Diet-ESP: A flexible and compressed format for IPsec/ESP

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Transcription:

unrestricted Diet-ESP: A flexible and compressed format for IPsec/ESP draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt D. Migault, T. Guggemos 25/02/2014- IETF89- London

Table of Contents Securing IoT communications IPsec / ESP Diet-ESP Use Cases Diet-ESP vs. ESP Conclusion mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 1 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

Securing IoT communications IPsec is not widely used to secure Applications: No API to setup IPsec (Kernel specific) Applications don t want to trust the OS Security overhead as computed on each IP packet (D)TLS is widely used to secure Applications: Common used APIs Application just embed the library Security overhead is computed on application payload mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 2 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

Securing IoT communications The IoT context: Sending data is very expensive (10-100 times higher than computation) Highly specialized device (OS + application) Developer specifies (or knows) the system Small Data usually fits in on IP frame IPsec can be used like a tiny Firewall, providing a secure environment for all applications Overhead for X byte data with UDP (Security-Header + 8 bytes UDP header) Packet Overhead IPsec/ESP DTLS Diet-ESP 6LoWPAN DTLS 10 + 8 bytes 13 + 8 bytes 6LoWPAN DTLS+UDP 0 + 0 bytes 8 + 8 bytes 8 + 3 bytes mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 3 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

IPsec / ESP 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Security Parameters Index (SPI) ^Int. +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Cov- Sequence Number ered +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Payload Data* (variable) ^ ~ ~ Conf. + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Cov- Padding (0-255 bytes) ered* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Pad Length Next Header v v +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Integrity Check Value-ICV (variable) ~ ~ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 4 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

IPsec / ESP 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Security Parameters Index (SPI) ^Int. +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Cov- Sequence Number ered +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Payload Data* (variable) ^ ~ ~ Conf. + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Cov- Padding (0-255 bytes) ered* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Pad Length Next Header v v +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Integrity Check Value-ICV (variable) ~ ~ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The Diet-ESP context for compression definition: 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + SPI SIZE SN SIZE NH P ALIGN TH IH ICV X + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 5 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

Diet-ESP context The Diet-ESP context for compression definition: 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + SPI SIZE SN SIZE NH P ALIGN TH IH ICV X + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + SPI SIZE: Size of the SPI in the Diet-ESP-Header. SN SIZE: Size of the SN in the Diet-ESP-Header. NH: Next Header in the Diet-ESP-Trailer. P: Padding Length and Padding in the Diet-ESP-Trailer. ALIGN: necessary packet alignment (1, 2, 4 byte). TH: Transport Header in the Diet-ESP-payload. IH: IP Header in the Diet-ESP-payload (for TUNNEL). ICV: Size of the Diet-ESP-ICV. mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 6 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

Sending X byte of data every Y time. 1 application (fixed ports, specified in Traffic Selector) no Next Header / no UDP-Header 8 bit alignment or aligned application data no Padding / no Pad Length 1 IP connection no SPI 1 packet per minute, no replay risk no SN mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 7 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

Receiving X byte of data 1 application (fixed ports, specified in Traffic Selector) no Next Header / no UDP-Header 8 bit alignment or aligned application data no Padding / no Pad Length multiple Senders with different IPs no SPI some packets per day, replay risk 1-2 byte SN mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 8 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

Diet-ESP vs. ESP Impact on ESP ESP-header (compressed / removed fields) Encrypted ESP-payload (removed fields) ESP-ICV (compressed field) Impact on IPsec (eventually): SAD Lookup (variable SPI, no SPI) How can we make this an ESP extension? Diet-ESP Context is negotiated during IKE_AUTH exchange Modifications applies to the negotiated SA. mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 9 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

Negotiation with IKEv2 Initiator Responder 1) HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni > < HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr 2) HDR, SK { IDi, [CERT,] AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr, N(DIET_ESP_SUPPORTED [CTX_1, CTX_2, CTX_3, ANY])} > < HDR, SK { IDr, [CERT,] AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr, N(DIET_ESP_SUPPORTED [CTX_2])} mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 10 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

Security Considerations Reducing/Removing the SPI Regular SAD-Lookup Limiting number of possible connection on the gateway. Modified the SAD-Lookup higher effort to identify SA DoS-vulnerability Reducing/Removing the SN Prevents/Downgrade anti-replay-protection Can we use ESN mechanism without sending the all lower 32 bit on the wire? Reducing the ICV Reducing level of Security, provided by the MAC algorithm. mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 11 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

Accomplished Work / Next Steps Accomplished Work: Development Demonstration in Python (ca. 400 lines of code) Rudimentarily Contiki implementation based on the ESP implementation of Vilhelm Jutvik less than 100 lines of code patches Start performance measurements Next Step: Deployment on Excelyo Alternate Algorithm (Encryption / Authentication) IV reduction mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 12 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

Thank you for your attention Looking for a PhD tobias.guggemos@gmail.com mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 13 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

SAD Lookup The SPI size is unknown for incoming packets. >The lookup for incoming ESP packets, has to be changed: Naive implementation: one lookup for each supported SPI_SIZE (in general 5) perform 5 lookups based on IP_D, IP_S, SPI if more than one SA fits: authenticate with all found keys use the SA with the fitting key > DoS vulnerability mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 14 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

SAD Lookup Solution: Forbid overlapping SPIs for one IP_D IP_S combiniation Impossible for Mobile IP 2 possibilities: code the SPI size in the SPI field (1-4 byte) has to be included to the SA negotiation impossible for 0 SPI reduces SPI range IP address based lookup mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 15 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

IP address based lookup + + START + + V + + find 1st SA to IP address + + + V V yes / \ + + + / SPI_SIZE \ / > \ = 0? / / SAD \ / / + + no / V / + + / find 1st SA to / SPI +IP address + + V + + Diet-ESP packet + > procession + + mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 16 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

Compression Possible compression: ESP-header: 8 byte > 0 byte ESP-trailer: 2 (+ PADDING) byte > 0 byte ESP-payload: Transport Mode UDP: 8 byte > 0 byte Tunnel Mode IPv4: 20 byte > 0 byte Tunnel Mode IPv6: 40 byte > 0 byte Tunnel Mode 6LoWPAN: 2-42 byte > 1 byte mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 17 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014

Compression How is that possible? Most informations are already stored in the Traffic Selectors: IPsec mode IP addresses Transport protocol Transport protocol ports (cannot be a range) only the mapping is difficult: reduced interoperability > but in general, sensors have exactly ONE function Application Developer knows the intended use > he can specify the possible compression mglt.ietf@gmail.com, tobias.guggemos@gmail.com 18 draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-01.txt- IETF89, 25/02/2014