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Project Title Date Submitted Source(s) IEEE 802.16 Broadband Wireless Access Working Group <http://ieee802.org/16> Proposal for Adding BS SecurityManagementFunction Attributes 2006-03-08 Zou Lan Wu Jian Jun Huawei Technologies. No.98,Lane91, Eshan Road, Pudong, Shanghai, China Pudong Lujiazui Software Park Re: Contribution to IEEE 802.16i Abstract Purpose Notice Release Patent Policy and Procedures Voice: +86-21-68644808-24657 Fax: +86-21-50898375 Mailto: zlan@huawei.com This contribution proposed to add BS security management information model attributes. Adoption This document has been prepared to assist IEEE 802.16. It is offered as a basis for discussion and is not binding on the contributing individual(s) or organization(s). The material in this document is subject to change in form and content after further study. The contributor(s) reserve(s) the right to add, amend or withdraw material contained herein. The contributor grants a free, irrevocable license to the IEEE to incorporate material contained in this contribution, and any modifications thereof, in the creation of an IEEE Standards publication; to copyright in the IEEE s name any IEEE Standards publication even though it may include portions of this contribution; and at the IEEE s sole discretion to permit others to reproduce in whole or in part the resulting IEEE Standards publication. The contributor also acknowledges and accepts that this contribution may be made public by IEEE 802.16. The contributor is familiar with the IEEE 802.16 Patent Policy and Procedures <http://ieee802.org/16/ipr/patents/policy.html>, including the statement "IEEE standards may include the known use of patent(s), including patent applications, provided the IEEE receives assurance from the patent holder or applicant with respect to patents essential for compliance with both mandatory and optional portions of the standard." Early disclosure to the Working Group of patent information that might be relevant to the standard is essential to reduce the possibility for delays in the development process and increase the likelihood that the draft publication will be approved for publication. Please notify the Chair <mailto:chair@wirelessman.org> as early as possible, in written or electronic form, if patented technology (or technology under patent application) might be incorporated into a draft standard being developed within the IEEE 802.16 Working Group. The Chair will disclose this notification via the IEEE 802.16 web site <http://ieee802.org/16/ipr/patents/notices>. 1

Proposal for Adding BS SecurityManagementFunction Attributes Introduction Huawei Technologies. With mobility feature is introduced into WiMAX system, PKMV2 mechanism is adopted in 16e. This contribution proposes to add BS security management related configuration attributes to the current standard. Proposed Text 15.1.2.3.5 IOC SecurityManagmentFunction 15.1.2.3.5.1 Definition This IOC represents a SecurityManagmentFunction object. It is derived from ManagedFunction. 15.1.2.3.5.2 Attributes Attributes of SecurityManagmentFunction Attribute name Defined in Visibility Support Qualifier Read Qualifier Write Qualifier securitymanagementid - + M M - 15.1.2.3.6 IOC PkmBase 15.1.2.3.6.1 Definition This IOC represents a PkmBase object. It is derived from ManagedFunction. 15.1.2.3.6.2 Attributes Attributes of PkmBase Defined in Visibilit Support Read Write Attribute name y Qualifier Qualifier Qualifier wmanifbspkmbaseid - + M M - wmanifbspkmdefaultauthlifetime - + M M M wmanifbspkmdefaultteklifetime - + M M M wmanifbspkmdefaultselfsigmanufcerttru st - + M M M wmanifbspkmcheckcertvalidityperiods - + M M M wmanifbspmkdefaultprehandshakelifetim e - + M M M wmanifbspmkdefaultlifetime - + M M M wmanifbsdefaultsachallengetimer - + M M M wmanifbsdefaultsachallengemaxresends - + M M M wmanifbsdefaultsatektimer - + M M M wmanifbsdefaultsatekrequestmaxresends - + M M M 15.1.2.3.7 IOC PkmTek 2

