Scratch & Vote: Self-Contained Paper-Based Cryptographic Voting
|
|
|
- Anna Beasley
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Scratch & Vote: Self-Contained Paper-Based Cryptographic Voting Ben Adida Ronald L. Rivest 30 October 2006
2
3 The Next Harvard Pres!
4 Chain of Custody
5 Chain of Custody /* * source * code */ 1 if (... Vendor
6 Chain of Custody Voting Machine 2 /* * source * code */ if (... 1 Vendor
7 Chain of Custody Polling Location 3 Voting Machine 2 /* * source * code */ if (... 1 Vendor
8 Chain of Custody Polling Location 4 3 Voting Machine 2 /* * source * code */ if (... 1 Vendor Alice
9 Chain of Custody Polling Location 4 3 Voting Machine 2 /* * source * code */ if (... 1 Vendor Alice
10 Chain of Custody Polling Location 4 3 Voting Machine 2 /* * source * code */ if (... 1 Vendor Alice 5 Ballot Box Collection
11 Chain of Custody Polling Location 4 3 Voting Machine 2 /* * source * code */ if (... 1 Vendor Alice Results Ballot Box Collection
12 Chain of Custody Alice Polling Location 4 3 Voting Machine VVPAT 2 /* * source * code */ if (... 1 Vendor Results Ballot Box Collection
13 End-to-End
14 End-to-End Voting Machine /* * source * code */ if (... Vendor Polling Location
15 End-to-End Voting Machine /* * source * code */ if (... Vendor Polling Location Ballot Box / Bulletin Board Alice
16 End-to-End Voting Machine /* * source * code */ if (... Vendor Polling Location Ballot Box / Bulletin Board Results... Alice
17 End-to-End Voting Machine /* * source * code */ if (... Vendor Polling Location Ballot Box / Bulletin Board Results... Alice 1 Receipt
18 End-to-End Voting Machine /* * source * code */ if (... Vendor Polling Location Ballot Box / Bulletin Board Results... Alice 1 2 Receipt
19 Cryptographic End-to-End Voting Voting Machine /* * source * code */ if (... Vendor Polling Location Ballot Box / Bulletin Board Results... Alice 1 2 Receipt
20 Cryptographic Open-Audit End-to-End Voting Voting Machine /* * source * code */ if (... Vendor Polling Location Ballot Box / Bulletin Board Results... Alice 1 2 Receipt
21 Properties of OAV (1) Alice verifies her vote. (2) Everyone verifies tallying. (3) Alice cannot be coerced by Eve.
22 A Bulletin Board Bulletin Board Bridget: Clinton Carol: Rice
23 A Bulletin Board Bulletin Board Bridget: Clinton Carol: Rice Alice
24 A Bulletin Board Bulletin Board Alice: Rice Bridget: Clinton Carol: Rice Alice
25 A Bulletin Board Bulletin Board Alice: Rice Bridget: Clinton Carol: Rice Tally Rice...2 Clinton...1 Alice
26 An Encrypted Bulletin Board Bulletin Board Alice: Rice Bridget: Clinton Carol: Rice Tally Rice...2 Clinton...1 Alice
27 Verification Ballot Data Flow
28 Alice Bridget encryption Encrypted Votes Verification Ballot Data Flow
29 Alice Bridget encryption Encrypted Votes Verification Ballot Data Flow
30 Alice Bridget encryption Encrypted Votes anonymization Verification Ballot Data Flow
31 decryption Alice Bridget encryption Encrypted Votes anonymization Verification Ballot Data Flow
32 decryption Alice Bridget encryption Encrypted Votes anonymization Tally Results Verification Ballot Data Flow
33 decryption Alice Bridget encryption Encrypted Votes anonymization Tally Registration Database Results Verification Ballot Data Flow
34 The Need for Simple
35 The Need for Simple Too complicated = disenfranchisement. voter experience needs to be almost as simple as it is today
36 The Need for Simple Too complicated = disenfranchisement. voter experience needs to be almost as simple as it is today Intuitive enough for officials to adopt
37 The Need for Simple Too complicated = disenfranchisement. voter experience needs to be almost as simple as it is today Intuitive enough for officials to adopt But... let s not expect everyone to understand everything.
