ACT Workshop Report NATO in the Space Commons October 15, 2010 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Kalkar, Germany

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1 1 ACT Workshop Report NATO in the Space Commons October 15, 2010 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Kalkar, Germany Executive Summary This workshop constituted the fourth in a series of seven meetings organized by Allied Command Transformation on Global Commons Strategic Issues. The goal of the JAPCC workshop was to focus on NATO s challenges in the space commons. The workshop sought to identify the vulnerabilities affecting NATO s assured access to the space commons, as well as make recommendations for NATO s way ahead in developing relevant policies and capabilities. The developed world has become dependent on space-based communications systems. This increased dependency, however, has not seen a corresponding investment in either the security of the space arena, or in internationally approved laws regulating space behavior in space. These deficits together make the space domain a critical vulnerability for the Alliance, even if space itself is not a centre of political or military gravity for most members. Aside from their importance for national defence and military operational capability, a strong economic case can be made for the protection of space assets due to their importance to the operation of global markets. Many Alliance nations and partners have individual space capabilities. NATO has the ability to leverage these capabilities through a comprehensive approach that involves all sectors of the Alliance community. Such an approach, in combination with the development of a forward-looking space policy, will allow NATO to assure its continued access to critical space-based systems. NATO must take several initial steps to make this approach a reality: develop a space policy in cooperation with strategic partners; establish a dedicated space office; and build a welleducated and well-trained cadre of space experts. Alongside these activities, NATO must begin a strategic discussion on space among members, allies, and partners, to both determine its medium- to long-term requirements, and decide whether it should develop its own space assets. Ultimately, NATO should be in a position to provide standards, interoperability, command and control (C2), data management, and the sharing of space information, and be able to address space issues that can lead to international instability and conflict. Because modern space systems lie primarily in commercial hands, NATO s most important role may be as an advocate and enabler of standards and good behaviour in the space domain. To frame the workshop s discussion, we presented five questions that were formulated during the early stages of the Global Commons project, and which are relevant to each domain of the Commons. This report will present each question in turn, followed by a description of the most relevant ideas and findings to come from the discussions. 1. What are NATO s stakes in the space domain? 1 P a g e

2 2 From earliest times to the present, free access to the maritime domain has enabled commerce to bloom, especially when one considers the 2 nd and 3 rd order effects of global trade. Now space gives commerce a different, but equally powerful, set of possibilities. From a military perspective, space is mainly used for communication, observation, and positioning. The communication function covers data transfer, such as C2 dissemination, phone, , internet, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations. The observation function deals with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems such as geostationary earth orbit (GEO) intelligence, signals intelligence, electronic intelligence, monitoring of enemy forces, support to electronic warfare, missile warning, and environment monitoring (mission planning, munitions loading decisions, weather forecasting). Positioning is determined by time distribution, and today is a fundamental task in the use of precisionguided munitions, navigation for all services, support to friendly force tracking, and UAV operations. Efficient use of space comes with a corresponding requirement for terrestrial-based command and control, along with payload and network management. Satellite protection, if it is to be managed effectively, requires robust space situational awareness. Space-based systems have transformed our world and forever changed the way we live and work. To perform their core missions, NATO expeditionary operations are dependent on, and arguably non-functional without, support from space. When considering how space contributes to national security, global commerce, information, industry, and military capabilities, it is clear that space-based systems have become both a center of gravity and a growing critical vulnerability for the Alliance. There are an ever increasing number of nations from around the world entering the space domain, primarily through private enterprises. As such, space will become more congested and contested, especially in the most valuable regions of geostationary earth orbit (GEO). NATO must use a comprehensive approach to work with the public and private sectors to address space issues, such as ASATs and space debris, both of which can lead to international instability and conflict. NATO s stake in space does not simply grow and contract with NATO s level of ambition, but continues to increase as space capabilities come to underpin more of the national economies that support NATO. Indirect military benefits result from the revenue generated by national commercial applications of space capabilities: taxes on those revenues add to GDP, which in turn dictates the size of defense budgets. Global financial transactions are wholly dependent on instant communications down to 1/8000 of a second. If these communications break down or the timing is disrupted, the effects will potentially dwarf the present economic crisis. There is as yet no data that quantifies the likely commercial effects from the loss of space access per se, although some organizations are now collaborating on such a study, along the lines of the military s Day without Space exercise. The information derived from studies such as this help improve decision-making by senior leaders which has a cascading effect on political, military, social and economic concerns. Economic vulnerabilities do not imply a lesser threat or security concern for nations, as long as they are potential triggers of conflict. What, for instance, does an attack on a commercial satellite mean for security? Most satellites are in space to transfer information, like television, weather, or GPS, all of which have both commercial and security implications. 2 P a g e