15.1.2.3.7.1 Definition This IOC represents a PkmTek object. It is derived from ManagedFunction. 15.1.2.3.7.2 Attributes Attributes of PkmTek Defined in Visibilit Support Read Write Attribute name y Qualifier Qualifier Qualifier wmanifbspkmtekid - + M M - wmanifbspkmteksaid - + M - - wmanifbspkmteksatype - + M M - wmanifbspkmtekdataencryptalg - + M M - wmanifbspkmtekdataauthentalg - + M M - wmanifbspkmtekencryptalg - + M M - wmanifbspkmteklifetime - + M M - wmanifbspkmtekkeysequencenumber - + M M - wmanifbspkmtekexpiresold - + M M - wmanifbspkmtekexpiresnew - + M M - wmanifbspkmtekreset - + M M M wmanifbspkmassociatedgkeksequencenumb er - + M M - wmanifbspkmsaservicetype - + M M - 15.1.2.3.8 IOC MS/SSPkmAuth 15.1.2.3.8.1 Definition This IOC represents a MS/SSPkmAuth object. It is derived from ManagedFunction. 15.1.2.3.8.2 Attributes Attributes of MSPkmAuth Defined in Visibilit Support Read Write Attribute name y Qualifier Qualifier Qualifier wmanifbsmspkmauthid - + M M - wmanifbssspkmauthmacaddress - - M - - wmanifbssspkmauthkeysequencenumb er - + M M - wmanifbssspkmauthexpiresold - + M M - wmanifbssspkmauthexpiresnew - + M M - wmanifbssspkmauthlifetime - + M M - wmanifbssspkmauthreset - + M M M wmanifbssspkmauthprimarysaid - + M M - wmanifbssspkmauthvalidstatus - + M M - wmanifbsmscmacpacketnumbercounte r - + M M wmanifbsmscmac_pn_ul - + M M wmanifbsmscmac_pn_dl - + M M wmanifbsmscmacvalue - + M M wmanifbsmspkmauthresultcode - + M M wmanifbsmspkmakid - + M M wmanifbskeypushmode - + O M wmanifbskeypushcounter - + O M Appending following description into section 15.1.2.6.1 Definition and legal values: Attribute Name Definition Legal Values 3

securitymanagementid wmanifbspkmbaseid wmanifbspkmtekid wmanifbsmspkmauthid wmanifbspkmdefaultauthlifetime wmanifbspkmdefaultteklifetime wmanifbspkmdefaultselfsigmanufcerttrus t wmanifbspkmcheckcertvalidityperiods wmanifbspmkdefaultprehandshakelifetime wmanifbspmkdefaultlifetime wmanifbsdefaultsachallengetimer wmanifbsdefaultsachallengemaxresends wmanifbsdefaultsatektimer wmanifbsdefaultsatekrequestmaxresends It contains 'name+value' that is the RDN, when naming an instance, of this object class containing this attribute. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. The value of this object is the default lifetime, in seconds, the BS assigns to a new authorization key. The value of this object is the default lifetime, in seconds, the BS assigns to a new Traffic Encryption Key(TEK). This object determines the default trust of all (new) self-signed manufacturer certificates obtained after setting the object. Setting this object to TRUE causes all certificates received thereafter to have their validity periods (and their chain's validity periods) checked against the current time of day. A FALSE setting will cause all certificates received Thereafter to not have their validity periods (nor their chain's validity periods) checked against the current time of day. The lifetime assigned to PMK when created If MSK lifetime is unspecified (i.e. by AAA server), PMK lifetime shall be set to this value.(in seconds) Time prior to re-send of SA-TEK-Challenge (in seconds) Maximum number of transmissions of SATEK-Challenge Time prior to re-send of SA-TEK-Request (in seconds) Maximum number of transmissions of SATEK-Request trusted (1), untrusted (2) TRUE FALSE wmanifbspkmteksaid wmanifbspkmteksatype wmanifbspkmtekdataencryptalg wmanifbspkmtekdataauthentalg wmanifbspkmtekencryptalg wmanifbspkmteklifetime wmanifbspkmtekkeysequencenumber wmanifbspkmtekexpiresold The value of this object is the Security Association ID (SAID). The value of this object is the type of security association. Dynamic does not apply to SSs running in PKM mode. The value of this object is the data encryption algorithm being utilized. The value of this object is the data authentication algorithm being utilized. The value of this object is the TEK key encryption algorithm being utilized. The value of this object is the lifetime, in seconds, the BS assigns to keys for this TEK association. The value of this object is the most recent TEK key sequence number for this SAID. time for expiration of the immediate predecessor of the most recent TEK for this FSM. If this FSM has only one TEK, then the value is the time of activation of this FSM. 4 primarysa(0), staticsa(1), dynamicsa(2) No Data Encryption(0) CBC-Mode(1) AES, CCM Mode(2) No Data Authentication(0) 3-DES EDE with 128-bit key(1) RSA with 1024-bit key(2) AES with 128-bit key(3)