38 Continuing the Simplicity Trend Chaum s Punchscan Ryan s Prêt-à-Voter Benaloh s simple cryptographic voting
39 Scratch-and-Vote Experience
40 Charlie Adam Bob Bob DavidCharlie David Adam 1. Receive two ballots.
41 Charlie Adam Bob David Charlie Adam Bob David r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 2. Choose one randomly for auditing by scratch-off.
42 Bob Charlie David Adam 3. Vote.
43 arlie Bob David Adam Adam Bob Charlie David Charlie Bob Adam David Bob Charlie David Adam 4. Tear & Discard left half of ballot.
44 5. Tear & Discard scratch-off. Scan & take home
45 Tallying
46 Bulletin Board Alice Bridget Carol
47 PARAMETERS #1 - Adam #2 - Bob #3 - Charlie #4 - David M=28, Key = pk Bob Charlie David E pk (2 28 ; r 1 ) E pk (2 56 ; r 2 ) E pk (2 84 ; r 3 ) E pk (2 0 ; r 4 ) Adam H(pk) r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4
48 Homomorphic Tallying Vote for Adam Vote for Bob Vote for Charlie Vote for David Sample Tally [B+2001, P1999]
49 Proof of Ballot (NIZK)
50 Proof of Ballot (NIZK) Malicious Voter submits: Enc(1000)
51 Proof of Ballot (NIZK) Malicious Voter submits: Enc(1000) in S&V, ciphertexts are picked ahead of time
52 Proof of Ballot (NIZK) Malicious Voter submits: Enc(1000) in S&V, ciphertexts are picked ahead of time but... what if election officials collude with a voter to throw the election with a bad ballot?
53 Proof of Ballot (NIZK) Malicious Voter submits: Enc(1000) in S&V, ciphertexts are picked ahead of time but... what if election officials collude with a voter to throw the election with a bad ballot? election officials must prepare proofs of correct ballot form ahead of time, on bulletin board (~80K per full ballot).
54 Practical Considerations 5 questions, 5 options per question. Ballot Verification: less than a second. Barcode Encoding: PDF417 open standard. Barcode Size: 10 square inches of barcode for a full sheet visual ballot. Proof Time: ~3 seconds per ballot.
55 Limitations Write-in Votes: not supported Take-Home Receipt: not currently legal
56 Scratch & Vote Personal Verification: scratch and verify Open-Audit: anyone can verify the tally Incoercible: voting booth & encryption Simple: common & cheap tech, process is close to current voting.
57 Questions?
A proposal for verifiable intra-institutional elections over Plone
A proposal for verifiable intra-institutional elections over Plone Sergio Rajsbaum Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) Plone Symposium East 2011 The case of the Institute of Mathematics (UNAM)
Verifiability experiences in government online voting
Verifiability experiences in government online voting E-Vote-ID 2017 Jordi Puiggalí CSO and SVP of Research & Security Scytl Secure Electronic Voting October, 2017 Online voting security and verifiability
Privacy Enhancing Technologies CSE 701 Fall 2017
Privacy Enhancing Technologies Lecture 2: Anonymity Applications Department of Computer Science and Engineering University at Buffalo 1 Lecture Outline Anonymous communication mixes, anonymizing proxies,
A new secure and practical electronic voting protocol without revealing voters identity
A new secure and practical electronic voting protocol without revealing voters identity Sadegh Jafari Computer Engineering Department Islamic Azad University, Zanjan Branch Zanjan, Iran jafari.s66@gmail.com
Bitcoin, Security for Cloud & Big Data
Bitcoin, Security for Cloud & Big Data CS 161: Computer Security Prof. David Wagner April 18, 2013 Bitcoin Public, distributed, peer-to-peer, hash-chained audit log of all transactions ( block chain ).
