Tracking Anonymous Peer-to-Peer Calls on the Internet

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Transcription:

1 Tracking Anonymous Peer-to-Peer Calls on the Internet Xinyuan Wang, Shiping Chen and Sushil Jajodia CCS 2005 Presenter: Patrick Traynor

2 Extra Credit Watch the following video and count the number of times the people in white shirts pass the ball. First person to get it right gets +5 points on their Introduction assignment. If you get it wrong, you lose 10 points! Pay attention! http://viscog.beckman.uiuc.edu/grafs/demos/15.html

3 Covert Channels Information can be exchanged between parties in overt and covert manners. As we ve seen, truly interesting information can be exchanged without you noticing it. Covert communications in computing systems typically exist as of storage or timing channels. How can we use covert channels against encrypted data?

4 VoIP and Security Voice over IP (VoIP) software allows individuals to have conversations over the Internet. All call content is protected (by default) using AES-256. Anonymizing networks can hide the parties involved. How does these guarantees differ from traditional telephony? What are we trading off here?

5 The Gist It is possible to remove the protection provided by anonymizing networks by creating a covert channel in inter-packet delay (IPD). Increase your delay to encode a 1, decrease it for a 0. Before the packets arrive at the suspected destination, see if the embedded watermark is still present. Why is this difficult?

6 Boiling it Down Natural jitter in the network changes the timing of packets. lim Pr[ n(xn µ) n σ x] = Φ(x) where Φ(x) = x 1 2π e u2 2 du. The theorem indicates that whenever a random sampl r(yr,d E(Y k,d )) Pr[ Var(Yr,d ) ryr,d < x] = Pr[ σ Y,d < x] Φ(x) ryr,d Pr[Y r,d < a] = Pr[ σ Y,d < a r ] Φ( a r ) σ Y,d σ Y,d Pr[Y r,d < a] Φ( a r σ 2Y,d + σ2d + 2Cor(Y k,d, X k )σ Y,d σ d ) Simply, just take a lot of samples. The Central Limit Theorem says that given enough samples, the correct IPDs will become obvious. a r Φ( ) (7) σ Y,d + σ d

7 Results A 24-bit random value was encoded in IPD. Voice samples occurred every 30ms. After approximately 1200 packets (90 seconds), an observer can perfectly verify about 59% of all calls. Allowing error bits increases this value towards 100% fairly quickly. How well would 6 out of 24 error bits stand up in a courtroom?

8 Limitations 90 seconds is a long time, given that the phone companies assume the average call lasts 2 minutes. How many calls would be untraceable given standard behavior? What time of day were the experiments conducted? If I wanted to hide the fact that I made a call, I d do it at high-traffic times. How does this effect jitter? Sampling (r)? What about sending other traffic through the same first hop? Chaffing the channel.

9 Improvements? This is a nice use of timing channels, but is there an easier way to get the same result? Why not just replicate a packet? If you have this kind of control, you could filter out duplicates on the other end. The client may even do it for you. Can we do better if we shift the mean? It may be hard to get packets out faster than they would normally flow.

10 Comments The idea here is good and fairly simple. Be careful of math in papers! There s nothing here you don t already understand. Understand how to take a simple idea and make it into a research agenda. DaTA - Data-Transparent Authentication Without Communication Overhead (SecureComm 06) Tracing Traffic through Intermediate Hosts that Repacketize Flows (INFOCOM 07) Network Flow Watermarking Attack on Low-Latency Anonymous Communication Systems (OAKLAND 07)

11 Questions Patrick Traynor traynor@cse.psu.edu http://www.cse.psu.edu/~traynor