ShortMAC: Efficient Data-plane Fault Localization. Xin Zhang, Zongwei Zhou, Hsu- Chun Hsiao, Tiffany Hyun- Jin Kim Adrian Perrig and Patrick Tague
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1 ShortMAC: Efficient Data-plane Fault Localization Xin Zhang, Zongwei Zhou, Hsu- Chun Hsiao, Tiffany Hyun- Jin Kim Adrian Perrig and Patrick Tague
2 What is Fault LocalizaDon? Problem defini-on Iden-fy faulty links during packet forwarding A;acker Model Drop, modify, misroute, or inject packets at data plane Challenges Selec-ve a;ack: break ping, traceroute, etc High overhead Slander & framing Only drop node 5 s ACKs Got it Got it Got it Got it Got it Source Dest 2
3 What is Fault LocalizaDon? Challenges (cont d) A;acks against sampling Forgery a;ack: break NeSlow, Bloom Filter, etc Natural packet loss 100 pkts Source is not sampled, drop it! Got 100 Got 100 Got 100 Got 100 Got Only modify packets Dest 3
4 Why is Fault LocalizaDon Important? The current Internet Best effort, purely end- to- end Fault localiza-on enables: Data- plane accountability Intelligent path selec-on Linear path trial Source Worst case: 3 vs 2 3 trials Worst case: 2 3 Des-na-on 4
5 Security Design Goals Against drop, modify, inject, and replay packets Against mul-ple colluding nodes Efficiency Low detec-on delay Low storage, communica-on and computa-on overhead Provable guarantees Upper bound of damage without being detected Lower bound of forwarding correctness if no fault detected 5
6 ShortMAC Key Insight #1 Fault Localiza-on Packet authen-ca-on Fault Localiza-on monitor packet count and content W/ pkt authen, content count Only counts small state, low bandwidth cost Source A B Detectable! C Detectable! 6
7 ShortMAC Key Insight #2 Limi+ng a;acks instead of perfect detec-on Detect every misbehavior? Costly! Error- prone! Absorb low- impact a;ack: tolerance threshold Trap the a;acker into a dilemma Enable probabilis-c algorithms with provable bounds A;ack more? Will get caught! Stay under 2%? Damage is bounded! Source Dest. 7
8 ShortMAC Key Ideas k- bit MAC, e.g., k = 1 Limi-ng instead of perfectly detec-ng fake packets Source marks each packet with k bits (with keyed PRF) The ShortMAC packet marking K 1 K d 1 0 K 2 1 Source K 1 K 2 K d (, 1, 0, 1) K 1 K = PRF Kd (, SN, TTL d ) = PRF K2 (, SN, TTL 2, ) Forge m? 50% chance of inconsistency. Detectable! = PRF K1 (, SN, TTL 1,, ) Dest K d 8
9 High- level steps ShortMAC Key Ideas Each node maintains two counters (counter only!) Secure repor-ng Threshold- based detec-on robust to natural errors sends 1000 pkts 1- bit MAC 1000 Source forges 500 pkt More details: Onion ACK for repor-ng, threshold- based detec-on, etc Dest. 9
10 The math θ =(1 T dr ) d β N. The numbers TheoreDcal Bounds e of its malicious links without being β = T in q + r ( etection threshold N = ln( 2d δ ( ) 2 T dr ρ ) 2+8qTin ln 2 δ ln 2 δ +ln 2 δ 4q 2 dr,the ) 2 (1 T dr ) d espondingly, the fraction o PAAI- 1: X. Zhang, A. Jain, and A. Perrig, Packet- dropping Protocol ShortMAC PAAI- 1 SSS Sketch Adversary Iden-fica-on on Data- plane security. Delay (pkt) SSS, Sketch: B. Barak, 4 S Goldberg, 5 D. Xiao, Protocols 8 10 and 6 Lower Bounds for Failure Localiza-on State (bytes)
11 Experimental EvaluaDon Average- case performance, proof of concept Simula-on + Prototyping Simula-on: large- scale, security proper-es Prototype: computa-onal overhead SSF- net based simula-on Single 6- hop path Malicious node in the middle Independently dropping/injec-ng packets 11
12 SimulaDon Results False rates, detec-on delay, and comparison 2- bit- MAC false rates - linear scale drop 2 inject 2 drop 5 inject 5 drop 5 inject detection delay (N) - linear scale 12
13 Prototyping Results Pure- sosware router prototype in Linux/Click Evalua-on of fast path performance Per- packet PRF computa-on Different MACs with AES- ni Computa-onal overhead Throughput and latency Linear path topology Netperf benchmark 13
14 Prototyping Results Throughput and latency Throughput latency (µs) (Mb/s) MTU MTU MTU MTU baseline 20 no parallel 10 internal external path path length length 14
15 Phew the end Limi+ng instead of perfectly detec-ng Enables efficient algorithms Provable security guarantee Theore-cal bounds, against strong adversaries High efficiency Low detec-on delay, router state, comm. overhead Probabilis+c packet authen-ca-on Building block for other applica-ons 15
16 Thank you! QuesDons? Xin Zhang
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