Efficiency and Effectiveness of Stakeholder Engagement Michael Walker, Senior Vice President and Chief Enterprise Risk and Strategic Development Officer Member Representatives Committee Meeting February 7, 2018
Background ERO Enterprise Long-Term Strategy and Operating Plan recognize the importance of effective industry expertise Emerging issues are increasing resource demands on both industry and the ERO Enterprise There are opportunities to improve efficiency and effectiveness for the benefit of stakeholders, the ERO Enterprise, and reliability Requested policy input on ways to improve efficiency and effectiveness of stakeholder engagement 2
Themes of Policy Input Responses Include wider stakeholder involvement in effectiveness and efficiency reviews Review stakeholder committee organization and charters Track and share stakeholder time devoted to ERO groups Leverage technology to reduce travel time and costs Enhance ERO staff training and tools to engage stakeholders Increase communications with and among segments and sectors Increase executive-level stakeholder involvement Avoid duplicate work within the ERO Enterprise and between the ERO Enterprise and industry 3
Next Steps Open discussion of input during MRC meeting Obtain feedback from Board of Trustees Follow-up discussion at the May meeting 4
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ERO Reliability Risk Priorities Report Peter Brandien, Reliability Issues Steering Committee Chair Member Representatives Committee Meeting February 7, 2018
Purpose and Process Strategically defines and prioritizes risks to the reliable operation of the bulk power system (BPS) Supports ERO Enterprise strategic and operational planning Key inputs Reliability Issues Steering Committee s (RISC s) subject matter expertise Reliability Leadership Summit FERC Technical Conference Pulse point interviews Review of a number of NERC technical studies Department of Energy grid study 2
Risk Profiles and Recommendations Nine inherent risk profiles for continued level of attention No new profiles; shift in Profile 4 from asset management and maintenance to increasing complexity in protection and control systems Includes recommended actions to mitigate the risks Effort to narrow recommendations since last draft Reduced 99 recommendations to 53 Removed overlapping recommendations and those captured in ongoing activities 3
Risk Groupings Risk profiles categorized by mapping of likelihood and impact RISC recommends higher likelihood, higher impact profiles be given highest priority All risk profiles warrant attention regardless of categorization Higher Likelihood, Higher Impact Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Changing Resource Mix BPS Planning Resource Adequacy 4
Risk Groupings Higher Likelihood, Lower Impact Increasing Complexity in Protection and Control Systems Human Performance and Skilled Workforce Lower Likelihood, Higher Impact Loss of Situational Awareness Lower Likelihood, Lower Impact Physical Security Vulnerabilities Extreme Natural Events 5
Risk Mapping 6
Next Steps Present report to Board of Trustees (Board) for acceptance on February 8, 2018 Next Reliability Leadership Summit Q1/Q2 2019 Next report to Board August 2019 7
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Resilience Framework Peter Brandien, Reliability Issues Steering Committee Chair Member Representatives Committee Meeting February 7, 2018
Recommended Framework Develop common understanding and definition of the key elements of bulk power system (BPS) resilience Understand how key elements of BPS resilience fit in the existing ERO framework Evaluate whether additional steps are needed to address key elements of BPS resilience within the ERO framework 2
Understanding and Defining Resilience National Infrastructure Advisory Council s (NIAC s) resilience framework includes four outcome-focused abilities: Robustness absorb shocks and continue operating Resourcefulness skillfully manage a crisis as it unfolds Rapid Recovery get services back as quickly as possible Adaptability incorporate lessons learned from past events to improve resilience 3
ERO Enterprise Activities Supporting NIAC Framework Robustness Risk, event, and performance monitoring Reliability and emerging risk assessments Technical committee work Operator training and certification Reliability Standards and Reliability Guidelines E-ISAC information-sharing programs Resourcefulness Situational awareness and industry coordination Government coordination Cross-sector information sharing Reliability Standards and Functional Model 4
ERO Enterprise Activities Supporting NIAC Framework Rapid Recovery Situational awareness and industry coordination Government coordination Cross-sector information sharing Adaptability Reliability assessments Event analysis and forensics Reliability Guidelines Technical committee work 5
Recommended Next Steps Request standing committee input to the RISC Provide recommendations at the May 2018 Member Representatives Committee meeting Monitor FERC proceedings 6
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2017 Reliability Assessments Standard and Guideline Recommendations Mark Lauby, Senior Vice President and Chief Reliability Officer Member Representatives Committee February 7, 2018
