On the Effectiveness of Distributed Worm Monitoring

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On the Effectiveness of Distributed Worm Monitoring Moheeb Abu Rajab Fabian Monrose Andreas Terzis Computer Science Department Johns Hopkins University 1

Monitoring Internet Threats Threat monitoring techniques: Intrusion detection systems monitoring active networks Monitoring routable unused IP space [ Moore et al, 2002 ] Monitoring unused address space is attractive No legitimate traffic Forensic analysis and early warning CAIDA deployed the first /8 telescope 2

Single Monitor Case DoS Attack /8 Worm Scans DoS Attack DoS Backscatter Worm Scans 3

Size Matters! Size of the monitor is an important factor in providing an accurate view of a worm breakout [Moore et al, 2002] But there are several other factors yet to be explored 4

Single monitor view is too limited DoS Attack /8 Worm Scans Non-uniform scanner 5

Goals Provide a model to evaluate the performance of distributed monitoring systems in terms of: Number of monitors? Sizes of monitors and the overall IP space requirements? Provide guidelines for better design and monitor deployment practices. 6

Outline Problem and Motivation A Worm Propagation Model Population Distribution Extended worm model Distributed Worm Monitoring Distributed Telescope Model Design parameters Summary 7

Why another worm model? Previous worm models assumed that the vulnerable population is uniformly distributed over the whole IP space. Sources of non-uniformity in population distribution Un-allocated address space Highly-clustered allocated space Usage of the allocated space 8

Population distribution DShield dataset CAIDA s dataset (Witty Worm) The distribution of Vulnerable population over the IP space is far from uniform Best fits a Log-normal distribution 9

Extended Worm Propagation Model Worm propagation models must incorporate population density distribution. Especially Non-uniform scanning worms: Probability of scanning a host depends on its location relative to the infected scanner 10

Non-uniform worm propagation model Expected number of scans per /16 subnet 16 j j (/8) 2 k i = p16 sbi + p8 sbi + 24 2 p 0 sn i 2 2 16 32 2 32-2 8 2 8-2 16 2 16 n i b i (/8) b i v i P 16 P 8 P 0 11

Non-uniform worm propagation model The expected number of infected hosts per /16 subnet (AAWP Model [Chen et al,2003]) = + ( b 1 1 1 2 j j j bi + 1 bi vi i 16 The expected total infection ) Vulnerable non- infected hosts j k i 16 2 = + 1 j= 1 n i b i j 12

Impact of population distribution Number of Infected hosts vs time, for a Nimda-like worm s= 100 scans/time tick, P 16 = 0.5, P 8 =0.25, P 0 = 0.25 N= 10 6 hosts uniformly distributed Over the IP space N= 620,000 hosts extracted from DShield data set 13

Outline Problem and Motivation Better Worm Model Population Distribution Extended worm model Distributed Worm Monitoring Distributed monitoring system model Design parameters Summary 14

Using the Model--- Distributed Monitoring: What do we want to evaluate? System detection time: the time it takes the monitoring system to detect (with particular confidence) a new scanner. 15

Assumptions Single scan detection Information sharing and aggregation infrastructure among all monitors. 16

Monitors Logical Hierarchy /0 /8 M P 0 S (/0) = M + M A + M B + M C /8 M A M A P 8 M B M C S (/8) = M B + M C /16 P 16 M B M C S (/16) = M C 17

Evaluation Nimda-like scanner Three Monitor deployment scenarios: Random monitor deployment Full knowledge of population distribution Partial population knowledge 18

Evaluation (Random monitor placement) /8 940 time ticks Random Monitor placement P r = 0.999, s= 10 scans/time tick Nimda-like scanning 512 /17 230 time ticks with only 40 hosts per /16, 7100 more scans will cause infecting 2 victims before being detected 19

Evaluation ( Full vulnerable distribution knowledge) /8 940 time ticks 512 /17 9 time ticks Monitors deployed in top populated prefixes 20

Evaluation (Partial Knowledge ) /8 940 time ticks 512 /17 33 time ticks Monitors deployed randomly over the 5000 most populated /16 prefixes (contain 90% of the vulnerable population) Example: 512 monitors with 2048 IP addresses/monitor 160 time ticks 21

Practical Considerations Monitors will be deployed at different administrative domains. How many domains are needed to deploy these 512 monitors? Mapping the monitors to AS space, only 130 AS s among the top address space owners are required to achieve detection time of 160 time ticks 22

Summary Population distribution has a profound impact on worm propagation speed. Distributed Monitoring provides an improved detection time (three times faster than a single monitor of equivalent size). Even partial knowledge of the population distribution can improve detection time by roughly 30 times. Effective distributed monitoring is possible with cooperation among top address space owners. 23

Questions? 24