3 3 Space has the potential to become an over-contested domain in the continuing absence of integrated policy and the promotion of best practices and behaviour. As access to sophisticated technologies becomes cheaper and easier, adversaries will attempt to deny or degrade NATO s use of space. Military decisions about how to fight on the ground and sea depend on access to space. Up to the present, Alliance nations have been happy to increase their dependency on space-based assets without putting the corresponding effort into protecting those systems. States may elect to create terrestrial backup or even alternate systems, but despite that, NATO members are unlikely to pay the prohibitive financial cost of foregoing the efficiencies of space capabilities. There was consensus among the participants that NATO should not create another centre of excellence for space, but that these issues and concerns can be addressed within existing structures. JAPPC, however, does not itself have adequate expertise to address these issues without additional resources. Although there was general agreement that NATO needs to invest in space expertise, the question remains: where and how? 2. How does NATO assure its access to space systems and its ability to conduct operations in support of Alliance missions in defence of the homeland, as well as out-of-area missions? How will opponents and adversaries deny or disrupt access to space-based systems? NATO must be prepared to maintain its access to space capabilities across the spectrum of conflict, from peace through major combat operations and all points in between; against the physical harshness of the space environment; and prepare for interference by a third party. Continuous operational access to space demands that NATO first determine its requirements for space capabilities, and then clearly state those requirements to Industry. The next step is to determine information requirements, and identify critical capabilities and vulnerabilities. Only then can it be determined how to protect these capabilities. Many mission areas, such as missile defence, require assured access to space services, which must be built into those areas long term plans, to include strategy, and capability documents. At the tactical level, once a pending attack on a space asset has been identified, commanders should have access to pre-determined options. They should know who makes the decisions, how the C2 works, and what defence capabilities and TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) they have available to oppose and mitigate an attack. A Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC), specifically CAOC 2, could perhaps serve as a test bed. Once NATO knows its requirements, it can begin to build relationships with member nations and partners. NATO currently owns no space assets, nor are those that member nations make available considered as common assets. Access to information is either purchased through the private sector or provided by the nations. If NATO decides to develop its own space assets, where should the effort concentrate? Given the need to maximize effectiveness and efficiency, who will organize space security on a global scale? Most NATO nations have little if any domestic space capability, but many can turn to individual space-faring nations like the US and international organizations such as the European Space Agency to meet 3 P a g e

4 4 their needs. This type of partner reliance should be studied as a potential to learn how to best leverage existing space competence and capability throughout NATO. Strategic discussions concerning space have been largely absent within NATO, although some nations have conducted bi-lateral negotiations on an operational level. There needs to be tasking from the North Atlantic Council to develop a comprehensive space policy for the Alliance. In its absence, nations will do whatever they think needs to be done, rather than what is most effective for the Alliance. 3. How can NATO's operational access to space-based systems be strengthened in the future? Space has become a critical vulnerability, and some believe a centre of gravity for the Alliance. Space capabilities must be protected to prevent an adversary from denying or disrupting our capability to access and conduct operations in space at will. NATO must have operational access to reliable and cost-effective space-based systems. Such systems can be owned outright by NATO, rented from the commercial sector, provided by a NATO member nation, or in some combination. Shared capacities, shared costs, and shared information may be ways to improve the effectiveness of NATO s ability to access and operate in space. NATO s operational use of space can be strengthened by: A policy A general code of good conduct in space (addressed in more detail in section 3); a NATO space policy; a space situational awareness information sharing center; technical/emergency back-up systems: o on-orbit back-up space assets (micro- or nano-satellites), o low-cost and rapidly available launchers ( aircraft capable of delivering payloads from suborbital paths) or emergency launch systems; and, a robust space industry able to replace mission critical satellites or ground stations (also addressed in the following section). A NATO space policy would assist the nations in understanding what is needed, why it is needed, and the required level of commitment. In turn, NATO needs to define its requirements for capability, information, and security. This will help to determine whether the current capability is sufficient or not. If more is needed, then a determination will have to be made as to which nations can provide that capability. Space Situational Awareness In order to ensure proper behaviour in space, one must be able to know what is taking place in the space environment. Among NATO members, only the United States has a robust space situational awareness capability. However, this capability is observe only, with little ability to take corrective actions or distinguish and verify intent. Space situational awareness (SSA) has to do with the capabilities of the whole system, including ground assets. NATO does not always need to get the data directly, but it does 4 P a g e

