Peering into Botnets via Fast Flux Enumeration: The ATLAS Experience. Jose Nazario, Ph.D. FIRST 2008 NSM-SIG Vancouver

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Transcription:

Peering into Botnets via Fast Flux Enumeration: The ATLAS Experience Jose Nazario, Ph.D. FIRST 2008 NSM-SIG Vancouver

Project o ATLAS - global Internet monitoring o Fast flux - used to discover bots/infected hosts Active probing o Added to ATLAS Q1 2008 Page 2

Operational Uses o Tracking botnets o Storm, Rock phishing, etc Page 3

Observations o Storm - sometimes used o Rock phish - used heavily o Other spam, phishing - used often o Malcode distribution - Spring 08 SQL injection Page 4

Botnet Visibility o Botnets need good server management when using fast flux o Let them do the host qualifications o Only globally unique IP addresses o Other factors - uptime, speed - vary Page 5

Botnet Visibility via DNS Mining ~10%? Page 6

24 Hours of Fast Flux Bots Page 7

Calling it Fast Flux o Heuristics o Based on discussions with R. Danford, T. Holz o Using Danford s heuristics as base Page 8

Qualifying Fast Flux Domain Names o Domain name - A record query o Short TTL - under 900 sec o TTL < 2 treated specially, aggressively o More than 5 IPs o IP list has average distance > /16 More than 8 IPs? Score is +2 o IP list has more than 2 ASNs represented o Page 9

Qualifying Fast Flux Domain Names ;; ANSWER SECTION: clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 96.28.27.85 clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 71.204.120.243 clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 88.168.128.191 clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 75.181.90.242 clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 72.226.191.199 clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 76.18.84.109 clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 67.185.50.195 clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 74.65.213.40 clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 71.56.67.60 clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 66.90.158.152 clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 76.31.155.100 clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 24.164.58.120 clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 71.201.126.62 clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 84.25.70.94 TTL < 900sec - TTL < 2sec treated special Page 10 More than 5 IPs in RRset Avg. Distance > /16 -More than 8 IPs? +2 More than 2 ASNs

Qualifying Fast Flux Domain Names (cont) o Domain name NS query o NS results average distance > /16 o More than 3 NS entries o SOA query o Minimum retry < 15min Page 11

Qualifying Fast Flux Domains (cont) ;; ANSWER SECTION: clickbnr.com. 600 IN NS ns6.clickbnr.com. clickbnr.com. 600 IN NS ns8.clickbnr.com. clickbnr.com. 600 IN NS ns4.clickbnr.com. clickbnr.com. 600 IN NS ns2.clickbnr.com. clickbnr.com. 600 IN NS ns10.clickbnr.com. clickbnr.com. 600 IN NS ns9.clickbnr.com. clickbnr.com. 600 IN NS ns11.clickbnr.com. clickbnr.com. 600 IN NS ns7.clickbnr.com. clickbnr.com. 600 IN NS ns5.clickbnr.com. clickbnr.com. 600 IN NS ns1.clickbnr.com. clickbnr.com. 600 IN NS ns3.clickbnr.com. ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: ns5.clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 75.129.134.139 ns6.clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 68.202.106.222 ns7.clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 75.137.93.12 ns8.clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 83.5.235.157 ns9.clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 71.59.102.113 ns10.clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 79.184.34.183 ns11.clickbnr.com. 600 IN A 89.228.212.197 More than 3 NS entries Avg. Distance > /16 Page 12

Qualifying Fast Flux Domain Names (cont) o Each attribute is 1 pt o If more than 4 points - fluxy o Exclude whitelist behaviors o Confirm with SURBL If not, just suspect Page 13

