Expressing Human Trust in Distributed Systems: the Mismatch Between Tools and Reality
|
|
|
- Ernest Hensley
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Expressing Human Trust in Distributed Systems: the Mismatch Between Tools and Reality Sean W. Smith Department of Computer Science Dartmouth College Hanover, NH USA April 15, 2005 joint work with various students
2 Overview? Background on PKI Problems with mental models Problems with expressiveness (research)
3 Public Key Cryptography
4 Public Key Cryptography Infrastructure
5 Basic Uses: Public Key Cryptography Infrastructure Signed communication Encrypted communication Authentication
6 Basic Uses: Public Key Cryptography Infrastructure Signed communication Encrypted communication Authentication Basic Problem: Basic Approach: Basic Worries: Alice needs to learn Bob's public key A CA signs an X.509 identity cert binding Bob's name to his public key How does Alice obtain Bob's cert? How does she decide to believe his CA? How does she check if this CA has changed its mind?
7 Problem: Mental Models Does what people think the machines do match what the machines really do? digital signatures on office documents server-side SSL client-side SSL passwords
8 Digital Signatures If Alice's tools tell her that X has a valid signature from Bob, should she conclude that Bob signed that virtual piece of paper? With a quick exploration, we could subvert: Word (without macros) Excel (without macros*) PDF HTML using: PGP and S/MIME signatures DST's CertainSEnd Assured Office/ProSigner/E-Lock Acrobat Visible Signatures
9 Server-Side SSL SERVER CERT ` SERVER PRIVATE KEY If Alice's browser tells her that she has an https connection to bob.com, should she believe it?
10 Standard Browser Signals
11 Standard Browser Signals SSL warning window
12 Standard Browser Signals "https", security icons
13 Standard Browser Signals security page
14 Standard Browser Signals server certificate
15 Web Spoofing Revisited Attacks: For IE/Windows and Netscape/Linux (circa ), we built a malicious server that spoofed: Location bar SSL icon SSL warning windows SSL certificate info (and password prompts) Defenses: Prototyped and validated "secure GUI" countermeasures in Mozilla (Usenix 02) Didn't get adoped Users have strange beliefs about online trust The problem has only grown worse
16 Client-Side SSL SERVER CERT CLIENT CERT CLIENT PRIVATE KEY SERVER PRIVATE KEY Does "client-side authenticated request" "user authorized the request"?
17 The "Browser" Keystore Microsoft CSP, "high" or "medium" security keypair
18 Keyjacking #1 Suppose the adversary adds one user-level executable... INTERNET EXPLORER ATTACK.DLL CRYPT32.DLL CLIENT PRIVATE KEY Result: adversary gets key, even with medium/high security Countermeasure: make key non-exportable
19 Keyjacking #2 Suppose the adversary writes devious server content Request Martha.com 2. Martha s Malicious Frameset Claire 3. Stealth request Victor.com Result: often, adversary fools victim server Countermeasure: careful server content, browser configs
20 Mystery If Claire approves using her key for victor.com once, IE appears happy to keep using it for SSL handshakes to that server. Let's follow all the rules: WinXP Pro, current SP, current updates "High security" key Followed DoD DMS key hygiene guidelines Result: IE will still use Claire's key without telling her
21 Keyjacking #3 Add one user-level executable, with two parts... Countermeasures? Magic button? ("kill SSL state" or kill browser) Make key non-exportable? Aladdin etoken USB? Spyrus Rosetta USB Careful server content?
22 Keyjacking #3 Add one user-level executable, with two parts... Countermeasures? Magic button? ("kill SSL state" or kill browser) Make key non-exportable? Aladdin etoken USB? Spyrus Rosetta USB Careful server content? All your keypairs are belong to us
23 Keyjacking #3 Add one user-level executable, with two parts... Countermeasures? Magic button? ("kill SSL state" or kill browser) Make key non-exportable? Aladdin etoken USB? Spyrus Rosetta USB Careful server content? All your keypairs are belong to us SHEMP: Proxy certs, TPMs, XACML
24 Passwords Assumption: knowledge of password identity of user Reality: CS38 hw
25 Passwords Assumption: knowledge of password identity of user Reality: CS38 hw Plastic Dinosaurs and Squirt Guns
26 Passwords Assumption: knowledge of password identity of user Reality: CS38 hw Plastic Dinosaurs and Squirt Guns 80% success rate. "Alice" got 100%.
