DNS Security DNSSEC. *http://compsec101.antibo zo.net/papers/dnssec/dnss ec.html. IT352 Network Security Najwa AlGhamdi

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Transcription:

DNS Security DNSSEC *http://compsec101.antibo zo.net/papers/dnssec/dnss ec.html 1 IT352 Network Security Najwa AlGhamdi

Introduction DNSSEC is a security extensions to the DNS protocol in response to the security issues surrounding the DNS. a new set of RRs are defined to hold the security information that provides strong security to DNS zones wishing to implement DNSSEC. These new RR types are used in conjunction with existing types of RRs. This allows answers to queries for DNS security information belonging to a zone that is protected by DNSSEC to be supported through non-security aware DNS servers.

DNSSEC Objective To assure authentication and integrity to DNS services. However: DNSSEC doesn t provide access control and confidentiality services Authentication and integrity of information held within DNS zones is provided by using digital signature. Although DNSSEC doesn't provide confidentiality to DNS transactions, it supports confidentiality as a worldwide public key distribution mechanism.

DNSSEC Scope DNSSEC provides three services: 1. key distribution 2. data origin authentication 3. transaction and request authentication. 4 IT352 Network Security Najwa AlGhamdi

DNSSEC Scope : Key Distribution 1.The retrieval of the public key of a DNS name to verify the authenticity of the DNS zone data. 2.Provides a mechanism through which any key associated with a DNS name can be used for purposes other than DNS. 3.The public key distribution service supports several different types of keys and several different types of key algorithms.

DNSSEC Scope : Data Origin Authentication Data origin authentication is the core of the design of DNSSEC. It mitigates such threats as cache poisoning and zone data compromise on a DNS server. The RRSets within a zone are signed to assert to resolvers and servers that the data just received can be trusted. The digital signature contains the encrypted hash of the RRSet. The hash is signed using a private key usually belonging to the corresponding zone. The recipient of the RRSet can then check the digital signature against the data in the RRSet just received.

DNSSEC Scope :DNS Transaction and Request Authentication Service 1: It provides the ability to authenticate DNS requests and DNS message headers. This guarantees that 1. the answer is in response to the original query 2. the response came from the server for which the query was intended. To assure this 1. Part of the information, returned in a response to a query from a security aware server, is a signature. 2. This signature is produced from the concatenation of the query and the response. This allows a security aware resolver to perform any necessary verification concerning the transaction.

DNSSEC Scope :DNS Transaction and Request Authentication Service 2 : DNS Dynamic Updates. Without DNSSEC DNS Dynamic Update does not provide a mechanism that stop any system with access to a DNS authoritative server from updating zone information. With DNSSEC Secure DNS Dynamic provides strong authentication for systems allowed to dynamically manipulate DNS zone information on the primary server

DNSSEC Resource Records Introduces new RR types: KEY: used for storing a public key that is associated with a DNS name. SIG: Digital signature. The SIG RR provides authentication for a RRSet and the signature s validity time.

DNSSEC Resource Records Introduces new RR types: NXT: NXT RRs are used to indicate a range of DNS names that are unavailable or a range of RR types that are unavailable for an existing DNS name. WHY? The DNS provides the ability to cache negative responses. A negative response means that a corresponding RRSet does not exist for the query. DNSSEC provides signatures for these nonexistent RRSets so that their nonexistence in a zone can be authenticated.

How DNSSEC works: Each RRSet has an associated SIG RR which is a digital signature of the RRSet using the private key of the zone. If a security aware resolver reliably learns a public key of the zone, it can authenticate signed data read from that zone. A security aware server will attempt to return, with RRs retrieved, the corresponding SIGs. 11 IT352 Network Security Najwa AlGhamdi