Benign Fast Flux Symptoms ;; ANSWER SECTION: database.clamav.net. 60 IN CNAME db.local.clamav.net. db.local.clamav.net. 7200 IN CNAME db.us.rr.clamav.net. db.us.rr.clamav.net. 900 IN A 64.246.134.219 db.us.rr.clamav.net. 900 IN A 155.98.64.86 db.us.rr.clamav.net. 900 IN A 199.239.233.95 db.us.rr.clamav.net. 900 IN A 209.170.150.7 ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: rr.clamav.net. 7200 IN NS ns3.clamav.net. rr.clamav.net. 7200 IN NS ns7.clamav.net. rr.clamav.net. 7200 IN NS ns5.clamav.net. rr.clamav.net. 7200 IN NS ns2.clamav.net. rr.clamav.net. 7200 IN NS ns6.clamav.net. rr.clamav.net. 7200 IN NS ns1.clamav.net. rr.clamav.net. 7200 IN NS ns4.clamav.net. ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: ns2.clamav.net. 101522 IN A 63.166.28.2 ns4.clamav.net. 94322 IN A 209.9.232.3 ns5.clamav.net. 108723 IN A 213.92.8.2 ns5.clamav.net. 70221 IN AAAA 2001:1418:13:1::1 ns6.clamav.net. 94322 IN A 208.201.249.238 ns7.clamav.net. 101522 IN A 209.204.159.15 ns1.clamav.net. 69122 IN A 69.61.68.204 Page 14

Code and Components o Python o High speed DNS query engine Libevent - evdns GNU adns o ATLAS data stores Time series data Geo-lookups of IPs Query front end Page 15

ATLAS Querying o Every TTL+1, run queries o Store results o Dead detection After 1 day of failure to grow, prune from list 0 IPs (eg pulled domain) or a parked domain name Page 16

Discovering Domains o Implemented qualifying domain name screening tool o Data sources Spam feed DNS names from malcode analysis Malware, spam domains lists o Added manually Page 17

Assessing Domain Discovery Methods o Looked at interval between domain name registration date and first seen actively fluxing o Average interval: 28.8 days o Minimum 0.4 days o Maximum 263.6 days o Possible reasons ATLAS visibility (e.g. weak spam feed) Sleeper domains Page 18

Global Fast Flux Trends o Domains in use by one botnet o Simple set-based approach to peek Net1 Net2 Net1 Net2 Near 0: no common members Near 1: same botnet Page 19

Active Fast Flux Botnets o 428 active domains analyzed May 30, 2008-24 hour snapshot o Results 26 active and distinct clusters Indicates 26 active botnets using fast flux techniques Some failures to cluster Page 20

Botnet Purposes o Based on post-facto analysis of 26 clusters 1 Casino 1 Enlargement 4 Malware 10 Pharmacy 13 Phishing Data assistance from CastleCops, PhishTank Some are used for multiple purposes Page 21

Multiple infections? Partial overlaps? Partial advertisements? Based on 24h snapshot, June 2 2008 Page 22

6 Months of Data o Starting with our ATLAS fast flux tracking o Data: Jan 18 - June 4, 2008 o 912 domains monitored Page 23

Increasingly Global Registrar Problem o gtlds used by fast flux domains Broader distribution than found in Holz et al, 2007 Page 24

Lifetimes o Average: 18.5 days o Longest 60 days+ (ibank-halifax.com) 59 days+ (armsummer.com) 57 days+ (croptriangle.com) Based on dates of first to last tracking Page 25

Sizes o Average size: 2683 IPs (cumulative) o Largest nets: ibank-halifax.com, 100,379 IPs armsummer.com, 14,233 IPs boardhour.com, 11,900 IPs Page 26

Mitigation o Local DNS blocklist methods o Global Kill domain with registrar Kill mothership o Getting tougher with new features from registrars o ICANN SSAC Page 27

Fast Flux Data Availability o ATLAS public portal o Free accounts o Recently added domain list o Actively tracks 400-600 fast flux domains a day Page 28

Missing Data o Registrar data Would be valuable Key for cleanup, remediation o Malcode/family o Content/purpose Inferred post-facto o NS records Double flux Common NS, hosting nets Page 29

Acknowledgements o ATLAS, ASERT teams at Arbor o Robert o Thorsten o Jeff and William (SURBL) o Carol and everyone at FIRST Page 30