Military grade wireless ad hoc networks
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1 professor Hannu H. Kari Laboratory for Theoretical Computer Science Department of Computer Science and Engineering Helsinki University (HUT) Espoo, Finland Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 1/54
2 Agenda Internet Privacy Problems in military grade wireless ad hoc networks Problem statement Requirements Security levels Current and new solutions Layered model for wireless networks Context Aware Management/Policy Manager (CAM/PM) Packet Level Authentication (PLA) Applications Performance Conclusions Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 2/54
3 Internet Internet was designed to survive nuclear war S D Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 3/54
4 Internet Packets can be rerouted quickly S D Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 4/54
5 Internet...but one mole can damage the routing S D Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 5/54
6 Internet... or fill network with garbage... S D Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 6/54
7 Internet...or corrupt transmitted data S D Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 7/54
8 Internet Problems are dramatically getting worse, when wireless networks are used instead of wired links dynamic network infrastructure is used instead of static nodes are mobile environment is hostile nodes may become compromised strict Quality of Service requirements are needed transmission channel has very limited capacity Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 8/54
9 Privacy Definition of Privacy Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, and institutions to determine for themselves, when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others. Alan Westin 1967 Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 9/54
10 5 categories of privacy Data privacy (content) Identity privacy (source/destination) Location privacy (place) Time privacy (when) Privacy of existence (does it exist) Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 10/54
11 Problems in military grade wireless ad hoc networks Hostile enemy Privacy Routing Security Quality of service Performance Compromised nodes Dynamicity Life time of nodes Reliability Costs Inequality of nodes... Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 11/54
12 Problem statement How to ensure the privacy of communication in military grade wireless ad hoc networks Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 12/54
13 Problem statement How to ensure the privacy (data, identity, location, time, existence) of (reliable) communication in military grade (hostile enemies, compromised nodes, high casualty rate) wireless (eavesdropping, disturbance, unreliable links) ad hoc networks (no static infrastructure, mobile nodes, dynamic routing) Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 13/54
14 3 levels of security Content/Information Secured communication layer (IPsec, TLS/SSL, Secure Shell,...) Communication network Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 14/54
15 Current solutions Application level security PGP, Secure Shell,... Network level security IPsec Link level Security WEP, A5,... Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 15/54
16 New solution Context Aware Management/Policy Manager Each node (computer) has a rule based policy manager that controls the behavior of the node and adapts it to environment changes Adaptive trust model Trust on nodes is not static but changes on time Packet level authentication A mechanism to ensure that only correct and authentic packets are timely processed Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 16/54
17 Layered model for wireless networks mobile node level ad hoc router level HA HA access network level core network level mobility level server server server level Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 17/54
18 Layered model for wireless networks: ad hoc routers mobile node level ad hoc router level HA HA access network level core network level mobility level server server server level Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 18/54
19 Layered model for wireless networks: mobile nodes mobile node level ad hoc router level HA HA access network level core network level mobility level server server server level Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 19/54
20 Layered model for wireless networks: new access point mobile node level ad hoc router level HA HA access network level core network level mobility level server server server level Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 20/54
21 Context Aware Management/ Policy Manager Polic y m anager Application M obility, s ecurity, QoS, ac cess control, m ulticast layer Ad hoc netw ork ing layer C ontext aw are m anagem ent lay er Loc al database IP Pack et lev el authentication Access technology 1 Access technology 2 Access technology N Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 21/54
22 Context Aware Management/ Policy Manager Context Aware Management layer Interfaces with all protocol layers and applications Policy Manager Decisions are based on policy rules Collects information from all protocol layers and applications May have local user interface Can negotiate with neighboring PMs or take commands from remote entity Policy rules Formal representation of decision methodology New rules can be sent by authorized entity (e.g., owner of the node, civil/military authority) Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 22/54
23 Packet level authentication Analogy: Security measures on notes Holograms Microprint Watermarks UV-light... Receiver of notes can verify the authenticity of every note without consulting with banks or other authorities Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 23/54
24 Packet level authentication How about IP world? Each IP packet should have similar security measures Receiver of a packet must be capable of verifying the authenticity of the IP packet without prior security association with the sender I.e., receiver must be sure that the packet is sent by a legitimate node and the packet is not altered on the way Just like with notes, each IP packet shall have all necessary information to verify authenticity In addition, Since IP packets can be easily copied, we must have a mechanism to detect duplicated and delayed packets Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 24/54
25 Packet level authentication Why not IPsec? Benefits of IPsec Fast crypto algorithms and packet signatures due to symmetric keys Well tested implementations and protocols Disadvantages of IPsec Can t handle compromised nodes IPsec is end-to-end protocol, intermediate nodes can t validate packets qrequires several messages to establish security association between nodes Scales badly to very dynamic networks Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 25/54
26 Packet level authentication General requirements Security mechanism shall be based on public algorithms No security by obscurity! Public key algorithms and digital signatures provide undeniable proof of the origin Symmetric keys can t be used since nodes may be compromised Protocol must be compatible with standard IP routers and applications Standard header extensions shall be used Solution must be robust and scaleable It shall be applicable both in military and civilian networks Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 26/54
