of Valid queries are likely in the cache Invalid TLD are likely subjects for Root query Queries with Typo in the TLD portion.local/.domain/...

Brief History 1987 7 servers with 10 IP addresses, all in U.S. 1990 8 servers with 11 IP addresses, one in SE 1995 9 servers with 9 IP addresses Renamed to [A-I].root-servers.net to allow maximum compression 1997 Jan J/K introduced at NSI (InterNIC) 1997 May L/M introduced at ISI (IANA) K moved to London operated by RIPE/NCC 1997 Aug M moved to Tokyo operated by WIDE Number of Root Servers DNS transport depends on UDP UDP doesn t need circuit setup Prompt response Message size is limited to 512bytes UDP/IP headers are extra Priming response must fit into 512byte SZ = 33 + 15*NS + 16*A With 13 NS, 13 A, response size is 436bytes 15 is the absolute maximum number 76bytes remaining with 13 Roots This is a valuable space for AAAA records SZ = 33 + 15*NS + 16*A + 28*AAAA

To serve better Number of Root servers is limited Too small to install in every country The powerful tool is anycasting Install the server in multiple locations Sharing the same service IP address Provide the same service in all servers Advertise the prefix via BGP Let routing system to choose the destination It is likely to choose the nearest server Anycasting RFC3258 All of the instances are managed by single entity Point of contact is identical among all instances Currently RFC3258 style anycasting is deployed at C/F/I/J/K/M 84 instances from A-M are working now See http://www.root-servers.org/ For M-Root, see http://m.root-servers.org/

Which instance serves you?... To identify, execute the following unix command % dig @m.root-servers.net hostname.bind chaos txt ;; ANSWER SECTION: HOSTNAME.BIND. 0 CH TXT "M-d1" The string "M-d1" indentifies the server instance if not clearly states where it is located Server Selection Which server to use if multiple candidates exist? TinyDNS in DJBDNS chooses one at random BIND chooses one with smallest RTT RTT is decreased slightly for other candidates Eventually be tried to know up-to-date RTT Prefers the nearest server Note that all servers are used, anyway But the frequency may vary very much

Benefit of Anycasting In many cases, it provides smaller RTT Not always a case, unfortunately But BIND prefers other letters in such a case Enhance the total server capacity Multiple servers are working in parallel Limit the holizon of DDoS attack Only a fraction of the instances get affected Nearest ones of DDoS sources Other instances work as usual Issue of Anycasting Anycasting may breaks in TCP A TCP session involes multiple packets Some packets may delivered to other instances Yielding the TCP session breaks When the routing topology changes This rarely happens in short-live TCP sessions When ISP performs per-packet load-balancing TCP performance get suffered due to re-oder This is highly discouranged in general

Future enhancements IPv6 transport support July 2004 root zone includes AAAA glues for TLD servers No AAAA for Root server is defined B/F/H/K/M is ready to respond in IPv6 But they are totally useless No AAAA is defined in root-servers.net zone The way to include more than 2 AAAA is undefined Need to evaluate the method carefully DNSSEC It is highly required for additional security in DNS Packet size is also an issue BIND9.3 supports DNSSEC based on latest spec Need to evaluate its performance as well