SCADACS SCADACS. SCADA & Computer Security. Find Them, Bind Them Industrial Control Systems(ICS) on the Internet
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1 SCADA & Computer Security SCADACS SCADACS Find Them, Bind Them Industrial Control Systems(ICS) on the Internet Johannes Klick Daniel Marzin Secure Identity Research Group - Freie Universität Berlin PHDays - may Moscow Russia
2 Outline Introduction What is a SCADA system? Our playground Exploits on the Internet Start/Stop Exploit How to find ICS on the Internet Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) Outlook Joint Data Integration and Information SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
3 Outline Introduction What is a SCADA system? Our playground Exploits on the Internet Start/Stop Exploit How to find ICS on the Internet Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) Outlook Joint Data Integration and Information SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
4 Introduction Prof. Dr. Volker Roth Jan-Ole Malchow Mateusz Khalil Philipp Lämmel Sascha Zinke Robert Fehrmann SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
5 Introduction Founded October 2012 Testlab Research on Finding ICS on the Internet MC7-Disassembler / binary analysis ICS specific communication protocols Exploits Stay tuned! SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
6 Outline Introduction What is a SCADA system? Our playground Exploits on the Internet Start/Stop Exploit How to find ICS on the Internet Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) Outlook Joint Data Integration and Information SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
7 What is a SCADA system? SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) Controls and monitors industrial (often critical) processes Common system components Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) Read sensors Control actuators Remote terminal units (RTU) PLC to SCADA bridge Human machine interface (HMI) SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
8 Outline Introduction What is a SCADA system? Our playground Exploits on the Internet Start/Stop Exploit How to find ICS on the Internet Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) Outlook Joint Data Integration and Information SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
9 Our playground Siemens Simatic S7-300 CPU - 313C 313-5BF03-0ABP Network module - CPC 343 1GX30-0XE0 Industrial grade PLC (midrange) Programmable e.g. with STL Binary language MC7 Sponsored by SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
10 Our playground Setup like described in W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Symantec 2010/2011) SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
11 Our playground Siemens Simatic S CPU C 212-1BE31-0XB0 GSM Module - CP GPRS HMI - KTP400 Basic color PN Industrial grade PLC (lower end) Programmable e.g. with STL SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
12 Outline Introduction What is a SCADA system? Our playground Exploits on the Internet Start/Stop Exploit How to find ICS on the Internet Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) Outlook Joint Data Integration and Information SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
13 Exploits on the Internet SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
14 Exploits Search tags e.g. simatic Search on one of the following websites cve.mitre.org (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) (Open Source Vulnerability Database) (Exploit Database) packetstormsecurity.com (Packet Storm Security) (Metasploit) SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
15 Outline Introduction What is a SCADA system? Our playground Exploits on the Internet Start/Stop Exploit How to find ICS on the Internet Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) Outlook Joint Data Integration and Information SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
16 Start/Stop Exploit Example of public available exploit Siemens Simatic S7 300/400 CPU START/STOP Module Metasploit Module Dillon Beresford (Black Hat US 2011) Function Send start command Send a sequence of stop commands Our analysis It works now Identified the packets Removed unnecessary packets (two thirds) SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
17 Exploits SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
18 Exploits SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
19 Exploits Without Metasploit libnodave (libnodave.sourceforge.net) From Zottel (sps-forum.de) Great Work! Programs to demonstrate the functionality Including start/stop tests SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
20 Exploits Stop Exploit - Demo / Video SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
21 Outline Introduction What is a SCADA system? Our playground Exploits on the Internet Start/Stop Exploit How to find ICS on the Internet Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) Outlook Joint Data Integration and Information SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
22 How to find ICS on the Internet SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
23 How to find ICS on the Internet SHODAN shodanhq.com Scans for HTTP(S), Telnet, SNMP, FTP and NetBios SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
24 How to find ICS on the Internet shodanhq.com Scans for HTTP(S), Telnet, SNMP, FTP and NetBios Oldest results dating back to 2010 SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
25 How to find ICS on the Internet shodanhq.com Scans for HTTP(S), Telnet, SNMP, FTP and NetBios Oldest results dating back to 2010 Provides an API and search filters for protocols, dates, etc. SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
26 How to find ICS on the Internet Devices found on SHODAN Type Count Human Machine Interface 295 Uninterruptible Power Supply Enterprise-Resource-Planning Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition PLC Network Device Programmable Logic Controller Building Management System The industry and PLC manufacturer claim that ICS are not connected to the Internet! SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
27 How to find ICS on the Internet Devices found on SHODAN Type Count Human Machine Interface 295 Uninterruptible Power Supply 664 Enterprise-Resource-Planning Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition PLC Network Device Programmable Logic Controller Building Management System The industry and PLC manufacturer claim that ICS are not connected to the Internet! SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
