Vulnerability Disclosure

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Transcription:

Vulnerability Disclosure Rita Wells National SCADA Test Bed DoE-OE September 09, 2008

Department of Energy-Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability: National SCADA Test Bed Program Mission Support industry and government efforts to enhance control systems cyber security in the energy infrastructure Key INL activities are cyber Vulnerability Assessments (testing) and Industry Outreach (including training) Over 22 assessments in lab and on site ranging from 275 to 800 hours of cyber security researchers in addition to control systems and network engineer hours per each assessment Common vulnerabilities analyzed

National SCADA Test Bed DOE multi-laboratory program designed to: Support industry and government efforts to enhance control systems cyber security across the energy infrastructure PNL INL SNL ANL NIST Key Program Areas Assess and mitigate energy control systems vulnerabilities Develop advanced secure control systems technologies Support development of standards and best practices Conduct outreach and awareness

Vulnerability Disclosure Government Sponsored Time to public disclosure for CERT/Coordinating Center (CERT/CC) is normally 45 days More serious vulnerabilities are coordinated with US-CERT for disclosure[1] Trending of Vulnerabilities [1] CERT/CC Vulnerability Disclosure Policy, http://www.cert.org/kb/vul_disclosure.html From the FAQ: Our work is funded primarily by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security, along with a number of other federal civil agencies.

Vulnerability Disclosure Government Sponsored - continuted The US-CERT time to disclose varies for control systems based vulnerabilities US-CERT provides a more timely alert to control system vulnerabilities to users that register for through the secure portal While other more IT centric vulnerabilities are publish the same day as public disclosure The CitectSCADA buffer overflow (VU#476345) vulnerability it was one month from public disclosure to US- CERT published notes http://www.kb.cert.org/cert_web/services/vulnotes.nsf/id/476345

Vulnerability Discovery - Who Security Firms Core Security discovered two Citect vulnerabilities and one Wonderware vulnerability this year http://www.coresecurity.com/index.php5?module=contentmod&action=item&id=2312 Hackers OPC vulnerability at BlackHat 2007 http://www.eweek.com/c/a/security/hole-found-in-protocol-handling-vital-national- Infrastructure/ Protected Entities DHS-NCSD-CSSP Control System Security Program and DOE-OE National SCADA Test Bed and others Vendor Rarely disclosed prior to release notes End User Disclosed to Vendor

Stakeholders Perspectives Discoverer wants disclosure or not Vendor varies on culture normally all share with customers after fix Government Want to promote better secure systems while protecting infrastructure owned by private entities End User want to know prior to mitigations developed to apply defense in depth or other temporary protections

Responsible Disclosure Context and vulnerability issue are coupled

Responsible Disclosure Vulnerability Issue gets more attention and strays from context

Vulnerability Characterization Attack Surface Example Impact (Medium) will cause a denial of service (crash) if successfully exploited Exposure (High) can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker having network access only Deployment (Medium) exists in a configuration that is present in some U.S. critical infrastructure control system applications Simplicity (Moderately High) has its exploit code publicly available for use with automated exploit tools Impact EXAMPLE (CVE-2006-3942) Simplicity Exposure Deployment

Concluding Recommendations Use discloser process that includes context and characterization of the vulnerability Asset owners need to do their own characterization of vulnerabilities specific to architectures Mine the large knowledge base of vulnerabilities for control systems Create more independent and open testing facilities Require government co-sponsored testing to open up information after aged Analyzed aged information for trending back to asset owners

Resources Available

Contact Information Dave Kuipers National SCADA Test Bed INL Program Manager 208-526-4038 david.kuipers@inl.gov Rita Wells 208-526-3179 rita.wells@inl.gov