Hiding Amongst the Clouds
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- Rudolph Glenn
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1 Hiding Amongst the Clouds A Proposal for Cloud-based Onion Routing Nicholas Jones Matvey Arye Jacopo Cesareo Michael J. Freedman Princeton University
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3 We
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11 C O loud-based nion R outing
12 Benefits, Risks, and Challenges - Potential benefits of cloud infrastructure - High performance - Adaptability to censorship - Economic challenges - New security problems
13 Benefits of Cloud Infrastructure Performance (latency, throughput) Censorship Resistance
14 Performance - Individual nodes are higher bandwidth - Ability to add and remove nodes to meet demand 5:00 P.M.
15 Performance - Individual nodes are higher bandwidth - Ability to add and remove nodes to meet demand 7:00 P.M.
16 Performance - Individual nodes are higher bandwidth - Ability to add and remove nodes to meet demand 8:00 P.M.
17 Performance - Individual nodes are higher bandwidth - Ability to add and remove nodes to meet demand 11:00 P.M.
18 Performance - Individual nodes are higher bandwidth - Ability to add and remove nodes to meet demand 12:00 A.M.
19 Performance - Individual nodes are higher bandwidth - Ability to add and remove nodes to meet demand 2:00 A.M.
20 COR has higher throughput than Tor
21 COR has higher throughput than Tor
22 COR has higher throughput than Tor US & International
23 COR has higher throughput than Tor US & International US Only
24 COR has higher throughput than Tor US & International US Only 7.6x speedup
25 Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor
26 Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor 1-10 Mbps Home
27 Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor 1-10 Mbps Home
28 Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor 1-10 Mbps Home Datacenter
29 Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor 1-10 Mbps Home Gbps Sprint Datacenter
30 Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor 1-10 Mbps Home Gbps Sprint Level 3 Datacenter
31 Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor 1-10 Mbps Home Gbps Sprint Level 3 Datacenter AT&T
32 Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor 1-10 Mbps Home Gbps Sprint Level 3 Datacenter AT&T
33 Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor 1-10 Mbps Home Gbps Sprint Level 3 Datacenter AT&T
34 Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor 1-10 Mbps Home Gbps Sprint Level 3 Datacenter AT&T
35 Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor 1-10 Mbps Home Gbps Sprint Level 3 Datacenter AT&T
36 Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor 1-10 Mbps Home Gbps Sprint Level 3 Datacenter AT&T
37 Blocking Clouds Causes Collateral Damage
38 Blocking Clouds Causes Collateral Damage X
39 Blocking Clouds Causes Collateral Damage X X
40 Blocking Clouds Causes Collateral Damage X X X
41 Blocking Clouds Causes Collateral Damage X X X X
42 Blocking Clouds Causes Collateral Damage
43 Blocking Clouds Causes Collateral Damage
44 Blocking Clouds Causes Collateral Damage
45 Blocking Clouds Causes Collateral Damage
46 Blocking Clouds Causes Collateral Damage
47 Benefits of Clouds - Higher performance - Elasticity to scale to demand - Multi-homing and scale makes eavesdropping difficult - Elasticity forces censors to make hard choices: collateral damage or unblocked access
48 Economics Cloud pricing is affordable for end users
49 Cost of running COR in the cloud - Cloud providers charge for CPU and bandwidth
50 Cost of running COR in the cloud - Cloud providers charge for CPU and bandwidth - CPU is cheap
51 Cost of running COR in the cloud - Cloud providers charge for CPU and bandwidth - CPU is cheap users on a 34 /hr node
52 Cost of running COR in the cloud - Cloud providers charge for CPU and bandwidth - CPU is cheap users on a 34 /hr node
53 Cost of running COR in the cloud - Cloud providers charge for CPU and bandwidth - CPU is cheap users on a 34 /hr node - Bandwidth is dominant cost
54 Cost of running COR in the cloud - Cloud providers charge for CPU and bandwidth - CPU is cheap users on a 34 /hr node - Bandwidth is dominant cost - 100MB as low as 1 Amazon EC2 Pricing
55 Tor s Total Bandwidth Cost in the Cloud Approximately 900 MB/s 376 TB/month COR Cost: $61,200/month
56 Security Challenges and Solutions Involved Parties and Trust Model Building Tunnels Paying for Tunnels Learning About Relays
57 Distributing Trust - Tor - Tunnels between volunteer relays - COR - Tunnels between clouds from different providers
58 Is that sufficient? - Should users pay cloud providers directly? - Not anonymous: Credit cards and Paypal leak info
59 Is that sufficient? - Should users pay cloud providers directly? - Not anonymous: Credit cards and Paypal leak info - Another layer of indirection: Anonymity Service Providers - Operate relays and pay cloud providers - Mask users identities - Accept anonymous payment for access
60 System Roles - Cloud Hosting Providers (CHPs) - Provide infrastructure for COR relays - Anonymity Service Providers (ASPs) - Run relays and directory servers - Sell tokens - Redeemable for XX MB of connectivity or XX amount of time
61 System Architecture Example CHP A ASP 1 ASP 2 REQUEST TRAFFIC ENCRYPTED DESTINATION SERVER IP IP USER CHP B Organizations used above are examples only
62 System Architecture Example CHP A ASP 1 ASP 2 REQUEST TRAFFIC ENCRYPTED DESTINATION SERVER IP IP USER CHP B Cloud Hosting Providers Organizations used above are examples only
63 System Architecture Example CHP A ASP 1 ASP 2 REQUEST TRAFFIC ENCRYPTED DESTINATION SERVER IP IP USER CHP B Organizations used above are examples only
64 System Architecture Example CHP A ASP 1 ASP 2 REQUEST TRAFFIC ENCRYPTED DESTINATION SERVER IP IP USER CHP B Anonymity Service Providers Organizations used above are examples only
65 System Architecture Example CHP A ASP 1 ASP 2 REQUEST TRAFFIC ENCRYPTED DESTINATION SERVER IP IP USER CHP B Organizations used above are examples only
66 Circuit Construction Must be Policy Aware
67 Circuit Construction Must be Policy Aware - Two relays within each datacenter
68 Circuit Construction Must be Policy Aware - Two relays within each datacenter - Different entry and exit ASPs
69 Circuit Construction Must be Policy Aware - Two relays within each datacenter - Different entry and exit ASPs - Different entry and exit CHPs
70 Circuit Construction Must be Policy Aware - Two relays within each datacenter - Different entry and exit ASPs - Different entry and exit CHPs - ASP and CHP relays are contiguous within a circuit
71 Paying for Access - Users purchase tokens - Redeem tokens for access (bandwidth or time) - Chaum s e-cash: - Cryptographically untraceable
72 How do users gain access? - Users need two things: - Tokens - COR Directory
73 How do users gain access? - Users need two things: - Tokens - COR Directory - Solution: Bootstrapping Network - Low speed - High Latency - Free
74 Adversaries enumerate and block ingress - Current technologies - Tor Bridges - Two separate problems: - COR Relays - High speed, low latency, not free - Bootstrapping - Low speed, high latency, free
75 Summary Tor COR
76 Summary Tor COR Secure
77 Summary Tor COR Secure High Speed
78 Summary Tor COR Secure High Speed Dynamic Scaling
79 Summary Tor COR Secure High Speed Dynamic Scaling Adaptive to censorship
80 Summary Tor COR Secure High Speed Dynamic Scaling Adaptive to censorship Free
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