Session-based Security Model for SNMPv3 (SNMPv3/SBSM) David T. Perkins Wes Hardaker NMRG Meeting October 19, 2003

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Transcription:

Session-based Security Model for SNMPv3 (SNMPv3/SBSM) David T. Perkins Wes Hardaker NMRG Meeting October 19, 2003

SNMPv3 Background The following topics were left out due to time considerations: SNMPv3 message format SNMPv3 security and general security terminology The operational problems with using SNMPv3 with USM Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 2

SBSM Characteristics Uses existing security infrastructures for identity authentication (supports many) Both ends of message exchange are authenticated, and may use different mechanisms (including anonymous identity) When session establishment is initiated by a manager, the agent reveals its identity and authenticates before the manager (note that identities are encrypted) Has limited life time keys for message authentication and encryption Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 3

Characteristics (continued) Separates security mechanisms used for identity authentication from those used for message authentication and encryption Has no reprocessing of messages that are duplicated or replayed (reduces cost of packet loss processing and latency) Operates over connection oriented and connectionless transports Can use unmodified VACM, or with slight modifications Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 4

Consequences of Characteristics No (or low) cost to create new identities, change their authentication credentials, or delete, since provided by existing security infrastructure Saved encrypted messages can not be decrypted after compromised identity key Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 5

Most Important Characteristic and Consequence Session establishment based on SIGMA protocol, which has had extensive review SIGMA is simple and efficient, (it minimizes messages and computation) SIGMA protects identity of the session initiator SIGMA - Krawczyk, H., "SIGMA: the `SIGn-and-MAc' Approach to Authenticated Diffie- Hellman and its Use in the IKE Protocols", in Advances in Cryptography - CRYPTO 2003 Proceedings, LNCS 2729, Springer, 2003. available at: http://www.ee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/sigma.html Current draft of IKEv2 is draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-11.txt Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 6

SNMPv3 Message Format msgversion msgglobaldata msgsecurityparms msgdata msgid msgmaxsize msgflags msgsecuritymodel Present legal values are: '100'b - a noauthnoencr request '000'b - a noauthnoencr response or unacknowledged notification '101'b - an authnoencr request '001'b - an authnoencr response or unacknowledged notification '111'b - an authencr request '011'b - an authencr response or unacknowledged notification New format for SBSM New value for SBSM Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 7

SBSM Overview Security based on sessions Three phases of a session, which are: Establishment: SNMP entity identity authentication, and creation of session authentication and encryption keys Running: SNMP operations Termination: graceful close of session Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 8

SBSM Session Establishment Initiator SNMP GET message SBSMInit1 SBSMInit3 Session established Responder SNMP REPORT message SBSMInit2 SBSMRunning May iterate to support various mechanisms for identity authentication Note: for SNMPv3 messages containing SBSMInit[1,2,or 3] messages, the value for field msgflags indicates noauthnoencr security level Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 9

Session Operation Initiator Responder SBSMRunning SBSMRunning Note: SNMPv3 messages containing SBSMRunning messages are always authenticated, and are possibly encrypted using the session auth and encr keys. Thus, the value for field msgflags never indicates noauthnoencr security level. Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 10

Session Graceful Termination Details later Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 11

Use With VACM VACM has abstract function isaccessallowed, which has the following input parameters: security model ID: the message level security model security name: the identity for the operation security level: one of noauthnoencr, authnoencr, or authencr operation type: one of read, write, or notify context ID: the context which contains the instance of management information instance ID: the ID of the instance of management information for the operation Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 12

VACM Modification Abstract function isaccessallowed has input securityname and securitymodelid, which maps to a group name via table vacmsecuritytogrouptable Clarification: SBSM is really a higher level security model that supports many combinations of endpoint identity authentication. The security model ID for VACM is the identity security model, which is called the security sub-model. Issue: The to group table contains security names, which means that it must be updated for each new security identity, and if a system is compromised, then provides a list to help attacker. Need more study to determine if another or additional mechanisms are needed to get group ID Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 13

Details on SBSM security parms In an SNMPv3 message, field security parms is an octet string, which is the BER serialization of a security model dependent ASN.1 value For SBSM, the ASN.1 definition of a value is: SBSMSecurityParameters ::= CHOICE { sbsm-establishment1[0] SBSMInit1, sbsm-establishment2[1] SBSMInit2, sbsm-establishment3[2] SBSMInit3, sbsm-running[3] -- other values for termination and errors } SBSMRunning Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 14

SBSM Session Attributes local-identifier Unsigned32, remote-identifier Unsigned32, session-status INTEGER { init1(1), init2(2), up(3) } diffiehelmanexponent OCTET STRING, outgoingsequencenumber Unsigned32, incomingminsequencenumber Unsigned32, security-sub-model Unsigned32, securityname OCTET STRING, authenticationtype OBJECT IDENTIFER, incomingauthenticationkey OBJECT STRING, outgoingauthenticationkey OBJECT STRING, Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 15

Session Attributes (continued) encryptiontype OBJECT IDENTIFER, incomingencryptionparameters OCTET STRING, outgoingencryptionparameters OCTET STRING, incomingencryptionkey OBJECT STRING, outgoingencryptionkey OBJECT STRING, window-size INTEGER (1..255), starttime Unsigned32, legalsessionlength Unsigned32, -- seconds remoteengineid OCTET STRING (0 5..32) -- data cache array for replaying responses lastincominginit OCTET STRING, messagecachelist SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..255)) OF SBSMMessageCache Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 16

SBSMInit1 Generation Results SBSMInit1 is used to start establishment of a session Causes creation of a session instance Generator fills in: init-identifier session-status diffiehelmanexponent outgoingencryptionparameters Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 17

SBSMInit1 Reception Results Reception results in creation of a session instance with field values: local-identifier remote-identifier authenticationtype and encryptiontype incomingencryptionparameters outgoingencryptionparameters Incoming/outgoing Auth/Encr Key starttime and legalsessionlength lastincominginit, messagecachelist[0].message Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 18

SBSMInit2 Reception Results Reception results in update of the following: Incoming/outgoing Auth/Encr Key authenticationtype and encryptiontype remoteengineid window-size outgoingsequencenumber and incomingminsequencenumber session-status securityname starttime and legalsessionlength Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 19

SBSMInit3 Reception Results Reception results in update of the following: window-size session-status securityname starttime and legalsessionlength remoteengineid Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 20

What s Next? Further update of I-D to polish terminology, and fill in small missing pieces Complete the error handling descriptions Work through notification generation using the model and MIB from RFC 3414 (SNMP Applications) (was RFC Choose a couple of Identity Authentication types, document well, and write code Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 21

Questions Oct 7, 2003 NMRG Meeting 22