SpongeShaker. Release 1.1
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1 SpongeShaker Release 1.1 November 22, 2014
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3 Contents 1 spongeshaker API spongeshaker.sha3 - SHA-3 proposal spongeshaker.hashing - Sponge as hash spongeshaker.prng - Sponge as PRNG spongeshaker.stream_cipher - Sponge as Stream cipher spongeshaker.spongewrap - Sponge as AEAD cipher spongeshaker.sponge - Generic low-level sponge API spongeshaker.keccak - Low-level sponge API for Keccak spongeshaker Version Version Indices and tables 11 Python Module Index 13 i
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5 This module implements Keccak-f1600 sponge permutation and high-level APIs for various modes of it, including SHA-3 hashes. SHA-3 standard is not finalized, so actual output values are not stable yet. This implementation is up-to-date with Apr-2014 draft of FIPS-202. (Although it s unlikely that final SHA-3 changes hash parameters or padding again, instead they might add more modes.) Features: Todo: Links: Hashing (SHA3), PRNG, Stream cipher, AEAD cipher (SpongeWrap). Optimized-C implementation from Keccak reference code, with separate paths for 64- and 32-bit CPUs. Works with both Python 2.x and 3.x. Sync with final SHA-3. Optimized ASM implementations. Other Keccak permutation sizes. Other sponge algorithms. Other sponge modes. Downloads Git repo Documentation: Contents 1
6 2 Contents
7 CHAPTER 1 spongeshaker API Table Of Contents spongeshaker API spongeshaker.sha3 - SHA-3 proposal spongeshaker.hashing - Sponge as hash spongeshaker.prng - Sponge as PRNG spongeshaker.stream_cipher - Sponge as Stream cipher spongeshaker.spongewrap - Sponge as AEAD cipher spongeshaker.sponge - Generic low-level sponge API spongeshaker.keccak - Low-level sponge API for Keccak 1.1 spongeshaker.sha3 - SHA-3 proposal Proposed SHA3 algorithm selection. Current values correspond to draft FIPS 202 (Apr 2014). spongeshaker.sha3.sha3_224(data=none) Proposed SHA3-224 by NIST (c=448). Security level: 112/224 bits. Returns spongeshaker.hashing.spongehash for SHA spongeshaker.sha3.sha3_256(data=none) Proposed SHA3-256 by NIST (c=512). Security level: 128/256 bits. Returns spongeshaker.hashing.spongehash for SHA spongeshaker.sha3.sha3_384(data=none) Proposed SHA3-384 by NIST (c=768). Security level: 192/384 bits. Returns spongeshaker.hashing.spongehash for SHA spongeshaker.sha3.sha3_512(data=none) Proposed SHA3-512 by NIST (c=1024). Security level: 256/512 bits. 3
8 Returns spongeshaker.hashing.spongehash for SHA spongeshaker.sha3.shake128(data=none, digest_size=256) Proposed SHAKE128 hash by NIST (c=256). Security level: 128 bits. Parameters: data initial data to hash. digest_size Output size for.digest()/.hexdigest() when used as normal hash. Default: 256 bits. Returns spongeshaker.hashing.spongehash for SHAKE128. spongeshaker.sha3.shake256(data=none, digest_size=512) Proposed SHAKE256 hash by NIST (c=512). Security level: 256 bits. Parameters: data initial data to hash. digest_size Output size for.digest()/.hexdigest() when used as normal hash. Default: 512 bits. Returns spongeshaker.hashing.spongehash for SHAKE spongeshaker.hashing - Sponge as hash High-level APIs to Keccak1600 algorithm. exception spongeshaker.hashing.spongehashinvalidstate Bases: exceptions.exception Extracting has started, cannot.update()/.digest(). class spongeshaker.hashing.spongehash(capacity_bits, output_bits, data=none, name=none, sponge_class=none, padding=none, _sponge=none, _extracting=false) Bases: object Generic hashlib compatible hash function API. Initialize sponge instance with specified parameters. Parameters: capacity_bits number of bits for capacity. digest_bits number of bits for digest output. data initial data to hash. name User-visible name for hash+parameters. sponge_class Sponge implementation class that implements the spongeshaker.sponge.sponge interface. padding Start bytes for padding bytes to use, final bit is always added. copy() Create copy of current state. 4 Chapter 1. spongeshaker API
