Program Vulnerability Analysis Using DBI

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1 Program Vulnerability Analysis Using DBI CodeEngn Co-Administrator CodeEngn ReverseEngineering Conference

2 Outline What is DBI? Before that How? A simple example Demo! 2

3 What is DBI? Instrumentation Keyword : To gather information, insert code Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Keyword : Running program, special purpose, insert code Arbitrary Code Running 3

4 Static Analysis Summary - Without running - Considering all execution paths in a program - Tools : Sonar, cppcheck, Prevent, KlockWork 4

5 Static Analysis Check Out Coding Compile Error Modify Defect Check In 5

6 Dynamic Analysis Summary - Running - Considering single execution path - Input dependency 6

7 Winner Dynamic Analysis More precise Because > works with real values in the run-time if ( you think Ollydbg & IDA Disassembler ) Easy to understand 7

8 Source Analysis Source Analysis - Language dependency - Access high-level information - Tools : Source insight 8

9 Binary Analysis Binary Analysis - Platform dependency - Access low-level information ex) register - Complexity, Lack of Higher-level semantics, Code Obfuscation 9

10 DRAW Binary Analysis Original source code is not needed Source Analysis Just you look at source 10

11 SBI Static Binary Instrumentation - Before the program is run - Rewrites object code or executable code - Disassemble -> instrumentation 11

12 DBI Dynamic Binary Instrumentation - Run-time - By external process, grafted onto the client process 12

13 Winner DBI 1. Client program doesn t require to be prepared 2. Naturally covers all client code 13

14 Usefulness of DBI Do not need Recompiling and Relinking Find the specific code during execution Handle dynamically generated code Analyzing running process 14

15 Use Trace procedure generating Fault tolerance studies Emulating new instructions Code coverage -> t / all * 100 Memory-leak detection Thread profiling And so on... 15

16 Before that Taint Analysis Kind of information flow To see the flow from the external input effect 16

17 Taint propagation Tainted Tainted Untainted 17

18 Taint propagation Untrusted source 1 Untrusted source 2 18

19 Use Detecting flaws if ( tracking user data == available ) I see where untrusted code swimming Data Lifetime Analysis 19

20 How? Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Tools Pin : Win & Linux & MAC, Intermediate Language DynamoRIO : Win & Linux & MAC TEMU : Win & Linux, QEMU based Valgrind : Linux 20

21 How? Use PIN Tool Windows, Linux, MAC OSX Custom Code ( C or C++ ) Attach the running file Extensive API Pinheads 21

22 Pin? One of JIT ( Just In Time ) compiler Not input bytecode, but a regular executable Intercept instruction and generates more code and execute 22

23 Pin? Pin : Instrumentation Engine Pintool : Instrumentation Tool Application : Target Program or Process 23

24 Pin? 24

25 Pin? 25

26 Pin? 26

27 Pin? 27

28 Pin? 28

29 Install if ( Install window ) you need to visual c++ else if ( install linux ) you need to gcc-c++ else if ( install mac 64bit ) not available 29

30 A Simple Example Inscount & Itrace & Pinatrace Step by modify code Inscount M Itrace M Pinatrace 30

31 Inscount - count the total number of instructions executed 31

32 Modify Inscount 32

33 Itrace Itrace Instruction Address Trace How to pass arguments Useful understanding the control flow of a program for debugging 33

34 Itrace 34

35 Modify Itrace 35

36 insertpredicatedcall? To avoid generating references to instructions that are predicated when the predicate is false Predication is a general architectural feature of the IA-64 36

37 Pinatrace Pinatrace Memory Reference Trace Useful debugging and for simulating a data cache in processor 37

38 Pinatrace 770B89DA : Instrumentation Points R/W : Access Type 0023F434 : &Address 4 : R/W Size 0x01 : *Address 38

39 Vera Use vera! Shmoocon 2011 Danny Quist Visualizing Executables for Reversing & Analysis Better OEP detection & IDA Pro Plugin 39

40 Demo! if ( Use DBI with Vera ) you will see the memory flow ( easily ) And you will see the pattern of vulnerable program and patched program 40

41 Demo! 41

42 Zero-day! 1. Hook Vulnerability Function 2. And 3. Olleh! strcpy, strcat, sprintf, scanf, fscanf, strstr, strchr monitoring ESI It s possible to modify the parameters 42

43 Zero-day! 43

44 Zero-day! 44

45 reference

46 Q & A CodeEngn ReverseEngineering Conference 46

47 Quiz OR, XOR A Taint ( 1 ) B Taint?? hint ) AND B 1 Taint. 47

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