Performance Optimization of a Split-Value Voting System. Charles Z. Liu
Performance Optimization of a Split-Value Voting System by Charles Z. Liu Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Cryptanalysis of a Universally Verifiable Efficient Re-encryption Mixnet
Cryptanalysis of a Universally Verifiable Efficient Re-encryption Mixnet Shahram Khazaei, khazaei@kth.se Björn Terelius, terelius@kth.se Douglas Wikström, dog@csc.kth.se February 24, 2012 Abstract We study
ADVANCES IN CRYPTOGRAPHIC VOTING SYSTEMS. Key words: voting systems, cryptographic, election administration, secretballot BEN ADIDA MIT
CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT A multi-disciplinary, collaborative project of the California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge,
Kleptographic Attacks on E-Voting Schemes
Kleptographic Attacks on E-Voting Schemes Marcin Gogolewski 1, Marek Klonowski 2, Przemek Kubiak 2 Mirek Kutyłowski 2, Anna Lauks 2, Filip Zagórski 2 1 Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science, Adam
Activity Guide - Public Key Cryptography
Unit 2 Lesson 19 Name(s) Period Date Activity Guide - Public Key Cryptography Introduction This activity is similar to the cups and beans encryption we did in a previous lesson. However, instead of using
Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic Encryption Travis Mayberry Cloud Computing Cloud Computing Cloud Computing Cloud Computing Cloud Computing Northeastern saves money on infrastructure and gets the benefit of redundancy and
Return Code Schemes for Electronic Voting Systems
Return Code Schemes for Electronic Voting Systems Shahram Khazaei Douglas Wikström Sharif University of Technology, Iran KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden E-Vote-ID 2017 Presented by: Johannes
A New Sender-Side Public-Key Deniable Encryption Scheme with Fast Decryption
KSII TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS VOL. 8, NO. 9, Sep. 2014 3231 Copyright c 2014 KSII A New Sender-Side Public-Key Deniable Encryption Scheme with Fast Decryption Tamer Mohamed Barakat
A Hybrid Touch Interface for Prêt àvoter. Chris Culnane, University of Surrey Trustworthy Voting Systems Project
A Hybrid Touch Interface for Prêt àvoter Chris Culnane, University of Surrey Trustworthy Voting Systems Project Overview Brief Introduction to Prêt àvoter Motivation Hybrid Touch Concept Implementation
Platform-independent Secure Blockchain-Based Voting System
Platform-independent Secure Blockchain-Based Voting System Bin Yu 1, Joseph Liu 1, Amin Sakzad 1, Surya Nepal 2, Ron Steinfeld 1, Paul Rimba 2, and Man Ho Au 3 1 Monash University Australia 2 CSIRO Australia
Automated Analysis of Accountability
Alessandro Bruni, Rosario Giustolisi, Carsten Schürmann Information Security Conference 23 November 2017 Ho Chi Mihn, Vietnam Motivation Automated Analysis of Accountability Motivation Automated Analysis
Problem: Equivocation!
Bitcoin: 10,000 foot view Bitcoin and the Blockchain New bitcoins are created every ~10 min, owned by miner (more on this later) Thereafter, just keep record of transfers e.g., Alice pays Bob 1 BTC COS
Blind Signatures and Their Applications
Department of Computer Science, National Chiao Tung University 1 / 15 Cryptanalysis Lab Outline 1 Digital Signature 2 Blind signature 3 Partially blind signature 2 / 15 Cryptanalysis Lab Digital Signature
Cryptography (cont.)
CSE 484 / CSE M 584 (Autumn 2011) Cryptography (cont.) Daniel Halperin Tadayoshi Kohno Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS: REVOCABLE ANONYMITY AND E-VOTING
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS: REVOCABLE ANONYMITY AND E-VOTING By BEKİR ARSLAN A PROPOSAL PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
CS 161 Computer Security
Popa & Wagner Spring 2016 CS 161 Computer Security Discussion 5 Week of February 19, 2017 Question 1 Diffie Hellman key exchange (15 min) Recall that in a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, there are values
Symmetric Cryptography
CSE 484 (Winter 2010) Symmetric Cryptography Tadayoshi Kohno Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials...