27 Passwords Assumption: knowledge of password identity of user Reality: CS38 hw Plastic Dinosaurs and Squirt Guns 80% success rate. "Alice" got 100%. link to spoofed site, using IE URL flaw
28 Passwords Assumption: knowledge of password identity of user Reality: CS38 hw Plastic Dinosaurs and Squirt Guns 80% success rate. "Alice" got 100%. link to spoofed site, using IE URL flaw 83% success rate. 36% had vulnerability. 3% of the rest noticed.
29 Passwords Assumption: knowledge of password identity of user Reality: CS38 hw Plastic Dinosaurs and Squirt Guns 80% success rate. "Alice" got 100%. link to spoofed site, using IE URL flaw 83% success rate. 36% had vulnerability. 3% of the rest noticed. Self-signed SSL site
30 Passwords Assumption: knowledge of password identity of user Reality: CS38 hw Plastic Dinosaurs and Squirt Guns 80% success rate. "Alice" got 100%. link to spoofed site, using IE URL flaw 83% success rate. 36% had vulnerability. 3% of the rest noticed. Self-signed SSL site 93% success
31 Passwords Assumption: knowledge of password identity of user Reality: CS38 hw Plastic Dinosaurs and Squirt Guns 80% success rate. "Alice" got 100%. link to spoofed site, using IE URL flaw 83% success rate. 36% had vulnerability. 3% of the rest noticed. Self-signed SSL site 93% success including two faculty (from social science)
32 Problem: Expressiveness Does standard PKI express what's important in human scenarios? name person name property property property formal delegation ad hoc delegation
33 Name Person Did that mail really come from the "John Wilson" I'm thinking of? One name, many persons One person, many names One person, many accounts One account, many capitalizations
34 Name Property Did that mail really come from the person with property P? What about the name-p binding? TCPA/TCG attestation about a remote machine Is "Martin Wyburne" the Dean? Who should sign the mail firing the CEO? Multiple people speak for P "Effie Cummings" sent the mail from "Dean Wyburne"
35 Property Property What does property P over there really mean? Name of predicate Who is the "Office of the Registrar" at UVM? Natural implications of predicate Dave Nicol and the soccer coach at UIUC Similarly named predicates may mean opposite things "Dean's List" at MSU "Dean's List" at Princeton
36 Delegation How do we express formal and ad hoc delegation relationships? Subcontracting "Modus Media" vs. is the "Dartmouth Ph.D. Admissions committee Less formal authorization Sharing passwords at NYU Dean of First-Years... and her admin assistant Stopping forgery of mail from the college president Ad hoc relationships Giving a visitor "inside" access in EAP-TLS WLAN
37 Research Angles Expressiveness: name equivalence non-identity attributes delegation ontology mapping PKI Tools: X.509 SubjectAltName X.509 attribute certs/permis X.509 proxy certs SDSI/SPKI, XACML, hybrids HEBCA Other areas: Trust Management HCISEC
38 "It hurts to straddle the fence." And in Conclusion Web spoofing: Signature hacking: Keyjacking: Plastic dinosaurs: Mismatch: Thanks: NSF Career, DoJ/DHS, Mellon, Internet2/AT&T, Cisco, Sun, Intel
SHEMP: Secure Hardware Enhanced MyProxy
SHEMP: Secure Hardware Enhanced MyProxy John Marchesini and Sean Smith Technical Report TR2005-532 Department of Computer Science Dartmouth College {carlo,sws}@cs.dartmouth.edu Abstract While PKI applications
Configuring SSL Security
CHAPTER9 This chapter describes how to configure SSL on the Cisco 4700 Series Application Control Engine (ACE) appliance. This chapter contains the following sections: Overview Configuring SSL Termination
Information Security CS 526
Information Security CS 526 Topic 14: Key Distribution & Agreement, Secure Communication Topic 14: Secure Communication 1 Readings for This Lecture On Wikipedia Needham-Schroeder protocol (only the symmetric
Computer Security module
Computer Security module Revision notes Mark D. Ryan June 2010 There won't be a revision lecture for the Computer Security module. Instead, these notes are provided to help you prepare for the exam. Revision
Cristina Nita-Rotaru. CS355: Cryptography. Lecture 17: X509. PGP. Authentication protocols. Key establishment.
