Critical Infrastructure Security Vulnerability Assessment. A New Approach. Norman Bird - Senior Technical Lead - Nuclear Security

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Transcription:

Critical Infrastructure Security Vulnerability Assessment A New Approach Norman Bird - Senior Technical Lead - Nuclear Security Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Europe (CIPRE) Securing Europe s Critical Infrastructure 12 th 13 th February 2014 London -UK

Overview Based on work undertaken by NNL Technology delivery in partnership with ARES Security As this case study involves a real nuclear facility I cannot discuss specific results

Background - Critical Infrastructure Desire: Steady-state operations No incidents (man-made, natural or malicious) Mitigation: Appropriate regulation Appropriate threat / risk mitigation Good design (incorporating appropriate resilience) Good operation (incl. effective security at all times) Effective maintenance and guarding Human aspects - best practices, reliability, awareness Financial: Justify expenditure and investment decisions, (CapEx, OpEx, etc.) Optimise return on investment (ROI) CapEx Capital Expenditure, OpEx Operational Expenditure, ROI Return On Investment

Background -(Nuclear)Critical Infrastructure? Desire: Steady-state operations No incidents (man-made, natural or malicious) Mitigation: Appropriate regulation Appropriate threat mitigation Good design (resilience) Good operation (effective security at all times) Effective maintenance and guarding Human aspects - Best practices, reliability, awareness Financial: Justify expenditure and investment decisions, (CapEx, OpEx, etc.) Optimise return on investment

Background NNL At a glance Strategic: International nuclear R&D centre of excellence Support new build and clean up Safeguard nuclear expertise, facilities and skills Trusted advisor Collaborations/Partnerships/Links Socio-economic focus Operational: Nuclear infrastructure operator Do our own threat assessments Operate nuclear facilities requiring outcome-based security compliance

Background Infrastructure information Imagery from Bing Maps

Background Modelling / Simulation Not new Often confused with CAD etc. Extensively used in civil nuclear sector to date (safety, process, design, etc.) An emerging technique (for security) Modelling of infrastructure is now an international, open source and leisure timeactivity Imagery from Google Earth and Google Streetview

Background Information and the Threat Source: http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/osc071906.pdf

Case Study M and S Approach Established and matured in US for over a decade Proven and endorsed technology for significant government programmes Accredited in US: DHS (Certified) DoD (Accredited) DoE (Accreditation in Progress) Used by NNL in their national early adopter role for nuclear industry and critical national infrastructure DHS US Dept of Homeland Security, DoD US Department of Defense, DoE US Department of Energy

Case Study -Aims Evaluate against a (complex) UK nuclear infrastructure asset Evaluate if there are substantial benefits over existing techniques Illustrate possible wider UK national infrastructure use in future Provide independent reach back, technical / software support / assessment services and training

Process -Overview -(5 Steps) DATA PHASE MODELLING PHASE SIMULATION PHASE OUTPUT PHASE VERIFICATION PHASE

Process -(Data) Step 1 DATA PHASE 2D CAD information 3D CAD information GIS information Aerial Photography Satellite Imagery Facility Record Drawings Facility Security Measures Security Performance Data Physical Systems / Sensors Guard Force Adversary Performance Data Environmental Criteria Plant Operational Criteria Threat Scenario Criteria Vulnerability of Facility

Process -(Modelling) Step 2 DATA PHASE MODELLING PHASE 2D CAD information 3D CAD information GIS information Aerial Photography Satellite Imagery Facility Record Drawings Facility Security Measures Security Performance Data Physical Systems / Sensors Guard Force Adversary Performance Data Environmental Criteria Plant Operational Criteria Threat Scenario Criteria Vulnerability of Facility

Process -(Simulation) Step 3 DATA PHASE MODELLING PHASE SIMULATION PHASE 2D CAD information 3D CAD information GIS information Aerial Photography Satellite Imagery Facility Record Drawings Facility Security Measures Security Performance Data Physical Systems / Sensors Guard Force Adversary Performance Data Environmental Criteria Plant Operational Criteria Threat Scenario Criteria Vulnerability of Facility

Process -(Output) Step 4 DATA PHASE 2D CAD information 3D CAD information GIS information Aerial Photography Satellite Imagery Facility Record Drawings Facility Security Measures Security Performance Data Physical Systems / Sensors Guard Force Adversary Performance Data Environmental Criteria Plant Operational Criteria Threat Scenario Criteria Vulnerability of Facility MODELLING PHASE SIMULATION PHASE OUTPUT PHASE

Process -(Verification) Step 5 DATA PHASE MODELLING PHASE SIMULATION PHASE OUTPUT PHASE 2D CAD information 3D CAD information GIS information Aerial Photography Satellite Imagery Facility Record Drawings Facility Security Measures Security Performance Data Physical Systems / Sensors Guard Force Adversary Performance Data Environmental Criteria Plant Operational Criteria Threat Scenario Criteria Vulnerability of Facility VERIFICATION PHASE (Future) Exercises Update data libraries and results based on real performance outcomes

Early results (Typical)

Early learning Accurate model information Early risk review mechanism Alignment with site visits (both site & model verification) Model simplification (don t need to model everything) Access to timely technical support / SMEs Early pooling of expert opinion around a centric model Early operational appreciation SME = Subject Matter Expert

Early challenges Inaccuracy in as built records Obtaining as built knowledge Obtaining verified performance data Managing sensitive data and results Managing the what if syndrome (and preventing scope creep) These challenges were all overcome in the case study

Typical examples of results output

Performance-basedinfrastructure assurance Quantitative performance assessment (Graded RAG approach) Challengeable and demonstrable threat mitigation Threat scenario is capable of being rehearsed / exercised Model can be re-verified from further exercises Managing output expectations: Practical Cost effective Operationally achievable Acceptable RAG = Red, Amber, Green. Note: The % threshold levels defined on this slide are also being used as a methodology to assess nuclear security effectiveness / threat mitigation at US nuclear infrastructure sites.

Case study M and S benefits Improved quantitative infrastructure assessment Enhanced security appreciation / optimisation Core model for determining minimum performance standards Reproducible / repeatable demonstration of assurances Efficient re-assessment of DBT impact Auditable platform(for further exercising, testing and improved consistency of approach for cost benefit analysis) DBT Design Basis Threat Outcome Modelled / measured security effectiveness

Conclusions Facilitates improved decision making Demonstrates operational effectiveness Helps to manage / mitigate the threat to infrastructure Helps to optimise security standards, costs, performance, compliance and expectations Future?

Future -(Dynamic) threat assessment National (and Public) Expectation (I.e. Design Basis) ALL THREATS STATUS VIEW Infrastructure Operation (I.e. Outcome-based) THREAT SCENARIO Strategic aim being closer parity between expectation (design) and infrastructure operation (delivery) using M and S

Summary Wider infrastructure uses: Transport Hubs Airports, Ports etc. Transport networks and movements Utilities, Telecomms Chemicals, Oil and Gas Key national infrastructure points Energy Defence, Borders and Emergency Services Commerce National and international risk governance / agencies Foreign embassies Temporary hardened assets (Events etc.) Contingency planning and resilience Where risk reduction and resilience are essential to continuity

Acknowledgements NNL Modelling and Simulation Team NNL Site Security Management ARES Security Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) University of Central Lancashire (UCLan) (Joint authors of the case study summary Norman Bird NNL and Prof. Laurence Williams - UCLan)

Thank you for listening Questions? For further information contact: Norman Bird norman.bird@nnl.co.uk or visit www.nnl.co.uk/commercial-services/security.aspx