Remote E-Voting System
Remote E-Voting System Crypto2-Spring 2013 Benjamin Kaiser Jacob Shedd Jeremy White Phases Initialization Registration Voting Verifying Activities Trusted Authority (TA) distributes 4 keys to Registrar,
Cryptography III. Public-Key Cryptography Digital Signatures. 2/1/18 Cryptography III
Cryptography III Public-Key Cryptography Digital Signatures 2/1/18 Cryptography III 1 Public Key Cryptography 2/1/18 Cryptography III 2 Key pair Public key: shared with everyone Secret key: kept secret,
Scaling Privacy Guarantees in Code Verification Elections
Scaling Privacy Guarantees in Code Verification Elections Anthi Orfanou Columbia University July 18, 2013 Joint work with Aggelos Kiayias (University of Athens) Anthi Orfanou (Columbia University) Scaling
Automatic Verification of Remote Electronic Voting Protocols
Automatic Verification of Remote Electronic Voting Protocols Cătălin Hrițcu Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany Joint work with: Michael Backes and Matteo Maffei Microsoft Research Cambridge, July
Notes for Lecture 14
COS 533: Advanced Cryptography Lecture 14 (November 6, 2017) Lecturer: Mark Zhandry Princeton University Scribe: Fermi Ma Notes for Lecture 14 1 Applications of Pairings 1.1 Recap Consider a bilinear e
Privacy-Preserving & User-Auditable Pseudonym Systems. Jan Camenisch, Anja Lehmann IBM Research Zurich
Privacy-Preserving & User-Auditable Pseudonym Systems Jan Camenisch, Anja Lehmann IBM Research Zurich Motivation: How to maintain related yet distributed data? examples: social security system, ehealth
Cryptographic Voting Protocols: A Systems Perspective
Cryptographic Voting Protocols: A Systems Perspective Chris Karlof Naveen Sastry David Wagner {ckarlof, nks, daw}@cs.berkeley.edu University of California, Berkeley Abstract Cryptographic voting protocols
Cryptography: Symmetric Encryption (finish), Hash Functions, Message Authentication Codes
CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy Cryptography: Symmetric Encryption (finish), Hash Functions, Message Authentication Codes Spring 2017 Franziska (Franzi) Roesner franzi@cs.washington.edu
PROCESSING AB ELECTION DAY REGISTRATIONS
PROCESSING AB ELECTION DAY REGISTRATIONS 6. Click the field to the left of the Search Using AB Record ID button. NOTES There is no longer a legal requirement to enter voucher information in SVRS. If entering/linking
Cryptography. Andreas Hülsing. 6 September 2016
Cryptography Andreas Hülsing 6 September 2016 1 / 21 Announcements Homepage: http: //www.hyperelliptic.org/tanja/teaching/crypto16/ Lecture is recorded First row might be on recordings. Anything organizational:
Du-Vote: Remote Electronic Voting with Untrusted Computers
Du-Vote: Remote Electronic Voting with Untrusted Computers Gurchetan S. Grewal School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK research@gurchetan.com Mark D. Ryan School of Computer Science, University
Voting System Security as per the VVSG
Voting System Security as per the VVSG Austin Conference on State Certification Testing for Voting Systems (2017) Michael Santos Test Manager SLI Compliance Elements of Security Outside Vendor Control
To Du or not to Du: A Security Analysis of Du-Vote
To Du or not to Du: A Security Analysis of Du-Vote Steve Kremer, Peter Rønne To cite this version: Steve Kremer, Peter Rønne. To Du or not to Du: A Security Analysis of Du-Vote. IEEE European Symposium
Encrypted Data Deduplication in Cloud Storage
Encrypted Data Deduplication in Cloud Storage Chun- I Fan, Shi- Yuan Huang, Wen- Che Hsu Department of Computer Science and Engineering Na>onal Sun Yat- sen University Kaohsiung, Taiwan AsiaJCIS 2015 Outline
CS573 Data Privacy and Security. Cryptographic Primitives and Secure Multiparty Computation. Li Xiong
CS573 Data Privacy and Security Cryptographic Primitives and Secure Multiparty Computation Li Xiong Outline Cryptographic primitives Symmetric Encryption Public Key Encryption Secure Multiparty Computation
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS: PRACTICAL REVOCATION AND KEY ROTATION
#RSAC SESSION ID: CRYP-W04 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS: PRACTICAL REVOCATION AND KEY ROTATION Adam Shull Recent Ph.D. Graduate Indiana University Access revocation on the cloud #RSAC sk sk Enc Pub Sym pk k