CS355: Cryptography Lecture 17: X509. PGP. Authentication protocols. Key establishment. Public Keys and Trust Public Key:P A Secret key: S A Public Key:P B Secret key: S B How are public keys stored How
CSC 5930/9010 Modern Cryptography: Public-Key Infrastructure
CSC 5930/9010 Modern Cryptography: Public-Key Infrastructure Professor Henry Carter Fall 2018 Recap Digital signatures provide message authenticity and integrity in the public-key setting As well as public
Data Security and Privacy. Topic 14: Authentication and Key Establishment
Data Security and Privacy Topic 14: Authentication and Key Establishment 1 Announcements Mid-term Exam Tuesday March 6, during class 2 Need for Key Establishment Encrypt K (M) C = Encrypt K (M) M = Decrypt
Chapter 6: Digital Certificates Introduction Authentication Methods PKI Digital Certificate Passing
Chapter 6: Digital Certificates Introduction Methods PKI Digital Certificate Passing Prof Bill Buchanan OBE http://asecuritysite.com/crypto06 http://asecuritysite.com/encryption Identity on the Internet
SSL/TLS & 3D Secure. CS 470 Introduction to Applied Cryptography. Ali Aydın Selçuk. CS470, A.A.Selçuk SSL/TLS & 3DSec 1
SSL/TLS & 3D Secure CS 470 Introduction to Applied Cryptography Ali Aydın Selçuk CS470, A.A.Selçuk SSL/TLS & 3DSec 1 SSLv2 Brief History of SSL/TLS Released in 1995 with Netscape 1.1 Key generation algorithm
Public Key Infrastructure. What can it do for you?
Public Key Infrastructure What can it do for you? What is PKI? Centrally-managed cryptography, for: Encryption Authentication Automatic negotiation Native support in most modern Operating Systems Allows
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS) Brad Karp UCL Computer Science CS GZ03 / M030 20 th November 2017 What Problems Do SSL/TLS Solve? Two parties, client and server, not previously
Lecture Nov. 21 st 2006 Dan Wendlandt ISP D ISP B ISP C ISP A. Bob. Alice. Denial-of-Service. Password Cracking. Traffic.
15-441 Lecture Nov. 21 st 2006 Dan Wendlandt Worms & Viruses Phishing End-host impersonation Denial-of-Service Route Hijacks Traffic modification Spyware Trojan Horse Password Cracking IP Spoofing DNS
KeyA3 Certificate Manager
3 PKI. .........KeyA3 Certificate Manager... -... --... --... User PIN --... SO PIN --... -... --... User PIN...... -- -- --... --... --... -- ... --... --... --... E-mail...Mozilla Thunderbird -...K3PKCS
BEST PRACTICES FOR PERSONAL Security
BEST PRACTICES FOR PERSONAL Email Security Sometimes it feels that the world of email and internet communication is fraught with dangers: malware, viruses, cyber attacks and so on. There are some simple
Information Security. message M. fingerprint f = H(M) one-way hash. 4/19/2006 Information Security 1
Information Security message M one-way hash fingerprint f = H(M) 4/19/2006 Information Security 1 Outline and Reading Digital signatures Definition RSA signature and verification One-way hash functions
ÓBUDA UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST SSL CERTIFICATES
ÓBUDA UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST SSL CERTIFICATES Keszthelyi.Andras@kgk.uni-obuda.hu INTRODUCTION KESZTHELYI András PhD Óbuda University, Keleti Károly Faculty of Economics Keszthelyi.Andras@kgk.uni-obuda.hu
Security & Privacy. Larry Rudolph. Pervasive Computing MIT SMA 5508 Spring 2006 Larry Rudolph
Security & Privacy Larry 1 Who cares about Privacy? Everybody? Nobody? Criminals? Governments? Corporations? Privacy is the right to keep information hidden. But there is lots of information. You do not
CSE 565 Computer Security Fall 2018
CSE 565 Computer Security Fall 2018 Lecture 11: Public Key Infrastructure Department of Computer Science and Engineering University at Buffalo 1 Lecture Outline Public key infrastructure Certificates Trust
Elements of Cryptography and Computer and Network Security Computer Science 134 (COMPSCI 134) Fall 2016 Instructor: Karim ElDefrawy
Elements of Cryptography and Computer and Network Security Computer Science 134 (COMPSCI 134) Fall 2016 Instructor: Karim ElDefrawy Homework 3 Due: Monday, 11/28/2016 at 11:55pm PT Solution: Will be posted
Cryptography (Overview)
Cryptography (Overview) Some history Caesar cipher, rot13 substitution ciphers, etc. Enigma (Turing) Modern secret key cryptography DES, AES Public key cryptography RSA, digital signatures Cryptography
Elements of Cryptography and Computer and Network Security Computer Science 134 (COMPSCI 134) Fall 2016 Instructor: Karim ElDefrawy