27 Packet level authentication Benefits Strong access control Only right packets are routed Easy to implement in HW ( Secure-CRC ) Less packets in the network Can be combined with QoS, AAA, firewalls,... Secures all routing protocols Disadvantages Increased packet size (~100 bytes) transmission overhead, processing delays Requires strong crypto algorithms Elliptic curves, digital signatures,... More computation per packet One or two digital signatures, one or two hashes per packet Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 27/54
28 Packet level authentication: Implementation IP packet IP HDR IP HDR TTP Pub-Key TTP-sig Seq # Packet-sig Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 28/54
29 Packet level authentication: Implementation Extra header per packet 1. Authority General, TTP, Access-network operator, home operator, Public key of sender E.g., Elliptic curve (ECC) 3. Authority s signature of sender key and validity time Authority s assurance that the sender s key is valid 4. Sending time (+sequence number) Possibility to remove duplicates and old packets 5. Signature of the sender of this packet Sender s assurance that he has sent this packet Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 29/54
30 Packet level authentication: Implementation Sending: 1. Authority Constant field 2. Public key of sender Constant field 3. Authority s signature of sender key and validity time Constant field 4. Sending time (+sequence number) Update per packet 5. Signature of the sender of this packet Calculate per packet Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 30/54
31 Packet level authentication: Implementation Reception, 1. packet: 1. Check sending time Check time 2. Authority Verify that you know the authority (or ask your authority is this trustworthy) 3. Public key of sender Store this 4. Authority s signature of sender key and validity time Check validity 5. Signature of the sender of this packet Verify 6. Sequence number Store sequence number Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 31/54
32 Packet level authentication: Implementation Reception, next packets: 1. Sending time Verify time and sequence numbers 2. Authority Verify data in cache 3. Public key of sender Verify data in cache 4. Authority s signature of sender key and validity time Verify data in cache 5. Signature of the sender of this packet Verify 6. Store time and sequence number Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 32/54
33 Applications for PLA Securing wireless ad hoc networks Restricting DoS and DDoS attacks Handling compromised nodes Delegation of command chain Reestablishing core network after military strike... Handling access control Replacing firewalls Handle charging/accounting Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 33/54
34 Application: Quick secured communication in battle field Any communication A C A->B B->A B C learns that both A and B are from same group First message from C to A A A learns that C is from same group C->A (message encrypted with A s public key) C Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 34/54
35 Application: Restricting DoS attack S D ignore duplicates Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 35/54
36 Application: Excluding compromised nodes E1 detection of misbehavior E2 Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 36/54
37 Application: Excluding compromised nodes E1 Nodes E1, E2 compromised E2 Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 37/54
38 Application: Excluding compromised nodes E1 E2 Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 38/54
39 Application: Delegation of command chain Trust G2 G1 G2 Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 39/54
40 Application: Delegation of command chain Authorization G2 Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 40/54
41 Application: Delegation of command chain Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 41/54
42 Application: Revocation of large quantity of nodes Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 42/54
43 G1 Application: Revocation of large quantity of nodes Nodes E1, E2,... compromised New rules to nodes E1, E2,... Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 43/54
44 Application: Revocation of large quantity of nodes Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 44/54
45 Application: New core network: Military strike access network level core network level server level Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 45/54
46 Application: New core network: Reconfiguration New rules access network level core network level server level Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 46/54
47 Application: New core network: After military strike access network level core network level server level Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 47/54
48 Performance Sending node One digital signature per packet Verifying node/receiving node First packet: One certificate validation & One digital signature verification Next packets: One digital signature verification per packet Digital signature requires one hash and one elliptic curve operation Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 48/54
49 Performance Elliptic curve HW implementation at ECE department of HUT FPGA with gates Clock speed 66MHz 167 bit ECC multiplication on 100 s using 167 bit arithmetics one signature in less than 1 ms Performance is thus (in order of magnitude) 1000 packets/s With 500 Byte packet size, 4 Mbps Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 49/54
50 Performance How about scaling up? Pentium IV class silicon Clock speed 66MHz -> 3 GHz 350kG 66MHz 55MG 3GHz (speedup factor 45) Dice size gates -> 55 M gates (160 parallel signature units) 1 1ms C C new ref G G new ref 1 1ms 3GHz 66Mhz Msignature / s Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 50/54
51 Performance Throughput of Pentium IV-class PLA HW accelerator Throughput [G bps ] S ignatures P ac k et s iz e validat ed per pac k et 150B 500B 1500B O ne (*) Two (**) (**) For the firs t pac k et from a given s ender (*) For the s ubs equent pac k ets from the s am e s ender Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 51/54
52 Methods to improve performance Parallel HW (multiple chips) Sending node Every packet must be signed by the sender in order to minimize security problems Receiving/Verifying node Check packets randomly Check only every Nth packet Checking can be adaptive Check fewer packets from trusted nodes Check more packets at the beginning of the stream of packets More packets from same node of a flow, fewer checks done When you feel paranoid, check more Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 52/54
53 Operating model for open source research Customer needs Military requirement s Civilian requirement s Protocol specifications Protocol analysis/ verification Protocol implementation s Standards Protocol testing Protocol design and validation Reference implementations Open source code Idea Companies Business opportunities Solutions Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 53/54
54 Conclusions Context Aware Management/Policy Manager (CAM/PM) -architecture is rule based system that adapts node s behavior according to its surrounding Packet level authentication (PLA) provides scalable method to eliminate most of the faulty, forged, duplicated, and otherwise unwanted packets PLA can be implemented in HW with gigabits/s authentication capacity Hannu H. Kari/HUT/CS/TCS Page 54/54
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