DOWNS MODEL OF ELECTIONS

DOWNS MODEL OF ELECTIONS 1

A. Assumptions 1. A single dimension of alternatives. 2. Voters. a. prefer the candidate that is closer to their ideal point more than one farther away (as before).

A. Assumptions 1. A single dimension of alternatives. 2. Voters. a. prefer the candidate that is closer to their ideal point more than one farther away (as before).

A. Assumptions 1. A single dimension of alternatives. 2. Voters. a. prefer the candidate that is closer to their ideal point more than one farther away (as before).

A. Assumptions 1. A single dimension of alternatives. 2. Voters. a. prefer the candidate that is closer to their ideal point more than one farther away (as before). b. Many voters (many ideal points) will be represented with a frequency distribution. The dotted line indicates the median.

A. Assumptions 3. Candidates (can exceed two) a. Represented by letters. b. Move across the spectrum to maximize their chance of election. A B C

A. Assumptions 4. Vote using plurality rule, not majority rule. a. Def: the candidate with the most votes wins. If a candidate wins a majority, then it wins a plurality. A has a plurality A has a majority However, if a candidate wins a plurality, it may or may not win a majority.

5. Ideology a. Downs argues candidates adopt ideologies to simplify their message to voters. b. Since candidates want to appear responsible and reliable, they won t jump each other.

B. Action in The Model 1. Who votes for A?

B. Action in The Model 1. Who votes for A? Who votes for B?

B. Action in The Model 1. Who votes for A? Who votes for B? Who votes for C?

B. Action in The Model 1. Who wins? C because he/she receives the largest area.

B. Action in The Model 2. Same model, just moved to the right.

B. Action in The Model 2. What would be B s best response?

B. Action in The Model 2. What would be B s best response? Perhaps to move right to increase his/her area.

B. Action in The Model 2. What would be B s best response? Perhaps to move right to increase his/her area.

B. Action in The Model 2. What would be B s best response? Perhaps to move right to increase his/her area.

B. Action in The Model 2. What would be A s best response?

B. Action in The Model 2. What would be A s best response? Perhaps to move right as well.

B. Action in The Model 2. What would be A s best response? Perhaps to move right as well.

B. Action in The Model 2. Now A wins, because B takes away more votes from C than from A. What happens to B? 1) B gets caught in the center and looses. Does the candidate closest to the median win? a. No, the median voter theorem does not apply, because we are not using two candidate, majority rule.

C. Discussion 1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies. Does this seem reasonable? a. Anne Lewis, former chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee, said parties exist for two purposes: to govern and to win elections. b. Do candidates really change policies to get elected? 2. Can mom-and-pop candidates win elections?

C. Discussion 3. What is ideology according to Downs? a. a simplified message to voters that helps` party candidates get elected (i.e. a sales pitch). 4. Does that seem reasonable? 5. What is the role of responsibility and reliability in Downs analysis? a. They prevents candidates from radically changing positions.

C. Discussion Italy 6. Why are there two dominant parties in the United States, but many parties in other countries? PSI PCI MFI CS Dem Rep CD Key: PSI Socialists, PCI Communists, MFI fascists, CS Christian Socialists, CD -- Christian Democrats. Note: Downs says it has to do with multimodal electorates, but perhaps it has to do with plurality rule in single member districts.

C. Discussion 7. If Downs is correct, why don t candidates fully converge toward the median? 8. Is a single dimension of alternatives reasonable? 9. Who is more likely to abstain from voting, voters on the extremes or voters in the middle? 10. Other thoughts?

D. Presidential Elections 1. 1988 Dem:

D. Presidential Elections 1. 1988 Dem: Dukakis.

D. Presidential Elections 1. 1988 Dem: Dukakis, Jackson.

D. Presidential Elections 1. 1988 Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart.

D. Presidential Elections 1. 1988 Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore.

D. Presidential Elections 1. 1988 Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore, Gephardt.

D. Presidential Elections 1. 1988 Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore, Gephardt. Rep: Bush.

D. Presidential Elections 1. 1988 Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore, Gephardt. Rep: Bush, Robertson.

D. Presidential Elections 1. 1988 Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore, Gephardt. Rep: Bush, Robertson, Dole.

D. Presidential Elections 2. 1992 Dem: Clinton, Paul Tsongas, Tom Harkin.

D. Presidential Elections 2. 1992 Dem: Clinton. Rep: Bush (incumbent). Ind: Ross Perot

D. Presidential Elections 3. 2000 Dem: Gore. Green: Nader Rep: Bush. Reform: Buchanan

D. Presidential Elections 4. 2008 Dem: Obama, Clinton, Edwards. Rep: McCain, Romney, Huckabee, Paul.

E. Preference Restrictions 1. A single dimensional model rules out certain preference orders. a. Consider three voters, and three candidates (A,B,C). A A A A A A A A B A A B A A C A A C B B B B B C B B A B B C B B A B B B C C C C C B C C C C C A C C B C C A A A A A A A A A B A A B A A C A A C B C B B C C B C A B C C B C A B C B C B C C B B C B C C B A C B B C B A A B A A B A A B B A B B A B C A B C B A B B A C B A A B A C B A A B A B C C C C C B C C C C C A C C B C C A A B A A B A A B B A B B A B C A B C B C B B C C B C A B C C B C A B C B C A C C A B C A C C A A C A B C A A A C A A C A A C B A C B A C C A C C B A B B A C B A A B A C B A A B A B C B C C B B C B C C B A C B B C B A A C A A C A A C B A C B A C C A C C B B B B B C B B A B B C B B A B B B C A C C A B C A C C A A C A B C A A There are 216 possible orderings, 36 of which are displayed here.

E. Preference Restrictions 1. A single dimensional model rules out certain preference orders. a. Consider three voters, and three candidates (A,B,C). A A A A A A A A B A A B A A C A A C B B B B B C B B A B B C B B A B B B C C C C C B C C C C C A C C B C C A A A A A A A A A B A A B A A C A A C B C B B C C B C A B C C B C A B C B C B C C B B C B C C B A C B B C B A There are 216 possible orderings, 36 of which are displayed here. A B A A B A A B B A B B A B C A B C B A B B A C B A A B A C B A A B A B C C C C C B C C C C C A C C B C C A A B A A B A A B B A B B A B C A B C B C B B C C B C A B C C B C A B C B C A C C A B C A C C A A C A B C A A A C A A C A A C B A C B A C C A C C B A B B A C B A A B A C B A A B A B C B C C B B C B C C B A C B B C B A A C A A C A A C B A C B A C C A C C B B B B B C B B A B B C B B A B B B C A C C A B C A C C A A C A B C A A Roughly 2/9ths of these orders, displayed in red, cannot be placed on a line. Pick one of the red.

Point: Assuming a single dimensional model limits the type of voting orders individuals can have.