5 5 need to analyze and distribute the data. The overall SSA effort needs to promote improved access to information through improved and more timely sharing of that information. Better sharing of information will help everyone build a bigger, more complete picture. From an operational perspective, how do you consolidate and organize a broad range of data to maximize mission effectiveness? At present, no one has taken the lead in organizing the data and information that is being generated, to get it where it is most needed. This is a role that NATO could take on, and in doing so improve the operational effectiveness of its members, allies, and partners. NATO could also develop a SSA capability through an expanded air defence chain, which would be able to produce a recognized space picture (RSP). There is a need for a sensor park for surveillance, to ensure information flow, conduct intelligence assessments on the RSP, scan, track, recognize, evaluate, and ensure short revisit time. Is going offensive necessary? Most agreed that it would be counter-productive for NATO to delve into offensive space operations, and it would be it would be better use of its limited resources to concentrate on defence. During times of peace, NATO only needs assured access and freedom of action. In conflict, NATO may want superiority, in a specific place against a specific adversary. What NATO needs is information superiority and space provides one of the critical paths. In the future, NATO may want to develop the ability to interfere with an adversaries ability to deny service or influence behavior but that is yet to be foreseen. 4. At a policy and strategy level, what could NATO do to strengthen its future ability to secure access to space-based systems? Space must be a primary focus. Every ISAF commander has asked for more capacity in space, starting with a policy. Space was a contested domain for the two superpowers during the Cold War. Now, it is a contested commons for other reasons: The evolution of technology allows many more nations to go into the space domain; the Alliance s great reliance on space capabilities invites potential opponents to attack NATO space assets; there are no internationally agreed definitions or a general code of good conduct/behaviour in space. The main strategy tenets for the space domain have to be developed at the policy and strategy levels. These tenets are: Space-based assets are vital to all NATO expeditionary operations, and to maintain information/decision superiority; the value of space power lies in global access and global presence; NATO must have assured access to space systems; space power assets form a critical vulnerability; military space power can be a coercive force; 5 P a g e

6 6 promote behavior that denigrates the weaponization of space; but, the Alliance must be prepared to develop such assets if an adversary chooses to do so; space force enhancement is a priority; and, promote the sharing of information derived from space. The integration of space assets into NATO operational planning will require highly trained personnel with space expertise at all levels to: Develop a space cadre; oversee acquisitions; explore and leverage emerging technologies such as micro-satellites, and pursue dual-use technologies; and, integrate space objectives into training and exercises. Policy Level As mentioned earlier, rules governing the use of space are sparse. For example, there is no enforceable prohibition against creating orbital debris (polluting), or any regulation requiring owners to remove objects that have outlived their operational usefulness from desirable orbits. In addition, there are no conflict resolution mechanisms beyond those available for any other nation-to-nation dispute, and thus no credible response mechanism. While the space domain has many nested organizations, no central body exists to settle disputes. Because of the paucity of rules, actors can essentially behave as they see fit -- without rules, there are no rule breakers. Therefore, protecting space as a commons first requires a mechanism that recognizes it as a finite resource, and institutes an adaptable set of best practices that are enforceable and agreed to by the relevant commons users. Again, a system that promotes good behavior and best practices in space that is transparent and monitored may be the best way forward. Developing this body may prove difficult, as nations with established space programs must be convinced that is in their long-term interest promote best practices in order to maximize utility for a greater number of participants. NATO, as both a military and political alliance, can play a useful role in bringing together parties from across government and the private sector to discuss space policy. There are some areas of critical importance in which the Alliance must engage nations to define a position: intentional interference with space-based systems; mitigation of the orbital debris problem, which threatens all space assets regardless of who is at fault; and international rules for spectrum and orbital management that do not impede NATO s space requirements. Another key interest is to preserve a healthy space industrial base within NATO nations. Normally, policy should be written within known rules and regulations. Because this is at times difficult in the case of space, NATO may find it easier if it first develops an agreement among the nations that codifies agreed activities, behaviours and methods. Otherwise, any new policy will likely be rejected. The EU and US space policy may serve as a good template. 6 P a g e