Elements of Cryptography and Computer and Network Security Computer Science 134 (COMPSCI 134) Fall 2016 Instructor: Karim ElDefrawy Homework 3 Due: Monday, 11/28/2016 at 11:55pm PT Solution: Will be posted
Security+ SY0-501 Study Guide Table of Contents
Security+ SY0-501 Study Guide Table of Contents Course Introduction Table of Contents About This Course About CompTIA Certifications Module 1 / Threats, Attacks, and Vulnerabilities Module 1 / Unit 1 Indicators
Crypto meets Web Security: Certificates and SSL/TLS
CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy Crypto meets Web Security: Certificates and SSL/TLS Spring 2016 Franziska (Franzi) Roesner franzi@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann,
emudhra DOWNLOAD INSTRUCTION MANUAL HARD TOKEN VERSION 3 Date of Publication: 10th November 2011
emudhra DOWNLOAD INSTRUCTION MANUAL HARD TOKEN VERSION 3 () Date of Publication: 10th November 2011 emudhra Consumer Services Ltd 3rd Floor, Sai Arcade Outer Ring Road Devarabeesanahalli Bangalore 560103
PROVING WHO YOU ARE TLS & THE PKI
PROVING WHO YOU ARE TLS & THE PKI CMSC 414 MAR 29 2018 RECALL OUR PROBLEM WITH DIFFIE-HELLMAN The two communicating parties thought, but did not confirm, that they were talking to one another. Therefore,
1 This research has been supported in part by Intel, Cisco, and the Mellon Foundation,
Expressing Trust in Distributed Systems: the Mismatch Between Tools and Reality 1 Sean W. Smith Chris Masone Sara Sinclair Department of Computer Science Dartmouth College {sws,cmasone,sinclair}@cs.dartmouth.edu
User Authentication Principles and Methods
User Authentication Principles and Methods David Groep, NIKHEF User Authentication - Principles and Methods 1 Principles and Methods Authorization factors Cryptographic methods Authentication for login
Security Fundamentals
COMP 150-IDS: Internet Scale Distributed Systems (Spring 2015) Security Fundamentals Noah Mendelsohn Tufts University Email: noah@cs.tufts.edu Web: http://www.cs.tufts.edu/~noah Copyright 2012 & 2015 Noah
Distributed Systems. 25. Authentication Paul Krzyzanowski. Rutgers University. Fall 2018
Distributed Systems 25. Authentication Paul Krzyzanowski Rutgers University Fall 2018 2018 Paul Krzyzanowski 1 Authentication For a user (or process): Establish & verify identity Then decide whether to
Implementing Secure Socket Layer
This module describes how to implement SSL. The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol and Transport Layer Security (TLS) are application-level protocols that provide for secure communication between a client
Sectigo Security Solution
Sectigo Email Security Solution 2018 Sectigo. All rights reserved. Email hacking is a commonly used malicious tactic in our increasingly connected world. Business email compromise (BEC), or email account
CS November 2018
Authentication Distributed Systems 25. Authentication For a user (or process): Establish & verify identity Then decide whether to allow access to resources (= authorization) Paul Krzyzanowski Rutgers University
6 Public Key Infrastructure 6.1 Certificates Structure of an X.509 certificate X.500 Distinguished Name and X.509v3 subjectalternativename
6 Public Key Infrastructure 6.1 Certificates Structure of an X.509 certificate X.500 Distinguished Name and X.509v3 subjectalternativename Certificate formats (DER, PEM, PKCS #12) 6.2 Certificate Authorities
CS155b: E-Commerce. Lecture 6: Jan. 25, Security and Privacy, Continued
CS155b: E-Commerce Lecture 6: Jan. 25, 2001 Security and Privacy, Continued FIREWALL A barrier between an internal network & the Internet Protects the internal network from outside attacks Executes administrator-defined
Datasäkerhetsmetoder föreläsning 7
Datasäkerhetsmetoder föreläsning 7 Nyckelhantering Jan-Åke Larsson Cryptography A security tool, not a general solution Cryptography usually converts a communication security problem into a key management
SIP and VoIP What is SIP? What s a Control Channel? History of Signaling Channels
Network Security - ISA 656 Voice Over IP (VoIP) Security Simple SIP ing Alice s Bob Session Initiation Protocol Control channel for Voice over IP (Other control channel protocols exist, notably H.323 and
Innovative uses as result of DNSSEC
Innovative uses as result of DNSSEC AKA: Some happenings in the DANE* WG in the IETF. * DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities Some background... When you connect to https://www.example.com you use
