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1 BEAT - Project Overview Prof Julian Fierrez On behalf of Dr Sébastien Marcel Idiap Research Institute, CH Biometrics Evaluation and Testing (BEAT) Research Projects Conference - Darmstadt, Sep 2015 BEAT «Biometrics Evaluation and Testing» FP7 SEC ( ) Performance evaluation, vulnerabilities and privacy protectio Certification 1
2 No system is perfect The reliability of biometric systems is not always known Biometric systems are vulnerable: Indirect attacks (intruders, hackers, ) Direct attacks (gummy fingers, photo attacks, ) also called presentation attacks (or spoofing) Lessons from FP7 TABULA RASA Vulnerability to presentation attacks can be: 1. assessed 1. mitigated 2
3 BEAT : objectives To propose a framework of standard operational evaluations for biometric technologies Evaluation of the performance of biometric systems Evaluation of the vulnerabilities of biometric systems Evaluation of privacy preservation mechanisms Developing standardization documents (certification) Integration and deployment of the BEAT platform Dissemination and exploitation on research activities Legal aspects BEAT : Partners 1 Idiap Research Institute IDIAP 2 Universidad Autonoma de Madrid UAM 3 University of Surrey UNIS 4 Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne EPFL 5 Informatics and Information Security, Advanced Technologies Research Center 6 Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives CEA TUBITAK 7 Morpho MORPHO 8 TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH TUVIT 9 Katholieke Universiteit Leuven KULEUVEN 10 Chalmers University of Technology CHALMERS Advisory Board: BSI (DE), NPL (UK), ANSSI (FR), CCN (SP), BI (AU), EAB (NL) 3
4 BEAT : objectives Towards Common Criteria (CC) evaluations Resistance level rating Vulnerability analysis methodology Reference document The Biometrics Evaluation and Testing Platform Web based, Reproducibility and attestations Privacy and data protection taken into consideration Biometric databases NOT accessible CC : a worldwide organization States National Agencies Evaluation Laboratories 4
5 CC : evaluation levels Ics, Smartcards: EAL4-5 Requirements for semi-formal and formal modeling Access to detailed design (source code) Increasing level of detail for evaluation EAL 7 EAL 6 EAL 5 EAL 4 EAL 3 EAL 2 EAL 1 formally verified design and tested semi-formally verified design and tested semi-formally designed and tested methodically designed, tested, and reviewed methodically tested and checked structurally tested functional tested Networks, VPN, firewall, SW: EAL2-EAL3 CC and Biometrics 2002: Biometrics Evaluation Methodology (BEM) Focused on intrinsic performance evaluation (FAR,FRR) Dimensioning databases 2007 Today Work on fingerprints (France, Germany, Spain) All kind of attacks specific to biometrics (spoofing, hill climbing, ) Document available: Characterizing Attacks to Fingerprint Verification Mechanismshttp:// CAFVM-Jul2011.pdf PPs from BSI EAL2, EAL2+ Max AVA_VAN.2, or even no AVA_VAN Definition of a dedicated SFR 5
6 Towards CC evaluations Adapt the methodology Translate CC requirements in Biometrics requirements Take into account biometrics specificity Examples : What is a TOE (parameterized or not)? How to compute intrinsic resistance? Vulnerability analysis methodology How to attack a system? What are the attacks to take into account? Rating approach and tools for resistance Define a rating table Define the resistance levels Example Simple system Fingerprint recognition No liveness detection Simple spoof (moulding) Simple system Any evaluation will fail 6
7 BEAT : objectives Towards Common Criteria (CC) evaluations Reference document available in Feb 2016 (public) ICCC 2015 Sep Event in Jan/Feb 2016 The Biometrics Evaluation and Testing Platform Web based, Reproducibility and attestations Privacy and data protection taken into consideration Biometric databases NOT accessible The BEAT online evaluation platform Goals Benchmarking biometric algorithms (or components) Reproducibility of research results Educational resource Security certification/attestation 7
8 The BEAT online evaluation platform Requirements Web accessible Certification/Attestation of biometric algorithms Allow reproducibility of public results Common protocols and standard metrics Source code (or binaries) uploaded Respect privacy consideration (source code, IP) Privacy and data protection taken into consideration Biometric databases not accessible for download An online evaluation platform 8
9 BEAT: User Page BEAT: Omni Search 9
10 BEAT: Attestation (click here) BEAT platform Status Operational and hosted at Idiap (100+ users) : Hosting biometric databases (14 so far) for face, speaker, fingervein, keystroke, anti-spoofing, Documented API BTAS Organisations interested : NFI, JRC, NIST, IARPA 10
11 BEAT platform Next Hosting more biometric databases : palmvein, iris, fingerprint Organize an international competition with the platform License the platform to 3rd parties The BEAT platform is for you if you need to : Perform evaluation WITHOUT distributing the data Share your data WITHOUT distributing it at large BEAT : objectives Towards Common Criteria (CC) evaluations Reference document available in Feb 2016 (public) ICCC 2015 Sep Event in Jan/Feb 2016 The Biometrics Evaluation and Testing Platform Operational at Idiap : Final release of platform : Feb
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