BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANT SOFTWARE- DEFINED NETWORKING (SDN) CONTROLLERS
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1 BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANT SOFTWARE- DEFINED NETWORKING (SDN) CONTROLLERS KARIM ELDEFRAWY* AND TYLER KACZMAREK** * INFORMATION AND SYSTEMS SCIENCES LAB (ISSL), HRL LABORATORIES ** UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE (UCI), WORK CONDUCTED WHILE AT HRL. KMELDEFRAWY@HRL.COM TKACZMAR@UCI.EDU 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 1
2 Overview of Talk Introduction and Motivation SDN Tools BFT-SMaRT Consensus Protocol BFT SDN System Design BFT SDN Controller Prototype Performance Results Improvements and Future Direction 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 2
3 Software-Defined Networking (SDN) Network Function Virtualization (NFV) Decouples Forwarding Operations from Control Decisions Introduces centralized controller Controller dictates forwarding rules Routers act as dumb switches Openflow emerged as de facto SDN protocol Typical SDN Architecture (Wikipedia, 2016) 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 3
4 Openflow Protocol: Messages Openflow introduces unique message types for SDN control PACKET_IN Switch sends captured packet to controller on 2 occasions Miss in the flow table Explicitly specified as per match rule FLOW_MOD Controller modifies state of switch PACKET_OUT Controller directly injects packet into switch s data plane 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 4
5 Openflow Protocol: Installing a Flow S1 s Flow Table Rule Action Rule S2 s Flow Table Action Ping H2 Dest = H1 FWD to H1 Dest = H2 FWD to H2 H1 S1 S2 H2 Controller 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 5
6 Openflow Protocol: Installing a Flow S1 s Flow Table Rule Action Rule S2 s Flow Table Action Dest = H1 FWD to H1 Dest = H2 FWD to H2 H1 S1 PACKET_IN: no rule for destination H2 S2 H2 Controller 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 6
7 Openflow Protocol: Installing a Flow S1 s Flow Table Rule Dest = H1 Action FWD to H1 Rule S2 s Flow Table Dest = H2 Action FWD to H2 H1 S1 FLOW_MOD: ADD Rule: Dest = H2, Action: FWD to S2 Control ler S2 H HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 7
8 Openflow Protocol: Installing a Flow S1 s Flow Table Rule Action Rule S2 s Flow Table Action Dest = H1 FWD to H1 Dest = H2 FWD to H2 H1 S1 Rule established: forward to S2 S2 H2 Controller 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 8
9 Openflow Protocol: Installing a Flow S1 s Flow Table Rule Action S2 s Flow Table Rule Action Dest = H1 FWD to H1 Dest = H2 FWD to H2 H1 S1 Rule established: forward to S2 S2 H2 Controller 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 9
10 Our Motivation SDN architecture introduces single point of failure Unique threats facing SDN (Kreutz et. al 2013) Attacks on Control Plane Attacks on Controller Vulnerabilities Few mechanisms ensuring trust between controller and management applications Current implementations do not account for failing or corrupted controllers 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 10
11 Our Contributions Designed and prototyped a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) SDN controller Able to handle f (1) corrupted controller out of 3f+1 (4) replica instances Integrated into both OpenFlowJ and Beacon SDN controllers Relies on BFT state machine replication (BFT-SMaRT) 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 11
12 OpenflowJ and Beacon OpenflowJ Basic controller implementation Close implementation of Openflow SDN standard Java-based SDN controller Beacon Optimizations on top of OpenflowJ Leverages Parallelism Modular Extensible 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 12
13 BFT-SMaRT Developed by Bessani et. al, (Technical Report, 2013) Implemented in Java ( Close implementation of Lamport s original schema Accepts f faults with 3f+1 total replicas Accepts batching Used for base-level implementation 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 13
14 BFT-SMaRT Consensus Protocol 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 14
15 BFT-SMaRT Consensus Protocol - Request Request Client multicasts request 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 15
16 BFT-SMaRT Consensus Protocol Pre- Prepare Pre-prepare Primary orders request and multicasts unique number 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 16
17 BFT-SMaRT Consensus Protocol - Prepare Prepare All replica multicast out Prepare 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 17
18 BFT-SMaRT Consensus Protocol - Commit Commit Replicas multicast Commit; request added to committed certificate 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 18
19 BFT-SMaRT Consensus Protocol - Reply Reply Replicas compute request and reply to client, result accepted once f+1 identical responses received 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 19
20 BFT Switch Design Based on Open vswitch Same switch design used for both controller designs Introduced Client Proxy to interface with BFT Controllers Switch sends PACKET_IN requests to Proxy, which formats into REQUEST messages as per BFT-SMaRT Client Proxy formats RESPONSE messages from BFT controller into either PACKET_OUT or FLOW_MOD messages 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 20
21 BFT Controller Design SimpleBFT Extension of OpenflowJ control logic Responds to individual PACKET_IN messages Issues identical PACKET_OUT and FLOW_MOD responses to OpenFlowJ Interfaces with Client Proxy instead of directly with switch Reaches consensus on each given message Primary changes after primary found faulty 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 21
22 BFT Controller Design BeaconBFT Identical modifications made to Beacon as OpenflowJ Extension of Beacon control logic Responds to individual PACKET_IN messages Issues identical PACKET_OUT and FLOW_MOD responses to OpenFlowJ Interfaces with Client Proxy instead of directly with switch Reaches consensus on each given message Primary changes after primary found faulty 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 22
23 BFT Controller Design - Architecture Changes Typical Architecture (2 switches, 2 hosts) H1 S1 S2 H2 Controller 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 23
24 BFT Controller Design Architecture Changes Modified Architecture (2 switches, 2 hosts) H1 S1 Proxy 1 S2 Proxy 2 H2 Controller Replicas R1-R HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 24
25 Performance Testing Tested in Cbench on an HP EliteBook 8560W Windows 7, 64 bit 4096MB RAM Intel Core i7 2.7GHz 4 CPUs Simulated binary tree network of depth 5 in mininet S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 Example Binary Tree topology of depth HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 25
26 Performance Results Controller End-to-End Setup Duration Flow Setup Delay Flow Setup Rate (flow mods/second) OpenflowJ 376ms 9.44ms fm/sec SimpleBFT 775ms 31.7ms 59.3 fm/sec Beacon 77ms 0.5ms fm/sec BeaconBFT 475ms 14.5ms 87.0 fm/sec 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 26
27 Performance Issues Slowdown for OpenFlowJ much smaller than for Beacon Beacon leverages parallelism for performance gains BeaconBFT unable to leverage parallelism Total ordering required for BFT operation 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 27
28 Speeding up the Switch Batch Client requests Minimize overhead per PACKET_IN message Integrate BFT Switch with client Removes reliance on proxy for communication 1 less step in communication 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 28
29 Speeding up the Controller Alternative BFT protocols Naïve implementation maximizes communication Spinning BFT Allows multiple views Greater parallelism support Speculative BFT f+1 replicas running until fault occurs Reduces messages needed by a factor of 3 in PREPARE and COMMIT steps 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 29
30 Speeding up the Network Scalability issues even with non-bft SDN controllers in reactive mode Convert to proactive controller Greatest costs are in pre-computing many flows Minimize active PACKET_IN messages generated Less real-time computation 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 30
31 Questions? 2016 HRL Laboratories, LLC. All Rights Reserved 31
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