راهنماي استفاده از توکن امنيتي کيا 3 در نرمافزارهاي مبتني بر PKI توکن امنيتي سخت افزاري
راهنماي استفاده از توکن امنيتي کيا 3 در نرمافزارهاي مبتني بر PKI توکن امنيتي سخت افزاري Certificate Manager KeyA3 SO PIN E-mail Mozilla Thunderbird K3PKCS SSL E-mail SSL Adobe Acrobat Mozilla Firefox PDF
Chapter 8. Network Security. Cryptography. Need for Security. An Introduction to Cryptography 10/7/2010
Cryptography Chapter 8 Network Security Introduction to Cryptography Substitution Ciphers Transposition Ciphers One-Time Pads Two Fundamental Cryptographic Principles Need for Security An Introduction
Managing Certificates
CHAPTER 12 The Cisco Identity Services Engine (Cisco ISE) relies on public key infrastructure (PKI) to provide secure communication for the following: Client and server authentication for Transport Layer
Evaluating the Security Risks of Static vs. Dynamic Websites
Evaluating the Security Risks of Static vs. Dynamic Websites Ballard Blair Comp 116: Introduction to Computer Security Professor Ming Chow December 13, 2017 Abstract This research paper aims to outline
CPSC 467: Cryptography and Computer Security
CPSC 467: Cryptography and Computer Security Michael J. Fischer Lecture 11 October 4, 2017 CPSC 467, Lecture 11 1/39 ElGamal Cryptosystem Message Integrity and Authenticity Message authentication codes
2/24/2018. Computer Security CS433 Luai E. Hasnawi, PhD
Computer Security CS433 Luai E. Hasnawi, PhD lhasnawi@taibahu.edu.sa Bits (or characters) in a file are independent from each other. These elements has no binding. If one element is changed, it can go
2015 Online Trust Audit & Honor Roll Methodology
2015 Online Trust Audit & Honor Roll Methodology Jeff Wilbur VP Marketing, Iconix Craig Spiezle Executive Director & President, OTA 2015 All rights reserved. Online Trust Alliance (OTA) Slide 1 Who Is
CS 425 / ECE 428 Distributed Systems Fall 2017
CS 425 / ECE 428 Distributed Systems Fall 2017 Indranil Gupta (Indy) Dec 5, 2017 Lecture 27: Security All slides IG Security Threats Leakage Unauthorized access to service or data E.g., Someone knows your
Ten Risks of PKI : What You re not Being Told about Public Key Infrastructure By Carl Ellison and Bruce Schneier
Presented by Joshua Schiffman & Archana Viswanath Ten Risks of PKI : What You re not Being Told about Public Key Infrastructure By Carl Ellison and Bruce Schneier Trust Models Rooted Trust Model! In a
Internet security and privacy
Internet security and privacy SSL/TLS 1 Application layer App. TCP/UDP IP L2 L1 2 Application layer App. SSL/TLS TCP/UDP IP L2 L1 3 History of SSL/TLS Originally, SSL Secure Socket Layer, was developed
Chapter 9: Key Management
Chapter 9: Key Management Session and Interchange Keys Key Exchange Cryptographic Key Infrastructure Storing and Revoking Keys Digital Signatures Slide #9-1 Overview Key exchange Session vs. interchange
1. CyberCIEGE Advanced VPNs
1. CyberCIEGE Advanced VPNs CyberCIEGE is an information assurance (IA) training tool that illustrates computer and network security principles through simulation and resource management trade-offs. CyberCIEGE
CSCE 813 Internet Security Final Exam Preview
CSCE 813 Internet Security Final Exam Preview Professor Lisa Luo Fall 2017 Coverage All contents! Week1 ~ Week 15 The nature of the exam: 12 questions: 3 multiple choices questions 1 true or false question
SEEM4540 Open Systems for E-Commerce Lecture 03 Internet Security
SEEM4540 Open Systems for E-Commerce Lecture 03 Internet Security Consider 2. Based on DNS, identified the IP address of www.cuhk.edu.hk is 137.189.11.73. 1. Go to http://www.cuhk.edu.hk 3. Forward the
Applied Cryptography Basic Protocols
Applied Cryptography Basic Protocols Sape J. Mullender Huygens Systems Research Laboratory Universiteit Twente Enschede 1 Session keys It is prudent practice to use a different key for each session. This
Key Management and Distribution
Key Management and Distribution Raj Jain Washington University in Saint Louis Saint Louis, MO 63130 Jain@cse.wustl.edu Audio/Video recordings of this lecture are available at: http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-14/
Reference Card: How to connect Windows 7 to UniWireless
Reference Card: How to connect Windows 7 to UniWireless Important Information Windows 7 is not supported by ITS. These instructions provided are only a guide and do not provide any troubleshooting assistance.
