The Dark Oracle: Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery

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Transcription:

The Dark Oracle: Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery Evan Cooke *, Michael Bailey *, Farnam Jahanian *, Richard Mortier *University of Michigan Microsoft Research - 1 - NSDI 2006

Honeynet Monitoring Unused Internet addresses form the basis for a broad class of security systems: honeynet monitoring Honeypots Darknets Telescopes Goal today is to dramatically expand the scope of this class of systems by redefining what we mean by unused Internet addresses - 2 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

A Closer Look At Address Usage White= Used Black= Unused All IPv4 67% of IPv4 addresses not announced via BGP - 3 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

A Closer Look At Address Usage White= Used Black= Unused All IPv4 Organization 67% of IPv4 addresses not announced via BGP 58% of addresses in an organization not internally routed - 4 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

A Closer Look At Address Usage White= Used Black= Unused All IPv4 Organization Subnet 67% of IPv4 addresses not announced via BGP 58% of addresses in an organization not internally routed 65% of addresses allocated to a DHCP server not used - 5 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Honeynets Sample of existing projects: Honeynet Project ~ /32 (1 address) honeyd ~ /24 (255 addresses) Potemkin Honeypot Farm ~ /16 (65K addresses) Observations: Very small % of available addresses Contagious blocks of unused addresses Only globally advertised and globally reachable addresses - 6 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Automatic Address Discovery Our Goal: 1. Redefine unused addresses as dark addresses 2. Develop a methodology for automatically discovering dark addresses 3. Route traffic to those addresses to honeynet monitoring systems Vision: Pervasive Honeynets Give honeynets the visibility of 1,000 s honeypots distributed inside and outside the network - 7 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Redefining Dark Space Honeynets typically configured to monitor globally advertised and globally reachable unused addresses Attacker 68.0.0.1 Honeypot Acme co. Internet - 8 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Unused and Unreachable Addresses We propose a dark address should be defined as an unused or unreachable address - 9 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Unused and Unreachable Addresses We propose a dark address should be defined as an unused or unreachable address Attacker Firewall/ NAT Internet 10.0.0.1 X Honeypot Acme co. Unreachable Address - 10 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Perspective-Aware With this expanded definition we can adopt the perspective of a specific network and construct incoming and outgoing honeynets Outgoing Honeypot Acme co. Firewall/ NAT Internet Attacker 10.0.0.1 Incoming X Unreachable Address - 11 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Architecture Leverage distributed address allocation data External Routing (e.g. BGP) Internal Routing (e.g. OSPF) Host Config. (e.g. DHCP) Organizational Network Address Manager Honeynet/ HoneyFarm - 12 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Finding Unused Addresses Why is it hard to get more unused addresses: 1.Address allocation information distributed across devices, applications, domains 2.Address allocations change quickly (e.g. mobile users) - 13 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Potential Sources of Global Addresses Allocation Proceeds Many unused addresses at each step in the address allocation process (unused = black) - 14 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Leveraging Internal Data Find globally unique and local routable addresses - 15 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Address Allocation Data Sources We find three major classes of potential sources of address allocation information 1. External Routing Data e.g. BGP 2. Internal Routing Data e.g. OSPF, ISIS, RIP 3. Host Configuration Data e.g. DHCP, LDAP - 16 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Address Misclassification But, what if you make a mistake and misclassify an address as dark or used? Two possible ways this can happen: 1. State between data source and data reader become out of sync 2. Inaccurate data source Can help prevent by: sampling often add delay to the used to dark transition - 17 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

The Dark Oracle We implemented a prototype address discovery platform call the Dark Oracle Inputs BGP feed from RouteView project as source of external routing data OSPF listener as source of internal routing data DHCP server monitor as source of host config data Outputs A locally-accurate map of dark addresses - 18 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

The Honeynet We passively captured packet to the dark addresses from the Dark Oracle Traffic was capture using: 1. Darktrap: A userland program to differentiate dark traffic from live traffic from a route span port 2. Blackhole Route: A fall-through route Routing Table 1.2.3.0/24 1.2.7.0/24 1.2.0.0/16 0.0.0.0/0 Blackhole Route 1.2.3.0/24 ISP Router EECS Dept. Subnet Blackhole:1.2.0.0/16 Darknet Capture 1.2.7.0/24 English Dept. Subnet - 19 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Evaluation Plan Analyze the stability, density, and quantity of the addresses from the three data sources Deploy the Dark Oracle on academic, enterprise, and ISP networks Compare the resulting visibility to an existing honeynet - 20 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Data Source Eval: External Routing Data Bogon List RIPE + ARIN Allocations BGP from RouteViews More accurate information reveals significantly more and better external reachability information - 21 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Data Source Eval: External Routing Data Over the 1 month period the average change in addresses per 4-hours was 0.01-0.001% of IPv4 (~/16) Very small error incurred by sampling less frequently (0.04% error if sampled once per day) - 22 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Data Source Eval: Host Config We monitored DHCP server that managed 5120 addresses, 70% of those addresses never alloc! An address newly classified as dark remained for an average of 8.85 days - 23 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Dark Oracle Deployment Deployed Dark Oracle on a live network with ~10,000 hosts Darktrap run on 3Ghz system connected to a span port from a centrally located Cisco Catalyst 6500 (DHCP/BGP addresses) Blackhole route (OSPF addresses) - 24 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Addresses Discovered Huge Outgoing Honeypot Large % Of Unused Addresses At Each Level - 25 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Honeynet Detection Results Traditional /24 Darknet - 26 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Honeynet Detection Results Infected/ Misconfigured Sources From the Same Network! - 27 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Conclusion By becoming perspective-aware and monitoring external reachability data we can construct incoming and outgoing honeynets Automatic address discovery provides order-ofmagnitude more unused addresses compared to existing honeynet allocation systems Pervasive honeynet are better at detecting targeted attacks and are resistant to fingerprinting - 28 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006

Questions - 29 - The Dark Oracle Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery NSDI 2006