CSE 127: Computer Security Cryptography. Kirill Levchenko
CSE 127: Computer Security Cryptography Kirill Levchenko October 24, 2017 Motivation Two parties want to communicate securely Secrecy: No one else can read messages Integrity: messages cannot be modified
Introduction. CSE 5351: Introduction to cryptography Reading assignment: Chapter 1 of Katz & Lindell
Introduction CSE 5351: Introduction to cryptography Reading assignment: Chapter 1 of Katz & Lindell 1 Cryptography Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary: 1. secret writing 2. the enciphering and deciphering
VoteBox: a verifiable, tamper-evident electronic voting system
VoteBox: a verifiable, tamper-evident electronic voting system Daniel R. Sandler Rice University February 17, 2009 The Johns Hopkins University Talk outline Background Trustworthiness of electronic voting
Distributed-Application Security
Distributed-Application Security Spam Spams Spam referred to unsolicited bulk email Spam emails contain advertisement, viruses, malware Spams emails are used to gather information about the victim Harvesting
Foundations of Cryptography CS Shweta Agrawal
Foundations of Cryptography CS 6111 Shweta Agrawal Course Information 4-5 homeworks (20% total) A midsem (25%) A major (35%) A project (20%) Attendance required as per institute policy Challenge questions
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Anonymous Credentials and Pseudonym Systems. Anja Lehmann IBM Research Zurich
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Anonymous Credentials and Pseudonym Systems Anja Lehmann IBM Research Zurich ROADMAP Anonymous Credentials privacy-preserving (user) authentication Pseudonym Systems privacy-preserving
Cryptography Lecture 4. Attacks against Block Ciphers Introduction to Public Key Cryptography. November 14, / 39
Cryptography 2017 Lecture 4 Attacks against Block Ciphers Introduction to Public Key Cryptography November 14, 2017 1 / 39 What have seen? What are we discussing today? What is coming later? Lecture 3
CNT Computer and Network Security: Privacy/Anonymity
CNT 5410 - Computer and Network Security: Privacy/Anonymity Professor Kevin Butler Fall 2015 When Confidentiality is Insufficient 2 Privacy!= Confidentiality Confidentiality refers to the property of the
The Interactive Guide to Protecting Your Election Website
The Interactive Guide to Protecting Your Election Website 1 INTRODUCTION Cloudflare is on a mission to help build a better Internet. Cloudflare is one of the world s largest networks. Today, businesses,
The power of Blockchain: Smart Contracts. Foteini Baldimtsi
The power of Blockchain: Smart Contracts Foteini Baldimtsi The Blockchain at the heart of a cryptocurrency Alice sends 2 John sends 1 Dave sends 5 to Bob to Eve to Alice Bob sends 1 Eve sends 4 to Dave
Notes for Lecture 5. 2 Non-interactive vs. Interactive Key Exchange
COS 597C: Recent Developments in Program Obfuscation Lecture 5 (9/29/16) Lecturer: Mark Zhandry Princeton University Scribe: Fermi Ma Notes for Lecture 5 1 Last Time Last time, we saw that we can get public
Block ciphers used to encode messages longer than block size Needs to be done correctly to preserve security Will look at five ways of doing this
Lecturers: Mark D. Ryan and David Galindo. Cryptography 2015. Slide: 74 Block ciphers used to encode messages longer than block size Needs to be done correctly to preserve security Will look at five ways
INSE 6110 Midterm LAST NAME FIRST NAME. Fall 2016 Duration: 80 minutes ID NUMBER. QUESTION Total GRADE. Notes:
A INSE 6110 Midterm Fall 2016 Duration: 80 minutes LAST NAME FIRST NAME ID NUMBER QUESTION 1 2 3 4 Total GRADE Notes: 1) Calculator (non-programming) allowed, nothing else permitted 2) Each page contains
CS 425 / ECE 428 Distributed Systems Fall 2017
CS 425 / ECE 428 Distributed Systems Fall 2017 Indranil Gupta (Indy) Dec 5, 2017 Lecture 27: Security All slides IG Security Threats Leakage Unauthorized access to service or data E.g., Someone knows your
ENEE 457: E-Cash and Bitcoin
ENEE 457: E-Cash and Bitcoin Charalampos (Babis) Papamanthou cpap@umd.edu Money today Any problems? Cash is cumbersome and can be forged Credit card transactions require centralized online bank are not