9 update(data) Update state with data. Cannot be used after extract() is called. digest() Return final hash digest. This follows the hashlib convention that state is not changed so update() can be called again to add more data to state. hexdigest() Return digest() value as hexadecimal string. extract(count) Extract data from hash state. This function can be continued to be called to extract unlimited amount of bytes from state. It does change the state, so update(), digest() and hexdigest() will throw error after extract() has been called. 1.3 spongeshaker.prng - Sponge as PRNG Pseudo-random number generator API. class spongeshaker.prng.spongeprng(sponge, padding= x01 ) Bases: object Sponge as PRNG. Initialize PRNG state with specified Keccak variant. add_entropy(data) Import new random data into state. get_random_bytes(nbytes) Return random bytes from state. class spongeshaker.prng.keccakprng(capacity=512, padding= x01 ) Bases: spongeshaker.prng.spongeprng Keccak as PRNG. 1.4 spongeshaker.stream_cipher - Sponge as Stream cipher Stream cipher with Keccak. Stream cipher is basically PRNG, seeded with key, that generarates bytes that are XORed with data. That means each message/stream must have unique stream, either by having unique key or IV. Otherwise the data can be trivially recovered. class spongeshaker.stream_cipher.spongestreamcipher(sponge, initial_data_pad= x01, data_pad= x01 ) Bases: object Keccak Stream Cipher. Example encryption: 1.3. spongeshaker.prng - Sponge as PRNG 5
10 state = KeccakStream(576) state.add_initial_data(key) ciphertext = state.encrypt(cleartext) mac = state.final_digest(16) Example decryption: state = KeccakStream(576) state.add_initial_data(key) cleartext = state.decrypt(cleartext) mac = state.final_digest(16) Set up Keccak stream with given capacity (in bits) and padding. add_initial_data(data) Add initial data - key, iv, extra plaintext. encrypt(plaintext) Encrypt data. Return plaintext XOR-ed with keystream. decrypt(ciphertext) Decrypt data. Return ciphertext XOR-ed with keystream. 1.5 spongeshaker.spongewrap - Sponge as AEAD cipher SpongeWrap - AEAD encryption with sponge. class spongeshaker.spongewrap.spongewrap(capacity=512, sponge_class=<type keccak.keccaksponge >) Bases: object Authenticated encryption with sponge. Each block is padded, padding includes frame bit before the standard 10*1 padding. Frame bit = 0: next block will not be keystream. Frame bit = 1: next block will be keystream. 1.6 spongeshaker.sponge - Generic low-level sponge API Low-level API for sponge implementations. class spongeshaker.sponge.sponge(capacity) Bases: object Generic sponge API. Initialze sponge with given capacity (in bits). absorb(data) Add data to sponge by XOR-ing it into state. squeeze(nbytes) Extract given number of bytes from state. 6 Chapter 1. spongeshaker API
11 squeeze_xor(data) Return data XOR-ed with state. encrypt(data) Return data XOR-ed into state. The state should already absorbed and permuted before encrypting starts. This means.absorb(key) +.pad() should be called. decrypt(enc_data) Return enc_data XOR-ed with state. This is reverse of.encrypt() - it assumes enc_data was created by XOR-ing current state with cleartext. This function reverses it. pad(suffix) pad(suffix) - Add padding and permute state. The suffix is added into state, then also final bit is flipped. So to get original simple 10*1 padding given in the Keccak SHA3 proposal, the suffix needs to be 01. If padding is suffix is empty, then final bit is not flipped, to support case when initial data for encryption is added without padding - which is bad style. rewind() Move internal position to start of state. Useful for PRNG/duplex modes. In fact, it should not be touched at all in other modes. forget() Clear internal state, except capacity. copy() Return new instance with same state. 1.7 spongeshaker.keccak - Low-level sponge API for Keccak Implements Sponge API for Keccak-f1600. class spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge Bases: object KeccakSponge(capacity) - Initializes Sponge object with given capacity in bits. absorb() absorb(data) - XOR data into state. capacity Sponge capacity in bits copy() copy() - Copy current state to new object. decrypt() decrypt(enc_data) - return enc_data XOR-ed with state. This is reverse of.encrypt() - it assumes enc_data was created by XOR-ing current state with cleartext. This function reverses it. encrypt() encrypt(data) - return data XOR-ed into state spongeshaker.keccak - Low-level sponge API for Keccak 7
