Impact of Network Topology on Anonymity and Overhead in Low-Latency Anonymity Networks
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1 Impact of Network Topology on Anonymity and Overhead in Low-Latency Anonymity Networks Claudia Diaz 1, Steven J. Murdoch 2, Carmela Troncoso 1 1 K.U.Leuven, ESAT/COSIC 2 University of Cambridge / The Tor Project
2 The problem! Packet counting! Inter-packet delays! Start and end of streams! Traffic watermarking (active attack)
3 Padding to resist traffic analysis! Independent Link Padding (ILP)! Constant rate! Poisson! Any distribution as long as output rate is independent of input rate! If traffic rate highly variable this is very inefficient! Lots of padding: wastes bandwidth! Little padding: drop/delay real packets (bad QoS)! Dependent Link Padding (DLP)! output rate dependent on inputs [VT08,WMS08]! Synchronous start and end of communications!
4 Dependent Link Padding (DLP) input 1 input 2 Δ Δ Δ output 1 Δ output 2
5 Our contribution! If we implement DLP in a network, are some network topologies better than others?! Overhead! Anonymity (how to compute it? [TD09])! Low-latency (circuit-based) anonymity networks multiplex the circuits between two routers over the same link! Can this help to further reduce overhead?! Can Tor support DLP? Which modifications would be needed?
6 Network topologies! Evaluation through simulations! Same (average) traffic load per node! Same traffic load for the network as a whole! Input: real Tor traces! Packet timestamp per circuit (bi-directional)
7 Reducing Overhead (RO-DLP)! Multiple circuits going between two nodes are multiplexed (link encryption)! Adversary cannot distinguish which packet belongs to which circuit! If a link carries more circuits than input packets to be forwarded at time t, then we do not need to send packets on all the circuits! Send min(c i, packets) Overhead (intra-network links) Overhead factor DLP RO-DLP 0 DLP RO DLP DLP RO DLP DLP RO DLP DLP RO DLP Free route Stratified S. Restricted Cascade
8 Feedback Effects in Free Routes node A node B Free Route Stratified Input Total traffic (cells) Time (seconds)
9 Comparison Topologies! Anonymity loss: difference with maximum achievable (log 2 N, where N is the total number of circuits in the network! Overhead factor: number of dummy packets generated per real packet Anonymity loss (bits) Free Route Stratified Stratified Restricted Cascade Overhead factor
10 Why Free Routes provide worse anonymity than Stratified! In Stratified topologies, a node is always in the same position for all the circuits it routes! Result: circuits always mix in all routers! In Free Routes, two circuits may pass by the same router and not be mixed to node 1 to node 2 or 3 from node 3 from node 1 or 2
11 Applying DLP to Tor! Topology: Tor was originally designed as a Free Route network, but:! Only a subset acts as entry! Only a subset acts as exit! In practice, the topology is close to Stratified! Padding modes! Supports link and circuit padding, but not used in practice! Neither padding scheme could be used to support DLP! Intermediate nodes must be able to inject padding in circuits that is only detected as padding at the destination! AES CTR mode: counter desynchronized if cells added! Change to per-cell IV instead of CTR mode (per-stream IV)
12 Conclusions! Possibility of reducing overhead by taking advantage of multiplexing! Impact of network topology for implementing DLP! Partitioning of anonymity sets in Cascades! Feedback effects in Free Routes (huge overhead, worse anonymity than Stratified)! Stratified: best anonymity/overhead tradeoff! Network scalability! Good news: very good anonymity as network grows (except for Cascades)! Bad news: high increase in overhead (except for Cascades)! Applicability to Tor: possible with small modifications! Open question: resistance of RO-DLP to corrupted nodes! Strategies for assigning padding to circuits in a smart way?
13 Network scalability: anonymity 7 6 Anonymity loss (bits) FR S SR C FR S SR C FR S SR C FR S SR C 12 nodes 27 nodes 48 nodes 300 nodes
14 Network scalability: overhead intra-network links edge links Overhead factor Overhead factor FR S SR C FR S SR C FR S SR C 12 nodes 27 nodes 48 nodes 0 FR S SR C FR S SR C FR S SR C 12 nodes 27 nodes 48 nodes
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