28 How to find ICS on the Internet Devices found on SHODAN Type Count Human Machine Interface 295 Uninterruptible Power Supply 664 Enterprise-Resource-Planning 1222 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition PLC Network Device Programmable Logic Controller Building Management System The industry and PLC manufacturer claim that ICS are not connected to the Internet! SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
29 How to find ICS on the Internet Devices found on SHODAN Type Count Human Machine Interface 295 Uninterruptible Power Supply 664 Enterprise-Resource-Planning 1222 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 3258 PLC Network Device Programmable Logic Controller Building Management System The industry and PLC manufacturer claim that ICS are not connected to the Internet! SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
30 How to find ICS on the Internet Devices found on SHODAN Type Count Human Machine Interface 295 Uninterruptible Power Supply 664 Enterprise-Resource-Planning 1222 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 3258 PLC Network Device 9772 Programmable Logic Controller Building Management System The industry and PLC manufacturer claim that ICS are not connected to the Internet! SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
31 How to find ICS on the Internet Devices found on SHODAN Type Count Human Machine Interface 295 Uninterruptible Power Supply 664 Enterprise-Resource-Planning 1222 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 3258 PLC Network Device 9772 Programmable Logic Controller Building Management System The industry and PLC manufacturer claim that ICS are not connected to the Internet! SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
32 How to find ICS on the Internet Devices found on SHODAN Type Count Human Machine Interface 295 Uninterruptible Power Supply 664 Enterprise-Resource-Planning 1222 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 3258 PLC Network Device 9772 Programmable Logic Controller Building Management System The industry and PLC manufacturer claim that ICS are not connected to the Internet! SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
33 How to find ICS on the Internet SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
34 How to find ICS on the Internet Project SHINE infracritical.org Running since SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
35 How to find ICS on the Internet infracritical.org Running since Found over 500,000 ICS related entries on SHODAN (ICS-ALERT A) SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
36 How to find ICS on the Internet infracritical.org Running since Found over 500,000 ICS related entries on SHODAN (ICS-ALERT A) U.S. DHS reduced the list to 20,000 devices SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
37 How to find ICS on the Internet infracritical.org Running since Found over 500,000 ICS related entries on SHODAN (ICS-ALERT A) U.S. DHS reduced the list to 20,000 devices List has since grown to over 800k entries SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
38 Outline Introduction What is a SCADA system? Our playground Exploits on the Internet Start/Stop Exploit How to find ICS on the Internet Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) Outlook Joint Data Integration and Information SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
39 Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
40 Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM Data source: SHODAN SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
41 Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM Data source: SHODAN 83,541 devices SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
42 Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM Data source: SHODAN 83,541 devices 83 SHODAN search terms e.g. SIMATIC SoftPLC Rockwell Automation+1769 i.lon inline+controller SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
43 Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM IRAM - 1. DEMO / VIDEO SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
44 Outline Introduction What is a SCADA system? Our playground Exploits on the Internet Start/Stop Exploit How to find ICS on the Internet Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) Outlook Joint Data Integration and Information SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
45 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
46 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE SCADACS Search Engine C implementation using raw sockets SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
47 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE SCADACS Search Engine C implementation using raw sockets Currently scanning at 2,500 IP / s... (possible up to 25,000 IP / s) SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
48 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE SCADACS Search Engine C implementation using raw sockets Currently scanning at 2,500 IP / s... (possible up to 25,000 IP / s) Services: HTTP(S), Telnet, S7com, Modbus, (SNMP) SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
49 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE SCADACS Search Engine C implementation using raw sockets Currently scanning at 2,500 IP / s... (possible up to 25,000 IP / s) Services: HTTP(S), Telnet, S7com, Modbus, (SNMP) Future protocols: BACnet, OPC, SRTP SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
50 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE S7 Communication (Siemens PLCs) Proprietary protocol Modbus SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
51 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE S7 Communication (Siemens PLCs) Proprietary protocol Existing code: libnodave and plcscan Modbus SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
52 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE S7 Communication (Siemens PLCs) Proprietary protocol Existing code: libnodave and plcscan Modbus Open protocol SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
53 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE S7 Communication (Siemens PLCs) Proprietary protocol Existing code: libnodave and plcscan Modbus Open protocol Many opensource tools (e.g. plcscan) SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
54 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Thanks to SCADA StrangeLove for plcscan tool! SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
55 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE First Scan Project - Setup Seeding with 7,000 whois queries on IPs found via SHODAN SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
56 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE First Scan Project - Setup Seeding with 7,000 whois queries on IPs found via SHODAN 4,213 European IP Blocks SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