User Authentication + Other Human Aspects
CSE 484 (Winter 2010) User Authentication + Other Human Aspects Tadayoshi Kohno Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for
Public Key Enabling Oracle Weblogic Server
DoD Public Key Enablement (PKE) Reference Guide Public Key Enabling Oracle Weblogic Server Contact: dodpke@mail.mil URL: http://iase.disa.mil/pki-pke URL: http://iase.disa.smil.mil/pki-pke Public Key Enabling
CS Computer and Network Security: PKI
CS 5410 - Computer and Network Security: PKI Professor Kevin Butler Fall 2015 Reminders No in-person class on Friday, October 2nd. We have pre-recorded the second half of the PKI lecture which will be
Cryptography SSL/TLS. Network Security Workshop. 3-5 October 2017 Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea
Cryptography SSL/TLS Network Security Workshop 3-5 October 2017 Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea 1 History Secure Sockets Layer was developed by Netscape in 1994 as a protocol which permitted persistent
Diffie-Hellman. Part 1 Cryptography 136
Diffie-Hellman Part 1 Cryptography 136 Diffie-Hellman Invented by Williamson (GCHQ) and, independently, by D and H (Stanford) A key exchange algorithm o Used to establish a shared symmetric key Not for
Securing Internet Communication: TLS
Securing Internet Communication: TLS CS 161: Computer Security Prof. David Wagner March 11, 2016 Today s Lecture Applying crypto technology in practice Two simple abstractions cover 80% of the use cases
Introduction to Network Security Missouri S&T University CPE 5420 Exam 2 Logistics
Introduction to Network Security Missouri S&T University CPE 5420 Exam 2 Logistics Egemen K. Çetinkaya Egemen K. Çetinkaya Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering Missouri University of Science
Lecture 13. Public Key Distribution (certification) PK-based Needham-Schroeder TTP. 3. [N a, A] PKb 6. [N a, N b ] PKa. 7.
![Lecture 13. Public Key Distribution (certification) PK-based Needham-Schroeder TTP. 3. [N a, A] PKb 6. [N a, N b ] PKa. 7.](/thumbs/84/91191448.jpg "Lecture 13. Public Key Distribution (certification) PK-based Needham-Schroeder TTP. 3. [N a, A] PKb 6. [N a, N b ] PKa. 7.")
Lecture 13 Public Key Distribution (certification) 1 PK-based Needham-Schroeder TTP 1. A, B 4. B, A 2. {PKb, B}SKT B}SKs 5. {PK a, A} SKT SKs A 3. [N a, A] PKb 6. [N a, N b ] PKa B 7. [N b ] PKb Here,
Cryptography and Network Security
Cryptography and Network Security Spring 2012 http://users.abo.fi/ipetre/crypto/ Lecture 8: Protocols for public-key management Ion Petre Department of IT, Åbo Akademi University 1 Key management two problems
Background. Network Security - Certificates, Keys and Signatures - Digital Signatures. Digital Signatures. Dr. John Keeney 3BA33
Background Network Security - Certificates, Keys and Signatures - Dr. John Keeney 3BA33 Slides Sources: Karl Quinn, Donal O Mahoney, Henric Johnson, Charlie Kaufman, Wikipedia, Google, Brian Raiter. Recommended
Lecture 15 PKI & Authenticated Key Exchange. COSC-260 Codes and Ciphers Adam O Neill Adapted from
Lecture 15 PKI & Authenticated Key Exchange COSC-260 Codes and Ciphers Adam O Neill Adapted from http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/cse107/ Today We will see how signatures are used to create public-key infrastructures
Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) Lab
SEED Labs PKI Lab 1 Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) Lab Copyright 2018 Wenliang Du, Syracuse University. The development of this document was partially funded by the National Science Foundation under Award
Authentication Handshakes
AIT 682: Network and Systems Security Topic 6.2 Authentication Protocols Instructor: Dr. Kun Sun Authentication Handshakes Secure communication almost always includes an initial authentication handshake.