wmanifbspkmtekexpiresnew wmanifbspkmtekreset wmanifbspkmassociatedgkeksequencenumbe r wmanifbspkmsaservicetype time for expiration of the most recent TEK for this FSM. Setting this object to TRUE causes the BS to invalidate the current active TEK(s) (plural due to key transition periods), and to generate a new TEK for the associated SAID; the BS MAY also generate an unsolicited TEK Invalid message, to optimize the TEK synchronization between the BS and the SS. Reading this object always returns FALSE. Associated GKEK sequence number with this TEK-Parameters This attribute indicates service types of the corresponding SA type. TRUE FALSE 0: Unicast service 1: Group multicast service 2: MBS service 3-255: Reserved. wmanifbssspkmauthmacaddress wmanifbssspkmauthkeysequencenumber wmanifbssspkmauthexpiresold wmanifbssspkmauthexpiresnew wmanifbssspkmauthlifetime wmanifbssspkmauthreset wmanifbssspkmauthprimarysaid The value of this object is the physical address of the SS to which the authorization association applies. The value of this object is the most recent authorization key sequence number for this SS. time for expiration of the immediate predecessor of the most recent authorization key for this FSM. If this FSM has only one authorization key, then the value is the time of activation of this FSM. time for expiration of the most recent authorization key for this FSM The vaue of this object is the lifetime, in seconds, the BS assigns to an authorization key for this SS. Setting this object to invalidateauth(2) causes the BS to invalidate the current SS authorization key(s), but not to transmit an Authorization Invalid message nor to invalidate unicast TEKs. Setting this object to sendauthinvalid(3) causes the BS to invalidate the current SS authorization key(s), and to transmit an Authorization Invalid message to the SS, but not to invalidate unicast TEKs. Setting this object to invalidateteks(4) causes the BS to invalidate the current SS authorization key(s), to transmit an Authorization Invalid message to the SS, and to invalidate all unicast TEKs associated with this SS authorization. Reading this object returns the most-recently-set value of this object, or returns noresetrequested(1) if the object has not been set since the last BS reboot. The value of this object is the Primary Security Association identifier. noresetrequested(1), invalidateauth(2), sendauthinvalid(3), invalidateteks(4) 5

wmanifbssspkmauthvalidstatus wmanifbsmscmacpacketnumbercounter wmanifbsmscmac_pn_ul wmanifbsmscmac_pn_dl wmanifbsmscmacvalue wmanifbsmspkmauthresultcode Contains the reason why a SS's certificate is deemed valid or invalid. Return unknown if the SS is running PKM mode. ValidSsChained means the certificate is valid because it chains to a valid certificate. ValidSsTrusted means the certificate is valid because it has been provisioned to be trusted. InvalidSsUntrusted means the certificate is invalid because it has been provisioned to be untrusted. InvalidCAUntrusted means the certificate is invalid because it chains to an untrusted certificate. InvalidSsOther and InvalidCAOther refer to errors in parsing, validity periods, etc, which are attributable to the SS certificate or its chain respectively. Contains the result code of the RSA-based authorization(only for PKMv2) wmanifbsmspkmakid Identify the AK as defined in Table 133 wmanifbskeypushmode wmanifbskeypushcounter Distinguish usage code of a PKMv2 Group Key Update Command message Protect for replay attack. unknown (0), validsschained (1), validsstrusted (2), invalidssuntrusted (3), invalidcauntrusted (4), invalidssother (5), invalidcaother (6) 6