7 7 Strategic Level Space-based systems are different from most other military systems. NATO nations operate in space to enhance terrestrial activities and to sustain capabilities. Most air, land, and sea operators care only about product, that is, what they gain from access to space assets, not about space per se. NATO needs to focus on how to use and make available capabilities from space. A statement of requirements for space products drives activities, and would be a good first step for NATO to begin to formulate a space policy. (The JAPCC Space Assessment, revised in January 2009, would be a good basis for developing a NATO space policy.) NATO s space policy must emphasize the following: It must focus on space activities to support operations; It must assure NATO s access to space; NATO must build and maintain space expertise; It should reflect NATO s long-term strategic need for space; It should account for the unique requirements of space system acquisition; One important question for NATO is whether collective defense and security extends into space. Can the Alliance gain deterrent value, and thereby a measure of protection by consciously adding space capabilities to those assets our potential adversaries know they must not trifle with? NATO may need to establish a Space Office to address strategic space issues for the Alliance, and engage the European Space Agency (ESA), the UN, and national space organizations on behalf of NATO. This office, supported by a coherent space policy and a clear roadmap, would be able to establish relationships and contracts with key supporting space nations and organisations. This Space Office could reside in ACT, ACO, or NATO HQ. 5. How can a Comprehensive Approach (integrated government, commercial and military effort) help the Alliance assure access to space systems? The NATO nations have individual space capabilities, owned and/or operated by the civilian sector, the government, or the defence establishment. NATO has the ability to leverage these capabilities through a comprehensive approach. NATO does not have its own space assets, but receives access to space capabilities through commercial and national providers. Most of the space systems in European countries do not belong to their respective Ministry of Defence, while some space systems are dual-use (military and civilian). NATO needs to establish working relationships with those organizations in charge of space systems, e.g., ESA, EU, national space agencies like US Space and NASA to include ministries of commerce and transportation. This more inclusive approach to space operations, essential to NATO s future planning, is already taking place to some degree in Afghanistan; however, the process is ad hoc, is not policy driven and clearly needs to be improved. 7 P a g e

8 8 Essential and Already In Place While some of NATO s lead space-faring nations have highly developed capabilities in space, the majority of nations are highly dependent on the commercial space industry. Most satellite manufacturers are private companies and a great deal of the satellite communications bandwidth used on a daily basis by NATO is leased from the civilian sector. In addition, the frequencies and orbital allocations for military satellites are governed by civilian organisations. These close ties between the commercial and military sectors in space are born out of necessity. Today, in NATO, basic knowledge and operational expertise in space is a complex mix of lead national expertise, e.g., US and France, combined with an increasingly robust commercial segment. While both sectors have developed cost and burden sharing procedures with regard to launch facilities, assets, research & development, and commercial space services, a great majority of those are private national agreements that make it difficult for NATO to drive requirements and predict outcomes. Needs Improvement Currently, NATO lacks a space policy as well as a space strategy, or a dedicated organization through which to develop them. As a result, the Alliance has insufficient guidance and doctrine in the area of space. Requires Governance Integrated governance would pave the way for improved integration of military and commercial space activities. A clearly defined level of ambition and clear requirements would enable policy makers and respective national industries to provide the necessary assets and capabilities, and would lay the foundation for future interagency relationship activities. We have already seen positive progress toward integration in the effort to build space situational awareness as a result of agreements made to support the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. A comprehensive approach should leverage all national power including political, military, civil, and economic. This is more easily accepted during times of crisis and conflict, but less welcome during times of peace. An economic case has to be made, especially for any new space systems, given that military use is increasingly only a small part of the overall space picture. ACT has started such a dialogue, and seeks to encourage political actions in this regard that are in the best interest of the Alliance. Recommendations to NATO Participants underlined a number of areas where NATO can focus its efforts to secure the Alliance s military operations and ensure future free access to the air and space commons: Develop a space policy for NATO. 8 P a g e

9 9 Recruit and maintain space subject-matter experts. This is fundamental to all other efforts. Promote and advocate for best behaviour and practices in space. Support the formation of international expert groups to consider critical issues, including space debris, collision risks, interference, and counter-space activities. Work with appropriate partners, including in the commercial sector, to develop a standardized architecture to improve space awareness. Seek solutions to the problems of interoperability in space make it a broad-based partnership with nations external to the Alliance. Improve NATO s shared space situational awareness, through data exchanges and the use of systems that promote situational awareness in space. 9 P a g e