Introduction to Cryptography Lecture 10
Introduction to Cryptography Lecture 10 Digital signatures, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Benny Pinkas January 1, 2012 page 1 Non Repudiation Prevent signer from denying that it signed the message I.e.,
Cryptographic Protocols 1
Cryptographic Protocols 1 Luke Anderson luke@lukeanderson.com.au 5 th May 2017 University Of Sydney Overview 1. Crypto-Bulletin 2. Problem with Diffie-Hellman 2.1 Session Hijacking 2.2 Encrypted Key Exchange
VSP16. Venafi Security Professional 16 Course 04 April 2016
VSP16 Venafi Security Professional 16 Course 04 April 2016 VSP16 Prerequisites Course intended for: IT Professionals who interact with Digital Certificates Also appropriate for: Enterprise Security Officers
Public Key Infrastructures
Public Key Infrastructures Trust Models Cryptography and Computer Algebra Prof. Johannes Buchmann Dr. Johannes Braun We trust certificates because we trust the system(s). Direct trust Web of trust Hierarchical
epldt Web Builder Security March 2017
epldt Web Builder Security March 2017 TABLE OF CONTENTS Overview... 4 Application Security... 5 Security Elements... 5 User & Role Management... 5 User / Reseller Hierarchy Management... 5 User Authentication
VSP18 Venafi Security Professional
VSP18 Venafi Security Professional 13 April 2018 2018 Venafi. All Rights Reserved. 1 VSP18 Prerequisites Course intended for: IT Professionals who interact with Digital Certificates Also appropriate for:
Cryptography and Network Security. Prof. D. Mukhopadhyay. Department of Computer Science and Engineering. Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur
Cryptography and Network Security Prof. D. Mukhopadhyay Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur Module No. # 01 Lecture No. # 38 A Tutorial on Network Protocols
SAML-Based SSO Solution
About SAML SSO Solution, page 1 SAML-Based SSO Features, page 2 Basic Elements of a SAML SSO Solution, page 2 SAML SSO Web Browsers, page 3 Cisco Unified Communications Applications that Support SAML SSO,
SPOOFING. Information Security in Systems & Networks Public Development Program. Sanjay Goel University at Albany, SUNY Fall 2006
SPOOFING Information Security in Systems & Networks Public Development Program Sanjay Goel University at Albany, SUNY Fall 2006 1 Learning Objectives Students should be able to: Determine relevance of
CS Computer Networks 1: Authentication
CS 3251- Computer Networks 1: Authentication Professor Patrick Traynor 4/14/11 Lecture 25 Announcements Homework 3 is due next class. Submit via T-Square or in person. Project 3 has been graded. Scores
Man In The Middle Project completed by: John Ouimet and Kyle Newman
Man In The Middle Project completed by: John Ouimet and Kyle Newman What is MITM? Man in the middle attacks are a form of eves dropping where the attacker relays messages that are sent between victims
WHITE PAPER. Secure communication. - Security functions of i-pro system s
WHITE PAPER Secure communication - Security functions of i-pro system s Panasonic Video surveillance systems Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 1 2. Outline... 1 3. Common security functions of the i-pro
User Authentication + Human Aspects
CSE 484 (Winter 2011) User Authentication + Human Aspects Tadayoshi Kohno Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample
Implementing Cisco Network Security (IINS) 3.0
Implementing Cisco Network Security (IINS) 3.0 COURSE OVERVIEW: Implementing Cisco Network Security (IINS) v3.0 is a 5-day instructor-led course focusing on security principles and technologies, using
Lecture Notes 14 : Public-Key Infrastructure
6.857 Computer and Network Security October 24, 2002 Lecture Notes 14 : Public-Key Infrastructure Lecturer: Ron Rivest Scribe: Armour/Johann-Berkel/Owsley/Quealy [These notes come from Fall 2001. These
Stop sweating the password and learn to love public key cryptography. Chris Streeks Solutions Engineer, Yubico
1 Stop sweating the password and learn to love public key cryptography Chris Streeks Solutions Engineer, Yubico Stop Sweating the Password! 2 Agenda Introduction The modern state of Phishing How to become
Cryptography & Key Exchange Protocols. Faculty of Computer Science & Engineering HCMC University of Technology
Cryptography & Key Exchange Protocols Faculty of Computer Science & Engineering HCMC University of Technology Outline 1 Cryptography-related concepts 2 3 4 5 6 7 Key channel for symmetric cryptosystems