12 The state should already absorbed and permuted before encrypting starts. This means.absorb(key) +.pad() should be called. forget() forget() - clear internal state, except capacity. name Sponge name pad() pad(suffix) - Add padding and permute state. The suffix is added into state, then also final bit is flipped. So to get original simple 10*1 padding given in the Keccak SHA3 proposal, the suffix needs to be \x01. If padding is suffix is empty, then final bit is not flipped, to support case when initial data for encryption is added without padding - which is bad style. pos Current position in bytes rate Sponge rate in bits rbytes Current position in bytes rewind() rewind() - move internal position to start of state. Useful for PRNG/duplex modes. In fact, it should not be touched at all in other modes. squeeze() squeeze(nbytes) - extract given number of bytes from state. squeeze_xor() squeeze_xor(data) - return data XOR-ed with state. 8 Chapter 1. spongeshaker API
13 CHAPTER 2 spongeshaker 2.1 Version 1.1 Keccak now uses optimized implementation by default. Fix potential crash on 32-bit architectures due to wrong sizeof. Generic base classes for PRNG and StreamCipher. 2.2 Version 1.0 Initial release. 9
14 10 Chapter 2. spongeshaker
15 CHAPTER 3 Indices and tables genindex modindex search 11
16 12 Chapter 3. Indices and tables
17 Python Module Index s spongeshaker.hashing, 4 spongeshaker.keccak, 7 spongeshaker.prng, 5 spongeshaker.sha3, 3 spongeshaker.sponge, 6 spongeshaker.spongewrap, 6 spongeshaker.stream_cipher, 5 13
18 14 Python Module Index
19 Index A absorb() (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge method), 7 absorb() (spongeshaker.sponge.sponge method), 6 add_entropy() (spongeshaker.prng.spongeprng method), 5 add_initial_data() (spongeshaker.stream_cipher.spongestreamcipher method), 6 C capacity (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge attribute), 7 copy() (spongeshaker.hashing.spongehash method), 4 copy() (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge method), 7 copy() (spongeshaker.sponge.sponge method), 7 D decrypt() (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge method), 7 decrypt() (spongeshaker.sponge.sponge method), 7 decrypt() (spongeshaker.stream_cipher.spongestreamcipher method), 6 digest() (spongeshaker.hashing.spongehash method), 5 E encrypt() (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge method), 7 encrypt() (spongeshaker.sponge.sponge method), 7 encrypt() (spongeshaker.stream_cipher.spongestreamcipher method), 6 extract() (spongeshaker.hashing.spongehash method), 5 F forget() (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge method), 8 forget() (spongeshaker.sponge.sponge method), 7 G get_random_bytes() method), 5 (spongeshaker.prng.spongeprng H hexdigest() (spongeshaker.hashing.spongehash method), 5 K KeccakPRNG (class in spongeshaker.prng), 5 KeccakSponge (class in spongeshaker.keccak), 7 N name (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge attribute), 8 P pad() (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge method), 8 pad() (spongeshaker.sponge.sponge method), 7 pos (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge attribute), 8 R rate (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge attribute), 8 rbytes (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge attribute), 8 rewind() (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge method), 8 rewind() (spongeshaker.sponge.sponge method), 7 S sha3_224() (in module spongeshaker.sha3), 3 sha3_256() (in module spongeshaker.sha3), 3 sha3_384() (in module spongeshaker.sha3), 3 sha3_512() (in module spongeshaker.sha3), 3 shake128() (in module spongeshaker.sha3), 4 shake256() (in module spongeshaker.sha3), 4 Sponge (class in spongeshaker.sponge), 6 SpongeHash (class in spongeshaker.hashing), 4 SpongeHashInvalidState, 4 SpongePRNG (class in spongeshaker.prng), 5 spongeshaker.hashing (module), 4 spongeshaker.keccak (module), 7 spongeshaker.prng (module), 5 spongeshaker.sha3 (module), 3 spongeshaker.sponge (module), 6 spongeshaker.spongewrap (module), 6 15
20 spongeshaker.stream_cipher (module), 5 SpongeStreamCipher (class in spongeshaker.stream_cipher), 5 SpongeWrap (class in spongeshaker.spongewrap), 6 squeeze() (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge method), 8 squeeze() (spongeshaker.sponge.sponge method), 6 squeeze_xor() (spongeshaker.keccak.keccaksponge method), 8 squeeze_xor() (spongeshaker.sponge.sponge method), 6 U update() (spongeshaker.hashing.spongehash method), 4 16 Index
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