VALIDATING E-PASSPORTS AT THE BORDER: THE ROLE OF THE PKD R RAJESHKUMAR CHIEF EXECUTIVE AUCTORIZIUM PTE LTD

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VALIDATING E-PASSPORTS AT THE BORDER: THE ROLE OF THE PKD R RAJESHKUMAR CHIEF EXECUTIVE AUCTORIZIUM PTE LTD

THE TRUST IMPERATIVE E-Passports are issued by entities that assert trust Trust depends on the requirements of the relying party Border Control of foreign countries E-Passports are Passports with a chip. The chip augments the security of the Passport, it does not replace it. Improper validation of E-Passport leads to a false sense of security.

WHAT DOES CHIP CONTAIN? Chip contains Logical Data Structure (LDS) with 16 Data Groups (DGs). DG1 contains the contents of the MRZ - mandatory DG2 contains photograph of the holder - mandatory DG3 contains fingerprint biometric Optional and so on Chip contains Security Data Object (SO D ) Contains hash of the Data Group present in LDS Contains a signature that encapsulates the stored hashes. 3

VALIDATING CONTENTS OF CHIP Extract each DG from LDS and hash it. Compare with hash stored in SO D If all hashes match, then verify signature of SO D using the Document Signing Certificate (DSC) used to sign the SO D DSC may be available on chip If not, DSC must be received from Issuing Authority 4

VALIDATING CONTENTS OF CHIP If signature passes, verify DSC using Country Signing Certificate Authority (CSCA) CSCA must be received from Issuing Authority If DSC is verified, check Certificate Revocation List (CRL) to check if DSC and CSCA are still valid CRL must be received from Issuing Authority CRL checking is blacklist checking 5

VALIDATING CONTENTS OF CHIP IF ALL STEPS SUCCEED, THEN CHIP IS NOT TAMPERED HOWEVER THIS IS NOT THE END OF THE VALIDATION. DG1 must match MRZ of the passport DG2 must match the face of the holder AT THIS POINT, FULL ASSURANCE OF INTEGRITY OF DOCUMENT 6

VALIDATION ISSUES DSC may not be on chip and not available through diplomatic means CRL may not be available or may not be latest CSCA exchange may not have been done with that country So, can you trust the E-Passport? 7

TRUST LEVELS Ideally, entire process must be completed. In real life, ideally does not exist. Treat E-Passport validation as a series of increasing confidence in the validity of the document. 8

TRUST LEVELS DSC is in whitelist Pre-approved DSCs CSCA and DSC verified against CRL DSC verified against CSCA Signature Verification successful DG hash compare successful Any check fails 9

PRE-APROVED DSC Reliability of DSC Any certificate issued under the CSCA can sign a document Document Signer - has intent and authorization to sign travel documents Receive list of DSCs used to sign passport from the Issuing Authority White List of Document Signers. 10

OPERATIONAL ISSUES Getting a white list of Document Signers from all E- Passport Issuing agencies DSCs are issued at least every three months by 70 Passport issuers. Bilateral Exchange is complicated and time consuming CRL distribution CRLs are issued at least once every 90 days. Some Issuers are issuing CRL every 48 hours. If there is a compromise, an emergency CRL will be issued between the regular updates. CSCA distribution Diplomatic channels may not be in place to exchange CSCAs in time 11

OPERATIONAL ISSUES Issuing Authority Contacts If a batch of passports fail validation, the Issuing Agency must be contacted to check on this. There is no Address Book which lists all the addresses of the Passport Issuers and their contact details. Compliance to Doc 9303 Certificate Profile has 18 fields With the different values allowed per field, total permutations possible is not manageable Managing the consequences of the various permutations is not practical Best if all issuers followed a single profile Need a reference implementation and control 12

THE PUBLIC KEY DIRECTORY Single repository of validated DSCs and CRLs Repository of Master Lists published by Participants CSCA Registry Yellow Pages for the Passport Issuance Agency of the Participant Compliance reference for DSC/CRL/ML against Doc 9303 13

MASTER LIST For CSCA Exchange: If all countries published the list of CSCAs that they have received, comparison and validation can be done CSCA Master List Country C - Country A - Country B Country A ML - Country A - Country B - Country C Country B ML - Country A - Country B - Country C - Country D OTHERS HAVE THE SAME CSCA If we trust Country B, then we can use Country D CSCA at border 14

STRUCTURE OF THE PKD Country upload point a mailbox for Passport Issuers to upload their DSC, CRL and Master List An internal process of validation and due diligence A Download directory where validated entries are available for download

STRUCTURE OF THE PKD Supply side Passport authorities Regulatory body Compliance (ICAO) Market formed by members Technology platform (Netrust) Demand side Border Control

COMPONENTS OF THE PKD Two locations connected through redundant MPLS connection Synchronised in real time 4 directories each location + 2 backup directories Upload is the only directory that can be accessed by the internet. Copy of data from Upload to Staging directory handled by software Montreal Operations office Can only connect to Netrust datacenter through VPN CSCAs of Participants are maintained in HSM

18

NON CONFORMANT ENTRIES A Participant s CSCA, DSC or CRL may not be compliant to Doc 9303 There are valid passports in circulation issued using these non-conformant credentials and cannot be ignored PKD allows for the publishing of nonconformant entries

PUBLISHING OF ENTRIES The PKD board has approved a list of Machine Readable Error Codes (MREC) to list the deviations in the CSCA, DSC or CRL. All entries with deviations are published along with MREC to allow downloading entities to differentiate the entries and decide whether to accept them at border or not in an automated fashion.

PUBLISHING OF ENTRIES The intent is to allow all entries into the PKD, while ensuring that all Participants will eventually be fully compliant to Doc 9303.

DOWNLOADING OF ENTRIES Web based access anybody can download only complete ldif can be downloaded. Participants use LDAP access to download Either full LDIF or can do ldap query. Authentication is username+password over SSL Main concern is quality of service, not access control

DOWNLOADING OF ENTRIES Accessible at https://pkddownloadsg.icao.int https://pkddownloadth.icao.int Script prevention measures in place Version number is listed and file is available for download Checksum available at https://pkddownloadsg.icao.int/icao/pkdchksum.jsp https://pkddownloadth.icao.int/icao/pkdchksum.jsp Soon, law enforcement of non-participants will be able to automate download as well

VENDOR TEST BENCH Available to any vendor interested in implementing the PKD interface. A one time charge of US$9,600 Allows for access and support for 6 months for implementing the PKD interface and allows access to Doc 9303 compliance tool. If Interface Specifications change, registered vendors will get another 6 months of access for free. Currently five registered vendors: Entrust, Bundesdrukerei, Primekey, IRIS/Digicert, Oberthur

PKD ADVANTAGES Authoritative source of validated DSCs and CRLs Authoritative source of country CSCAs through CSCA master list Yellow pages for contacting the Passport Issuing agency of each Participant A reference for compliance to Doc 9303 for Certificates and CRLs Defect lists are being discussed and might soon be a part of the PKD

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AT BORDER DSC, CRL and CSCA must be available at each terminal 26

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AT BORDER All Terminals must be up to date with CRL at least 27

TRUST LEVEL Too Many Error Codes can confuse officer Concept of mapping error codes to trust level 5 trust levels -1 Forged document 0 Not an E-Passport 1 Document okay but full validation not possible 2 Document okay and fairly confident about document integrity 3 Document integrity guaranteed 28

THANK YOU R Rajeshkumar E-mail: R.Rajeshkumar@auctorizium.com rraj88@gmail.com 29