IP Phone Security and CTL (Certificate Trust List)
IP Phone Security and CTL (Certificate Trust List) Purpose on page 1 Phone Security and CTL Overview on page 1 Configuration on page 3 1. Obtain USB etokens on page 3 2. Activate CTL Provider and CAPF
Open XML Gateway User Guide. CORISECIO GmbH - Uhlandstr Darmstadt - Germany -
Open XML Gateway User Guide Conventions Typographic representation: Screen text and KEYPAD Texts appearing on the screen, key pads like e.g. system messages, menu titles, - texts, or buttons are displayed
Cryptography in Lotus Notes/Domino Pragmatic Introduction for Administrators
Cryptography in Lotus Notes/Domino Pragmatic Introduction for Administrators Belfast, 11-Nov-2010 Innovative Software Solutions. Thomas Bahn - graduated in mathematics, University of Hannover - developing
L7: Key Distributions. Hui Chen, Ph.D. Dept. of Engineering & Computer Science Virginia State University Petersburg, VA 23806
L7: Key Distributions Hui Chen, Ph.D. Dept. of Engineering & Computer Science Virginia State University Petersburg, VA 23806 9/16/2015 CSCI 451 - Fall 2015 1 Acknowledgement Many slides are from or are
College Deans, Department Chairs & Supervising Faculty
Revised: 8.26.09 Sam Houston State University Protection of Human Subjects Committee (PHSC/IRB) College Deans, Department Chairs & Supervising Faculty Sam Houston State University has developed a new online
Managed Access Gateway. User Guide
Managed Access Gateway User Guide Version 3.0 Exostar, LLC April 20, 2013 Table of Contents Table of Contents...ii Purpose... 1 Log-in to your MAG Account... 2 Additional MAG Login Options... 2 First Time
Digital signatures: How it s done in PDF
Digital signatures: How it s done in PDF Agenda Why do we need digital signatures? Basic concepts applied to PDF Digital signatures and document workflow Long term validation Why do we need digital signatures?
cs642 /introduction computer security adam everspaugh
cs642 computer security /introduction adam everspaugh ace@cs.wisc.edu definition Computer Security := understanding and improving the behavior of computing systems in the presence of adversaries adversaries
Certificate Properties File Realm
Certificate Properties File Realm {scrollbar} This realm type allows you to configure Web applications to authenticate users against it. To get to that point, you will need to first configure Geronimo
CS 161 Computer Security
Paxson Spring 2017 CS 161 Computer Security Discussion 6 Week of March 6, 2017 Question 1 Password Hashing (10 min) When storing a password p for user u, a website randomly generates a string s (called
Authentication Part IV NOTE: Part IV includes all of Part III!
Authentication Part IV NOTE: Part IV includes all of Part III! ECE 3894 Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust Spring 2018 Assoc. Prof. Vincent John Mooney III Georgia Institute of Technology NOTE: THE FOLLOWING
Perspectives: Improving SSH-style authentication using multi-path probing
Perspectives: Improving SSH-style authentication using multi-path probing Dan Wendlandt, David G. Andersen, Adrian Perrig - ATC'08 By Hassan Shahid Khan CS 598 - COMPUTER SECURITY I THE PHYSICAL WORLD
Modern cryptography 2. CSCI 470: Web Science Keith Vertanen
Modern cryptography 2 CSCI 470: Web Science Keith Vertanen Modern cryptography Overview Asymmetric cryptography Diffie-Hellman key exchange (last time) Pubic key: RSA Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Digital
Survivable Trust for Critical Infrastructure David M. Nicol, Sean W. Smith, Chris Hawblitzel, Ed Feustel, John Marchesini, Bennet Yee*
Survivable Trust for Critical Infrastructure David M. Nicol, Sean W. Smith, Chris Hawblitzel, Ed Feustel, John Marchesini, Bennet Yee* Cybersecurity Research Group Institute for Security Technology Studies,
Public Key Infrastructures. Using PKC to solve network security problems
Public Key Infrastructures Using PKC to solve network security problems Distributing public keys P keys allow parties to share secrets over unprotected channels Extremely useful in an open network: Parties
Spring 2010: CS419 Computer Security
Spring 2010: CS419 Computer Security Vinod Ganapathy Lecture 7 Topic: Key exchange protocols Material: Class handout (lecture7_handout.pdf) Chapter 2 in Anderson's book. Today s agenda Key exchange basics