Formal Analysis of Chaumian Mix Nets with Randomized Partial Checking
Formal Analysis of Chaumian Mix Nets with Randomized Partial Checking Ralf Küsters University of Trier, Germany kuesters@uni-trier.de Tomasz Truderung University of Trier, Germany truderung@uni-trier.de
Lecture 07: Private-key Encryption. Private-key Encryption
Lecture 07: Three algorithms Key Generation: Generate the secret key sk Encryption: Given the secret key sk and a message m, it outputs the cipher-text c (Note that the encryption algorithm can be a randomized
Public Key Cryptography and the RSA Cryptosystem
Public Key Cryptography and the RSA Cryptosystem Two people, say Alice and Bob, would like to exchange secret messages; however, Eve is eavesdropping: One technique would be to use an encryption technique
Anonymous Credentials: How to show credentials without compromising privacy. Melissa Chase Microsoft Research
Anonymous Credentials: How to show credentials without compromising privacy Melissa Chase Microsoft Research Credentials: Motivation ID cards Sometimes used for other uses E.g. prove you re over 21, or
1 Quantum Cryptography
J. Rothberg March 3, 204 Quantum Cryptography. Quantum Key Distribution A better name for this application of Quantum Mechanics is Quantum Key Distribution since what is transmitted is not a message but
Securing Bitcoin wallets: A new DSA threshold signature scheme that is usable in the real world
Securing Bitcoin wallets: A new DSA threshold signature scheme that is usable in the real world https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/013 Rosario Gennaro, Steven Goldfeder, Arvind Narayanan Spending bitcoins is
Type-Based Verification of Electronic Voting Protocols
Type-Based Verification of Electronic Voting Protocols Véronique Cortier 1, Fabienne Eigner 2, Steve Kremer 1, Matteo Maffei 2, and Cyrille Wiedling 3 1 LORIA, CNRS & INRIA & University of Lorraine, France
Classification of approaches Overview of (cryptographic) primitives
Winterschool NISNet-Finse 25-30 April 2010 Tuesday April 27 9:00-12:30h Electronic Voting Berry Schoenmakers Coding & Crypto group Department of Mathematics & Computer Science Outline Evoting and cryptography:
CSCI 454/554 Computer and Network Security. Topic 5.2 Public Key Cryptography
CSCI 454/554 Computer and Network Security Topic 5.2 Public Key Cryptography Outline 1. Introduction 2. RSA 3. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 4. Digital Signature Standard 2 Introduction Public Key Cryptography
Anonymity and Privacy
Computer Security Spring 2008 Anonymity and Privacy Aggelos Kiayias University of Connecticut Anonymity in networks Anonymous Credentials Anonymous Payments Anonymous E-mail and Routing E-voting Group,
What did we talk about last time? Public key cryptography A little number theory
Week 4 - Friday What did we talk about last time? Public key cryptography A little number theory If p is prime and a is a positive integer not divisible by p, then: a p 1 1 (mod p) Assume a is positive
CPSC 467: Cryptography and Computer Security
CPSC 467: Cryptography and Computer Michael J. Fischer Lecture 4 September 11, 2017 CPSC 467, Lecture 4 1/23 Analyzing Confidentiality of Cryptosystems Secret ballot elections Information protection Adversaries
Outline. CSCI 454/554 Computer and Network Security. Introduction. Topic 5.2 Public Key Cryptography. 1. Introduction 2. RSA
CSCI 454/554 Computer and Network Security Topic 5.2 Public Key Cryptography 1. Introduction 2. RSA Outline 3. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 4. Digital Signature Standard 2 Introduction Public Key Cryptography
CSC 5930/9010 Modern Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
CSC 5930/9010 Modern Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography Professor Henry Carter Fall 2018 Recap Number theory provides useful tools for manipulating integers and primes modulo a large value Abstract
Certificateless Public Key Cryptography
Certificateless Public Key Cryptography Mohsen Toorani Department of Informatics University of Bergen Norsk Kryptoseminar November 9, 2011 1 Public Key Cryptography (PKC) Also known as asymmetric cryptography.
