Programming and Proving with Distributed Protocols Disel: Distributed Separation Logic.
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1 Programming and Proving with Distributed Protocols Disel: Distributed Separation Logic ` {P } c {Q} Ilya Sergey James R. Wilcox Zach Tatlock
2 Distributed Systems
3 Distributed Infrastructure
4 Distributed Applications
5 Verified Distributed Systems
6 Verified Distributed Infrastructure Veri- Wow Iron -Cert
7 Verified Distributed Applications Veri- Wow Iron -Cert
8 Verified Distributed Applications Veri- Challenging to verify apps in terms of infra. starting from scratch is unacceptable Wow Indicates deeper problems with composition one node s client is another s server! Iron -Cert
9 Verified Challenges Distributed Solutions Applications Client reasoning Veri- Protocols Wow Invariants WithInv rule Separation Frame rule/hooks Disel: Iron -Cert `{P } c {Q}
10 Outline `{P } c {Q} Protocols and running example Logical mechanisms programming with protocols invariants framing and hooks Implementation and future work
11 Cloud Compute 21 C S
12 Cloud Compute
13 Cloud Compute: Server while true: (from, n) <- recv Req send Resp(n, factors(n)) to from Traditional specification: messages from server have correct factors Proved by finding an invariant of the system
14 Cloud Compute: Server
15 Cloud Compute: Client
16 Cloud Compute: Client send Req(21) to server (_, ans) <- recv Resp assert ans == {3, 7} Start over with clients in system? In Disel: use protocol to describe client interface
17 Protocols
18 Protocols A protocol is an interface among nodes Enables compositional verification
19 Cloud Compute Protocol Messages: State: Transitions: Sends: precondition and effect Receives: effect
20 Cloud Compute Protocol Messages: Req(n) Resp(n,s) State: outstanding: Set<Msg> Transitions: Sends: Receives: Req Req Resp Resp
21 Cloud Compute Req(21) C S Send Req(n) Precondition: Effect: none none
22 Cloud Compute Req(21) C S { } (C,21) Receive Req(n) Effect: add (from, n) to out
23 Cloud Compute C S { } Resp({3,7}) Send Resp(n,l) Requires: l == factors(n) (n,to) in out Effect: removes (n,to) from out
24 Cloud Compute C S { } Resp({3,7}) Recv Resp(n,l) Effect: none
25 Cloud Compute Protocol Messages: Req(n) Resp(n,s) State: outstanding: Set<Msg> Transitions: Sends: Receives: Req Req Resp Resp
26 Outline `{P } c {Q} Protocols and running example Logical mechanisms programming with protocols invariants framing and hooks Implementation and future work
27 Cloud Compute: Server while true: (from, n) <- recv Req send Resp(n, factors(n)) to from Precondition on send requires correct factors
28 Cloud Compute: Server t 2 `{Pre }send m m to to h h t t { sent ( m, h) } t while true: (from, n) <- recv Req send Resp(n, factors(n)) to from Precondition on send requires correct factors
29 Cloud Compute: Client send Req(21) to server (_, ans) <- recv Resp assert ans == {3, 7} recv doesn t ensure correct factors
30 Cloud Compute: Client t 2 ` {>} recv m {recvd( m)} t send Req(21) to server (_, ans) <- recv Resp assert ans == {3, 7} recv doesn t ensure correct factors
31 Protocol Invariants `{P } c {Q} I inductive 0 `{P ^ I} c {Q ^ I} Protocol where every state satisfies I
32 Cloud Compute: Client t 2 0 ` {>} recv m {recvd( m)} t send Req(21) to server (_, ans) <- recv Resp assert ans == {3, 7} Now recv ensures correct factors
33 Cloud Compute: More Clients send Req(21) to server1 send Req(35) to server2 (_, ans1) <- recv Resp (_, ans2) <- recv Resp assert ans1 [ ans2 == {3, 5, 7} Same protocol enables verification
34 Frame rule `{P } c {Q} independent protocols R stable ` {P R} c {Q R} Reuse invariants from component protocols
35 Frame rule: Hooks `{P } c {Q} R stable ` {P R} c {Q R} Allows one protocol to restrict another
36 Outline `{P } c {Q} Protocols and running example Logical mechanisms programming with protocols invariants framing and hooks Implementation and future work
37 Implementation Shallowly embedded in Coq with full power of functional programming Executable via extraction to OCaml via trusted shim to implement semantics Case study: two-phase commit exercises all features of the logic
38 Related and Future Work Concurrent separation logics Iris, FCSL, CAP, Adding other effects e.g. mutable heap, threads, failure
39 Composition: A way to make proofs harder In 1997, the unfortunate reality is that engineers rarely specify and reason formally about the systems they build. It seems unlikely that reasoning about the composition of open-system specifications will be a practical concern within the next 15 years.
40 Verified Challenges Distributed Solutions Applications Client reasoning Veri- Protocols Wow Invariants WithInv rule Separation Frame rule/hooks Disel: Iron -Cert `{P } c {Q}
Programming Language Abstractions for Modularly Verified Distributed Systems. James R. Wilcox Zach Tatlock Ilya Sergey
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