SSL/TLS CONT Lecture 9a
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1 SSL/TLS CONT Lecture 9a COMPSCI 726 Network Defence and Countermeasures Muhammad Rizwan Asghar August 11, 2017 Source of some slides: University of Twente
2 2 HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL: KEY EXCHANGE AND AUTHENTICATION Client Server If requested by the client, the server sends its authentication data plus keys If necessary, the client sends its authentication data plus keys
3 3 HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL: PHASE 2 Certificate message Server s X.509v3 certificate followed by optional chain of certificates Required for RSA, Fixed DH, Ephemeral DH but not for Anonymous DH Server Key Exchange message Not needed for RSA and Fixed DH Required for Ephemeral DH and Anonymous DH Needed for RSA where the server has signature-only key
4 4 HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL: PHASE 2 Server Key Exchange message Signed by the server Signature is on hash of ClientHello.random, ServerHello.random Server Key Exchange parameters Certificate Request message Requests a certificate from the client Server Done message Ends phase 2, always required
5 5 HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL: PHASE 3 Certificate message Send if the server has requested certificate and the client has appropriate certificate Otherwise, send no_certificate alert Client Key Exchange message Content depends on type of key exchange (see next slide) Certificate Verify message Can be optionally sent following a client certificate with signing capability Signs hash of master secret (established by key exchange) and all handshake messages so far Provides evidence of possessing private key corresponding to certificate
6 6 HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL: PHASE 3 Client Key Exchange message RSA Client generates 48-byte pre-master secret, which is encrypted with the server s RSA public Ephemeral or Anonymous DH Fixed DH Client s public DH value Null, public key previously sent in the Certificate message
7 7 HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL: PHASE 3 48-byte pre-master secret RSA DH Generated by the client Sent encrypted to the server Both sides compute the same value Each side uses its own private value and the other side s public value
8 8 HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL: PHASE 3 pre_master_secret: 48 bytes master_secret = PRF(pre_master_secret, "master secret", ClientHello.random, ServerHello.random)
9 PRE-MASTER SECRET AND MASTER SECRET Pre_master_secret Computed for each session during handshaking Could be the same for all sessions It is not stored (so safe) Master_secret It is stored for the lifetime of the session May be compromised If compromised, damage limited to a session 9
10 10 GENERATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC PARAMETERS An SSL session needs four keys Four keys Client write MAC secret Server write MAC secret Client write key (for encryption) Server write key Two IVs Client write IV (for CBC) Server write IV These parameters are generated from the master secret
11 11 CHANGE CIPHER SPEC PROTOCOL Client Server Change cipher spec activates new algorithms Finished verifies new algorithms After the server sends Finished, actual data exchange starts
12 HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL: PHASE 4 Change Cipher Spec message Not considered part of the handshake protocol but in some sense is part of it Finished message Sent under new algorithms and keys Content is hash of all previous messages and master secret 12
13 13 PARTICIPANTS AS FINITE-STATE MACHINES Client state M_SLEEP ClientHello Server state M_CLIENT_HELLO ServerHello M_SERVER_HELLO M_SEND_KEY ServerKeyExchange M_SERVER_KEY M_CLIENT_KEY M_SEND_KEY ClientKeyExchange M_DONE
14 PROTOCOL IN ACTION Browser Client-hello Server-hello + Server-cert (PK) Server Cert SK rand k Key exchange (several options) Client-key-exchange: E(PK, k) k Finished HTTP data encrypted with KDF(k) Most common: Server authentication only 14
15 15 SSL ALERT PROTOCOL Conveys SSL-related alerts to peer entities 2-byte alert messages 1-byte level Fatal or warning 1-byte code Alert code Severity Fatal Warning
16 16 ALERT PROTOCOL Specific alert Fatal: Unexpected message, bad record MAC, decompression failure, handshake failure, and illegal parameter Warning: Close notify, no certificate, bad certificate, unsupported certificate, certificate revoked, certificate expired, and certificate unknown Compressed and encrypted like all SSL data
17 ALERT PROTOCOL 17
18 18 SSL ALERT MESSAGES Warning or fatal close_notify(0), unexpected_message(10), bad_record_mac(20), decryption_failed(21), record_overflow(22), decompression_failure(30), handshake_failure(40), bad_certificate(42), unsupported_certificate(43), certificate_revoked(44), certificate_expired(45), certificate_unknown(46), illegal_parameter(47), unknown_ca(48), access_denied(49), decode_error(50), decrypt_error(51), export_restriction(60), protocol_version(70), insufficient_security(71), internal_error(80), user_canceled(90), no_renegotiation(100),
19 HEARTBEAT PROTOCOL A periodic signal generated to indicate normal operation or to synchronise other parts of a system Typically used to monitor the availability of a protocol entity Defined in 2012 in RFC 6250 Runs on top of the TLS Record Protocol Use is established during Phase 1 of the handshake protocol Each peer indicates whether it supports heartbeats Serves two purposes: Assures the sender that the recipient is still alive Generates activity across the connection during idle periods 19
20 HEARTBLEED For this image, thanks to FenixFeather 20
21 APPLICATION PORTS https 443 ssmtp 465 snntp 563 sldap 636 spop3 995 ftp-data 889 ftps 990 imaps 991 telnets 992 ircs
22 22 SUMMARY SSL/TLS is based on two main sub-protocols Handshake protocol for key establishment Record protocol for secure communication It uses authenticated encryption Variation: MAC and then encrypt Key exchange methods use RSA and DH A master secret is generated from a pre-master secret for providing forward secrecy
23 23 RESOURCES Read Chapter 5 of Network Security Essentials Applications and Standards Fourth Edition William Stallings Prentice Hall ISBN OpenSSL: A free open-source implementation of SSL
24 24 Questions? Thanks for your attention!
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Requirements from the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Version: 1.0 2018-12-17 National Information Assurance Partnership Revision History Version Date Comment Introduction Purpose.