An Eye on the Storm: Inside the Storm Epidemic. Josh Ballard Network Security Analyst Kansas State University

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Transcription:

An Eye on the Storm: Inside the Storm Epidemic Josh Ballard Network Security Analyst Kansas State University bal@k-state.edu

Contents The Headlines Peer-to-peer network So just how big is this thing? How It Works: Update Process (deprecated) Control Architecture

The Headlines Bots Launching Storm Attacks Increase Dramatically Totaling 1.7 Million in June/July -- SecureWorks, 8/2/2007 The Storm botnet is enormous. Reasonable guesses would put it at around 5 or 10 million machines, but nobody can be exactly sure. -- MessageLabs 7/13/2007

The Headlines (cont.) those spikes are usually five to 10 times what we normally see, he said, noting he suspects the botnet could be as large as 50 million computers. --MessageLabs 9/6/2007 Storm Worm Botnet More Powerful Than Top Supercomputers -- InformationWeek via Prof. Peter Gutmann, Univ of Auckland

The Headlines (cont.) It's probably the largest collection of infected machines we've ever seen. -- Mikko Hypponen, F-Secure, Time Magazine

Where I m Coming From I m a protocol analyst (aka packet nerd) Protocol identification developer (http://hippie.oofle.com/) 7 years of research into protocol identification, with a heavy focus on peerto-peer

My Data Source In the first 2 weeks of distribution of the Storm worm, I started analyzing packets for this peer-to-peer botnet I realized I knew the protocol, and had the silly idea that maybe I could map the network, so I did.

Storm Peer-to-Peer Storm piggybacks an existing peer-to-peer network operating on the Overnet protocol This protocol and network are long dead, but there are a select few clients actually still running the network This creates an interesting challenge of setting apart the bot from the non-bot.

Exchange Mechanism Client starts with a preset list of seed peers. Client sends a Overnet connect packet to those hosts. Server responds with an acknowledgement of peering, and a list of peers the client might be interested in, based on its hash.

Exchange Mechanism (cont.) Client sends an Overnet search packet for its own hash out to the network, again soliciting more peers. Server responds with a list of peers who might be able to provide the answer to the search. Process is repeated until a maximum number of peering relationships are established

So How Big Is It? 11.5 million unique IP addresses since mid- April 6,000 average non-storm hosts online 240,000 peak users in 24 hours 90,000 average 24 hour usage today Smaller than the initial network after 1 month

May 2007

June 2007

July 2007

August 2007

September 2007

How It Works: Deprecated Update Process Once a client has reached a minimum peering point, it begins to search for updates. It chooses a number between 0-31, and generates a hash based on the date and that number, and begins searching for that hash. Controlling nodes on the network own those hashes for each day, and respond with update information. HTTP downloads ensue from encrypted URL returned.

How It Works: Control Architecture Storm now uses a tiered architecture for the control mechanism. Ultimately, there are two stages which interact on the botnet, and a third which does not.

Storm Control Stage 1 Stage 1 hosts are those which find themselves either behind a firewall (incoming connections blocked), or with RFC1918 addresses. This is the attacker stage, those hosts which carry out outbound attacks. These hosts are used as spam runners and DoS bots. Communicate up the chain to Stage 2 hosts via TCP communications.

Storm Control Stage 2 Storm Stage 2 nodes are those accessible from the outside world, but still not upper level control nodes. This is the relay or messenger stage of Storm. Stage 2 nodes will serve multiple purposes, from DNS for fast-flux domains, hosting for fast-flux, hosting for malware distribution, socks proxies, and TCP services for Stage 1 control. Stage 2 nodes are set to communicate to a Stage 3 control node, which is not represented on the p2p net.

Storm Control Stage 3 Likely non-compromised hosts rented/owned by the authors. Receives proxied web requests from Stage 2 nodes. Issues commands to Stage 2 nodes for them and their Stage 1 members.

Conclusions Ultimately, this malware is brilliantly designed. There have been many, many infected Storm hosts, but response has been good, and the network is not as advertised. This is not the end of the world as forecasted.

Questions? Attributions and Thanks: John Kristoff, NeuStar Ultra Services - Perl debugging and guidance Dave Monnier, REN-ISAC - Notifications and much more Wes Young, University of Buffalo - General Perl nerdery and help Many folks who wished to remain nameless for contributions of notification help, testing, packet captures, and many other things