Outline. Public Key Cryptography. Applications of Public Key Crypto. Applications (Cont d)
Outline AIT 682: Network and Systems Security 1. Introduction 2. RSA 3. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 4. Digital Signature Standard Topic 5.2 Public Key Cryptography Instructor: Dr. Kun Sun 2 Public Key
GUIDANCE ON ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM PREPARATION AND SECURITY
September, 2016 GUIDANCE ON ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM PREPARATION AND SECURITY As a reminder for counties, and refresher on good cyber hygiene practices, DOS recommends the following procedures in the preparation
Definition. Quantifying Anonymity. Anonymous Communication. How can we calculate how anonymous we are? Who you are from the communicating party
Definition Anonymous Communication Hiding identities of parties involved in communications from each other, or from third-parties Who you are from the communicating party Who you are talking to from everyone
Chapter 13. Digital Cash. Information Security/System Security p. 570/626
Chapter 13 Digital Cash Information Security/System Security p. 570/626 Introduction While cash is used in illegal activities such as bribing money laundering tax evasion it also protects privacy: not
Master of Science Project. An Internet-Based Voting System for Student Government Elections
Master of Science Project An Internet-Based Voting System for Student Government Elections Sungho Maeung Computer Science Department Rochester Institute of Technology July 27, 2005
Electronic voting: Methods and protocols
James Madison University JMU Scholarly Commons Masters Theses The Graduate School Spring 2013 Electronic voting: Methods and protocols Christopher Andrew Collord James Madison University Follow this and
Randomized Partial Checking Revisited
Randomized Partial Checking Revisited Shahram Khazaei, khazaei@kth.se Douglas Wikström, dog@csc.kth.se February 13, 2012 Abstract We study mix-nets with randomized partial checking (RPC) as proposed by
Decentralized E-Voting on Android Devices Using Homomorphic Tallying
Master s Thesis Decentralized E-Voting on Android Devices Using Homomorphic Tallying Jürg Ritter Bern University of Applied Sciences Engineering and Information Technology CH-2501 Biel, Switzerland February
Blockchain. CS 240: Computing Systems and Concurrency Lecture 20. Marco Canini
Blockchain CS 240: Computing Systems and Concurrency Lecture 20 Marco Canini Credits: Michael Freedman and Kyle Jamieson developed much of the original material. Bitcoin: 10,000 foot view New bitcoins
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS: REVOCABLE ANONYMITY AND E-VOTING
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS: REVOCABLE ANONYMITY AND E-VOTING By BEKİR ARSLAN A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
Applied Cryptography Protocol Building Blocks
Applied Cryptography Protocol Building Blocks Sape J. Mullender Huygens Systems Research Laboratory Universiteit Twente Enschede 1 Protocols An algorithm describes a series of steps carried out by a process
Lecture 02: Historical Encryption Schemes. Lecture 02: Historical Encryption Schemes
What is Encryption Parties involved: Alice: The Sender Bob: The Receiver Eve: The Eavesdropper Aim of Encryption Alice wants to send a message to Bob The message should remain hidden from Eve What distinguishes
Lecturers: Mark D. Ryan and David Galindo. Cryptography Slide: 24
Assume encryption and decryption use the same key. Will discuss how to distribute key to all parties later Symmetric ciphers unusable for authentication of sender Lecturers: Mark D. Ryan and David Galindo.