Evaluating Emerging Risks Through Assessments Key assessments from 2017 Special Reliability Assessment: Potential Bulk Power System Impacts Due to Severe Disruptions on the Natural Gas System 2017 Long-Term Reliability Assessment Recommendations aligned with RISC priorities 2
Special Reliability Assessment Objective of report: Evaluate disruptions of key natural gas facilities and their impact to BPS reliability Recommendation: NERC, with industry s support, should enhance its Reliability Guidelines and/or Standards as necessary to include additional planning and operating requirements for analyzing disruptions to the natural gas infrastructure and their impacts on the reliable operation of the BPS 3
Special Reliability Assessment Current Plan of Action: Planning Committee advisory group forming Review current requirements (e.g., TPL-001-4) Identify the need and scope for a Reliability Guideline Determine if existing controls are in place to assure extreme conditions due to natural gas disruptions are considered in planning Next Step: Plan of action will be presented for policy input in April 2018 An update of progress will be provided on a quarterly basis 4
2017 Long-Term Reliability Assessment Objective of Report: Review, assess, and report on the overall electric generation and transmission reliability of the BPS Recommendation: NERC should conduct a comprehensive evaluation of its Reliability Standards to ensure compatibility with nonsynchronous and distributed energy resources as well as for completeness related to essential reliability services, generator performance, system protection and control, and balancing functions. 5
2017 Long-Term Reliability Assessment Significant activity in progress: Revisions planned for MOD-032 to address data sharing Inverter-Based Resources Task Force (Reliability Guideline and Alert) Standard Authorization Request in place to address frequency control and balancing PC assessment of BES-connected dynamic reactive devices Next Steps: Standing Committee Coordinating Group to monitor progress across technical committees An update of progress will be provided on a quarterly basis 6
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CIPC Workplan Update Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee Marc A. Child, Great River Energy, CIPC Chair Member Representatives Committee Meeting February 7, 2018
CIPC Organizational Chart Executive Committee Ross Johnson, Phys SME, Capital Power Marc Child, Chair, Great River Energy Melanie Seader, EEI Brenda Davis, Cyber SME, CPS Energy David Grubbs, Vice Chair, City of Garland (vacant) APPA Lisa Carrington, Ops SME, Ariz Public Svc David Revill, Vice Chair, NRECA (vacant) EPSA Jeff Fuller, Policy SME, AES Tobias Whitney, Secretary, NERC (vacant) IPC Physical Security Subcommittee (Ross Johnson) Cybersecurity Subcommittee (Brenda Davis) Operating Security Subcommittee (Lisa Carrington) Policy Subcommittee (Jeff Fuller) Physical Security WG (PSAG) (Ross Johnson) Control Systems Security WG (Mike Mertz) (Carter Manucy) Grid Exercise WG (Tim Conway) Security Metrics WG (Larry Bugh) Physical Security Guidelines TF (Darrell Klimitchek) Security Training WG (David Godfrey) (Amelia Sawyer) Planning Committee Joint Project Criticality Reduction (Vacant) Compliance and Enforcement Input WG (Paul Crist) Supply Chain Working Group (Vacant) 2
CIPC Charter Key updates to CIPC Charter: Minor verbiage update to acknowledge security guidelines and standards implementation guidance are key deliverables of CIPC Added IEEE to the list of key collaborative organizations Added new non-voting member class: Partner Members Federal Energy Regulatory Commission US Department of Homeland Security US Department of Energy US Department of Energy Laboratories Public Safety Canada Natural Resources Canada Oil & Natural Gas subsector Telecomm sector Financial Services sector Critical Manufacturing sector Water sector 3
CIPC Strategic Plan and Work Plan 2018 2019 Strategic Plan & Work Plan Change in format to better align with the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) strategic goals ERO Enterprise Long-Term Strategy ERO Reliability Risk Priorities ( RISC Report ) E-ISAC Long Term Strategic Plan Appendix removed to reduce redundancy and enhance readability Organized into six major activities Advisory panel to the NERC Board of Trustees (Board) Cyber security risk management Physical security risk management NERC standards implementation input BES security metrics Training, outreach, and industry communications 4
Advisory Panel to the Board Reports to the Board will become more strategic to address emerging risks and issues pertinent to the security of BES Solicit input from the Board regarding priorities and new challenges Identify opportunities for collaboration with other subcommittees Less focus on status reporting and more focus on the proactive resolution of issues 5
Cyber Security Risk Management Cyber security program efforts address the RISC, E-ISAC Long Term Strategic Plan, and the ERO Enterprise Long Term Strategy Identification and reduction of cyber risks Cyber security risk of Fuel Handling SCADA systems for Generation Updated guidance in relation to NERC s Remote Access Study GridEx planning and preparation Supply Chain (vendor security controls and legacy systems testing) 6
