InterTubes: A Study of the US Longhaul Fiber-optic Infrastructure

Transcription

1 InterTubes: A Study of the US Longhaul Fiber-optic Infrastructure Ram Durairajan University of Wisconsin-Madison Joel Sommers Colgate University Paul Barford University of Wisconsin-Madison & comscore, Inc. Walter Willinger NIKSUN, Inc. 1

2 A view of the Internet Source: Internet Atlas h4p://internetatlas.org 2

3 A view of the Internet What does the Internet's underlying physical infrastructure look like? How resilient is this infrastructure? How can I broaden my perspective on risks in my network? What are all the right (and wrong) conduit deployment practices and policies? How can I improve robustness and/or performance? 3

4 No one has a complete view of Internet at the physical level Source: Lumeta Source: Peer1 4

5 Some are quite confused 5

6 InterTubes outline Introduction and Motivation Process for constructing a map Assessment of infrastructure sharing Robustness suggestions Implications 6

7 Process for constructing a map Step #1: Building an initial map Utilize (geocoded) maps of tier-1 ISPs and major cable providers found by web search Step #2: Consistency check with public records Rights of Way, agency filings, etc. Step #3: Add links from ISPs that are not geocoded E.g., the Sprint network map Step #4: Infer conduit sharing 7

8 Map construction 8

9 Geo-specific link encoding 9

10 Map of US long-haul fiber Source: Internet Atlas h4p://internetatlas.org Source: branfiber.net 10

11 Map of US long-haul fiber - details Source: Internet Atlas h4p://internetatlas.org Source: branfiber.net 11

12 Consistency check via public records Source: Virginia County Archive 12

13 Map of US long-haul fiber - details Source: Internet Atlas h4p://internetatlas.org 13

14 Map of US long-haul fiber - details Source: Internet Atlas h4p://internetatlas.org 14

15 Internet vs. other infrastructure Railway infrastructure Source: Internet Atlas h4p://internetatlas.org Roadway infrastructure 15

16 Assessing infrastructure sharing Striking characteristic of constructed maps is conduit sharing 16

17 Assessing infrastructure sharing Striking characteristic of constructed maps is conduit sharing Analyze shared risk using risk matrix c1 c2 c3 Level Sprint Two notions of risk Connectivity-only Connectivity plus inferred traffic volumes VisualizaPon! 17

18 Connectivity-only shared risk How many ISPs share a conduit? Raw number Number of conduits shared by ISPs Number of ISPs sharing a conduit 18

19 Connectivity-only shared risk How many ISPs share a conduit? Raw number Number of conduits shared by ISPs conduits Number of ISPs sharing a conduit 19

20 Connectivity-only shared risk How many ISPs share a conduit? Raw number % Number of conduits shared by ISPs 63.28% 53.50% Number of ISPs sharing a conduit 20

21 Connectivity-only shared risk How many ISPs share a conduit? Raw number Number of conduits shared by ISPs 12 cripcal choke points Number of ISPs sharing a conduit 21

22 Connectivity-only shared risk How many ISPs share a conduit? Raw number Number of conduits shared by ISPs Number of ISPs sharing a conduit Physical connectivity lacks much diversity that is a hallmark of commonly-known models. 22

23 Connectivity-only shared risk Average number of ISPs that share conduits in a given ISP s network Which ISPs do the most infrastructure sharing? Average sharing SuddenLink EarthLink Level3 Cox Comcast TWC CenturyLink Integra Sprint Verizon HE ISPs Intelliquent ATT Cogent Zayo Tata Telia Deutsche NTT XO 23

24 Connectivity-only shared risk Average number of ISPs that share conduits in a given ISP s network Which ISPs do the most infrastructure sharing? Average sharing SuddenLink EarthLink Level3 Cox Comcast TWC CenturyLink Integra Sprint A majority of the ISPs is trading off lower deployment cost for increased resilience. Verizon HE ISPs Intelliquent ATT Cogent Zayo Tata Telia Deutsche NTT 24 XO

25 Connectivity plus inferred traffic volume Source: Internet Atlas h4p://internetatlas.org Dataset: Ono from Jan. 01, 2014 to Mar. 31, 2014; strapfied into ten 9- day parts Thickness α number of probes traversing a conduit Color α number of ISPs 25

26 Connectivity plus inferred traffic volume Source: Internet Atlas h4p://internetatlas.org Dataset: Ono from Jan. 01, 2014 to Mar. 31, 2014; strapfied into ten 9- day parts Thickness α number of probes traversing a conduit Color α number of ISPs 26

27 Connectivity plus inferred traffic volume Source: Internet Atlas h4p://internetatlas.org Dataset: Ono from Jan. 01, 2014 to Mar. 31, 2014; strapfied into ten 9- day parts Thickness α number of probes traversing a conduit Color α number of ISPs 27

28 Robustness suggestions Goal: increase robustness of infrastructure to fiber cuts, or to minimize propagation delay Increase network robustness without adding new conduits by adding new conduits Minimize propagation delay without adding new conduits by adding new conduits 28

29 Robustness suggestions Goal: increase robustness of infrastructure to fiber cuts, or to minimize propagation delay Increase network robustness without adding new conduits by adding new conduits Minimize propagation delay without adding new conduits by adding new conduits More results in the paper! 29

30 Robustness suggestions Increasing network robustness without adding new conduits Shared Risk Reduction (SRR) Max. SRR Min. SRR Avg. SRR

31 Robustness suggestions Increasing network robustness without adding new conduits Shared Risk Reduction (SRR) Path Inflation (PI) Max. PI Min. PI Avg. PI

32 Implications for policy makers Robustness suggestions conflict with currently-discussed policies Title II enables FCC to specify providers as common carriers Recent decision: reclassify broadband providers as common carriers Provider s infrastructure will be available to third parties 32

33 Implications for policy makers Robustness suggestions conflict with currently-discussed policies Title II enables FCC to specify providers as common carriers Recent decision: reclassify broadband providers as common carriers Provider s infrastructure will be available to third parties If Title II classification is upheld, there will be a significant increase in shared risk. 33

34 Other implications For ISPs Provisioning and deployment Competitive advantage Safest physical communication backup For Researchers How to deploy the identified conduits Link Exchanges? More in the paper 34

35 Thank you! Datasets are available to the community at Questions? Acknowledgement: Thank you Edgescope project (Northwestern Univ.) for Ono dataset!