Secrets & Lies, Knowledge & Trust. (Modern Cryptography) COS 116 4/20/2006 Instructor: Sanjeev Arora
Secrets & Lies, Knowledge & Trust. (Modern Cryptography) COS 116 4/20/2006 Instructor: Sanjeev Arora Cryptography: 1 :secret writing 2:the enciphering and deciphering of messages in secret code or cipher
Unbounded Inner Product Functional Encryption from Bilinear Maps ASIACRYPT 2018
Unbounded Inner Product Functional Encryption from Bilinear Maps ASIACRYPT 2018 Junichi Tomida (NTT), Katsuyuki Takashima (Mitsubishi Electric) Functional Encryption[OʼNeill10, BSW11] msk Bob f(x) sk f
Homework 1 CS161 Computer Security, Spring 2008 Assigned 2/4/08 Due 2/13/08
Homework 1 CS161 Computer Security, Spring 2008 Assigned 2/4/08 Due 2/13/08 This homework assignment is due Wednesday, February 13 at the beginning of lecture. Please bring a hard copy to class; either
Spatial Encryption. March 17, Adam Barth, Dan Boneh, Mike Hamburg
Adam Barth Dan Boneh Mike Hamburg March 17, 2008 Traditional Public-Key Infrastructure CA Alice Bob Traditional Public-Key Infrastructure CA PK Bob, proof of identity Alice Bob Traditional Public-Key Infrastructure
Introduction to Modern Cryptography. Benny Chor
Introduction to Modern Cryptography Benny Chor Identification (User Authentication) Fiat-Shamir Scheme Lecture 12 Tel-Aviv University 4 January 2010 Model and Major Issues Alice wishes to prove to Bob
STAR-Vote VVSG Gap Analysis
Summary of Notable Discrepancies Compliant Non-Material Discrepancy Non-Compliant Discrepancy 2005 2007 2012 Explanation of Gap Retrieval of human-readable ballot images Independent Safety Certification
Cryptography (Overview)
Cryptography (Overview) Some history Caesar cipher, rot13 substitution ciphers, etc. Enigma (Turing) Modern secret key cryptography DES, AES Public key cryptography RSA, digital signatures Cryptography
Lecture 9a: Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) March, 2004
Internet and Intranet Protocols and Applications Lecture 9a: Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) March, 2004 Arthur Goldberg Computer Science Department New York University artg@cs.nyu.edu Security Achieved by
BALLOT ON DEMAND PROCEDURES FOR THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK
BALLOT ON DEMAND PROCEDURES FOR THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK Revision History: Original Effective Date 4/5/2016 Revision Date N/A Version # 1 Authors EVS Department Requested By Board
Eating from the Tree of Ignorance Part 2
Eating from the Tree of Ignorance Part 2 Jan van Eijck, CWI Amsterdam and Uil-OTS Utrecht Rineke Verbrugge, Institute of AI, University of Groningen ESSLLI 2009, Bordeaux, July 22, 2009 Overview of Part
CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security. Spring 2008 Lecture 23
CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security Spring 2008 Lecture 23 Announcements Project 4 is Due Friday May 2nd at 11:59 PM Final exam: Friday, May 12th. Noon - 2:00pm DRLB A6 Today: Last details
EECS 498 Introduction to Distributed Systems
EECS 498 Introduction to Distributed Systems Fall 2017 Harsha V. Madhyastha Today Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer digital currency Spark: In-memory big data processing December 4, 2017 EECS 498 Lecture 21 2 December
Introduction to Cryptography Lecture 7
Introduction to Cryptography Lecture 7 El Gamal Encryption RSA Encryption Benny Pinkas page 1 1 Public key encryption Alice publishes a public key PK Alice. Alice has a secret key SK Alice. Anyone knowing
How not to Prove Yourself: Pitfalls of the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic and Applications to Helios
How not to Prove Yourself: Pitfalls of the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic and Applications to Helios David Bernhard 1, Olivier Pereira 2, and Bogdan Warinschi 1 1 University of Bristol 2 Université Catholique de
Lecture 20: Public-key Encryption & Hybrid Encryption. Public-key Encryption
Lecture 20: & Hybrid Encryption Lecture 20: & Hybrid Encryption Overview Suppose there is a 2-round Key-Agreement protocol. This means that there exists a protocol where Bob sends the first message m B
Secure Voting in the Cloud using Homomorphic Encryption and Mobile Agents
Secure Voting in the Cloud using Homomorphic Encryption and Mobile Agents Mark A. Will, Brandon Nicholson, Marc Tiehuis and Ryan K L Ko Cyber Security Lab The University of Waikato Hamilton, New Zealand
CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security
Outline ZKIP Other IP CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security Lecture 19 Michael J. Fischer Department of Computer Science Yale University March 31, 2010 Michael J. Fischer CPSC 467b, Lecture 19
Introduction to Cryptography Lecture 7
Introduction to Cryptography Lecture 7 Public-Key Encryption: El-Gamal, RSA Benny Pinkas page 1 1 Public key encryption Alice publishes a public key PK Alice. Alice has a secret key SK Alice. Anyone knowing
Cryptography: Symmetric Encryption (finish), Hash Functions, Message Authentication Codes
CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy Cryptography: Symmetric Encryption (finish), Hash Functions, Message Authentication Codes Spring 2016 Franziska (Franzi) Roesner franzi@cs.washington.edu