Physical Security Risk Management Physical security program efforts address the RISC, E-ISAC Long Term Strategic Plan, and the ERO Enterprise Long Term Strategy Identification and reduction of physical risks Security practices for High Impact Control Centers Security implications of drones on electric power Key management security for physical access 7
NERC Standards Implementation Input The Compliance and Enforcement Input Working Group (CEIWG) is established to solicit industry stakeholders for input to assist NERC staff with clarification on compliance monitoring or enforcement with the following documents: Implications of Cloud Services for CIP Assets (Pilot/Study) Implementation Guidance for Voice-over-IP services Implementation Guidance for Shared Transmission Facilities 8
BES Security Metrics CIPC will utilize the expertise of its members, NERC staff, and others to provide direction, technical oversight, feedback on the collection of industry metrics, and reporting of BES security performance metrics Security Metrics derived from E-ISAC, compliance data, or other sources of periodic reporting Annual security assessment of the BES 9
Training, Outreach, and Communications CIPC will provide training, coordination, and communication with those responsible for both physical and cyber security to various industry segments Re-organize information on NERC.com Industry facing collaboration site to maximize joint project activities Publish annual training plan 10
Timeline of Activities # CIPC Deliverable (non-ongoing projects) Estimated Completion Date 1 Implications of Voice-over-IP and the CIP Standards Q1 2018 2 Develop CIPC Collaboration Site on NERC.com Q2 2018 3 CIP Implications of Shared Transmission Facilities Q2 2018 4 Key management security guideline Q2 2018 5 Vendor Essential Security Practices Model Q3 2018 6 Security implications of UAVs Q3 2018 7 Update CIPC Website on NERC.com Q3 2018 8 Implications of Cloud Services for CIP Assets Q4 2018 9 Assess the cyber security risk of Fuel Handling SCADA systems for Generation Q1 2019 10 Address Remote Access Security Findings #1-#18 Q3 2019 11 Identification and Reduction of Cyber and Physical Security Risks Q4 2019 12 Legacy system testing coordination with National Labs Q4 2019 13 Annual Security Assessment of the BES Q4 2019 11
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Michael Bardee, Director FERC Office of Electric Reliability February 7, 2018
Final Rule, RM17-12-000, 1/18/18 Approves revised reliability standards: Event Reporting (EOP-004-4) System Restoration from Blackstart Resources (EOP-005-3) System Restoration Coordination (EOP-006-3) Loss of Control Center Functionality (EOP-008-2) Revised standards will: Provide accurate reporting to NERC s event analysis group Specify roles of entities to restore system from blackstart resources Clarify procedures & coordination for RC staff to restore system Refine requirements to continue reliable operation if primary control functionality is lost Effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register
Proposed Rule, RM17-13, 1/18/18 Proposes to approve supply chain risk management CIP reliability standards: Supply Chain Risk Management (CIP-013-1) Electronic Security Perimeter(s) (CIP-005-6) Configuration Change Management (CIP-010-3) Proposes to direct NERC to expand these standards to include EACMS for medium- and high-impact; and expand study of low-impact to include PACs and PCAs Comments due 60 days after publication in Fed. Reg.
Proposed Rule, RM18-2 & AD17-9, 12/21/17 Proposes to direct NERC to broaden CIP-008 to include mandatory reporting of cyber security incidents that compromise, or attempt to compromise, an entity s Electronic Security Perimeter or associated EACMS Proposes that incident reports be sent to ICS-CERT (in addition to E-ISAC) and that NERC file an annual, public and anonymized summary with FERC Comments due 2/26/18
Order Accepting Filing, RR15-2-005, 11/16/17 Accepts NERC s 2016 Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program (CMEP) Annual Report Denies two changes proposed by NERC: Eliminate public posting of CEs identified through self-logging Allow CEs to include certain moderate risk non-compliance Terminates the annual informational filing requirement so long as NERC continues to include: Compliance exceptions in the annual FFT filing Information on RAI program in CMEP report to BOTCC
Proposed Rule, RM16-22, 11/16/17 Proposes to approve: PRC-027-1 (Coordination of Protection Systems for Performance During Faults) PER-006-1 (Specific Training for Personnel) Proposes to direct NERC to expand PRC-027-1 to require an initial protection system coordination study as baseline for proper coordination of their systems Comments due 1/28/18
Order issued in AD18-7 & RM18-1, 1/8/18 Terminates DOE NOPR on grid resilience Opens new proceeding to examine grid resilience Directs RTOs/ISOs to provide information. Goal: Develop common understanding among Commission, industry and others of what resilience of bulk power system means and requires Understand how each RTO/ISO assesses resilience in its footprint Use this info to evaluate whether additional Commission action on resilience is appropriate RTO/ISO submissions due 60 days after 1/8/18; reply comments 30 days later
Thank you! Questions?