57 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE First Scan Project - Setup Seeding with 7,000 whois queries on IPs found via SHODAN 4,213 European IP Blocks 283 Mio. IPs (6.58% of IPv4 address space) SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
58 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE First Scan Project - Results (Preview) 10,266 ICS/BMS related answers SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
59 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE First Scan Project - Results (Preview) 10,266 ICS/BMS related answers 436 via S7 Communication SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
60 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE First Scan Project - Results (Preview) 10,266 ICS/BMS related answers 436 via S7 Communication 2571 via Modbus SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
61 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE First Scan Project - Results (Preview) 10,266 ICS/BMS related answers 436 via S7 Communication 2571 via Modbus 602 IP Blocks (Modbus / S7) SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
62 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE First Scan Project - Results (Preview) 10,266 ICS/BMS related answers 436 via S7 Communication 2571 via Modbus 602 IP Blocks (Modbus / S7) 132 IP Blocks used for dynamic IPs SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
63 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE 6 IP blocks owned by a big manufacturer 6.25% of their IPs are answering to Modbus requests 8 IP blocks owned by critical infrastructure SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
64 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE 6 IP blocks owned by a big manufacturer 6.25% of their IPs are answering to Modbus requests 8 IP blocks owned by critical infrastructure 16% of their IPs are answering to S7 Communication requests SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
65 SCADACS Search Engine - SSE IRAM and SSE (green: Modbus, red: S7 communication) SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
66 Outline Introduction What is a SCADA system? Our playground Exploits on the Internet Start/Stop Exploit How to find ICS on the Internet Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) Outlook Joint Data Integration and Information SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
67 Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
68 Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) Scan of a SHODAN sample set (7,000 devices) Approx. 15 % of devices found on SHODAN are reachable at a given time SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
69 Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) IPs crawled by SHODAN: Approx. 4,000,000,000 IPs (worldwide) Search time used SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
70 Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) IPs crawled by SHODAN: Approx. 4,000,000,000 IPs (worldwide) SSE: 283,000,000 IPs (Europe) Search time used SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
71 Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) IPs crawled by SHODAN: Approx. 4,000,000,000 IPs (worldwide) SSE: 283,000,000 IPs (Europe) Search time used SHODAN: 1080 days (~3 years) SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
72 Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) IPs crawled by SHODAN: Approx. 4,000,000,000 IPs (worldwide) SSE: 283,000,000 IPs (Europe) Search time used SHODAN: 1080 days (~3 years) SSE: 2 days SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
73 Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) S7 devices found SHODAN: 444 Overlap of SHODAN and SSE SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
74 Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) S7 devices found SHODAN: 444 SSE: 436 Overlap of SHODAN and SSE SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
75 Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) S7 devices found SHODAN: 444 SSE: 436 Overlap of SHODAN and SSE 125 S7 devices ~28% SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
76 Outline Introduction What is a SCADA system? Our playground Exploits on the Internet Start/Stop Exploit How to find ICS on the Internet Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) Outlook Joint Data Integration and Information SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
77 Outlook SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
78 Outline Introduction What is a SCADA system? Our playground Exploits on the Internet Start/Stop Exploit How to find ICS on the Internet Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Evaluation of SHODAN (Preview) Outlook Joint Data Integration and Information SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
79 Joint Data Integration and Information Combine the presented results into one tool Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM What do we get? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
80 Joint Data Integration and Information Combine the presented results into one tool Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE What do we get? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
81 Joint Data Integration and Information Combine the presented results into one tool Industrial Risk Assessment Map - IRAM SCADACS Search Engine - SSE Exploits What do we get? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
82 Joint Data Integration and Information Easy to use point and click interface What could it look like? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
83 Joint Data Integration and Information Easy to use point and click interface Sophisticated target selection (per country, owner, device type, etc.) What could it look like? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
84 Joint Data Integration and Information Easy to use point and click interface Sophisticated target selection (per country, owner, device type, etc.) Integrated vulnerability and exploit database What could it look like? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
85 Joint Data Integration and Information Easy to use point and click interface Sophisticated target selection (per country, owner, device type, etc.) Integrated vulnerability and exploit database Direct access to network informations (ping, whois, reverse DNS) What could it look like? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
86 Joint Data Integration and Information Easy to use point and click interface Sophisticated target selection (per country, owner, device type, etc.) Integrated vulnerability and exploit database Direct access to network informations (ping, whois, reverse DNS) Seamless integration of further data sources What could it look like? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
87 Joint Data Integration and Information Easy to use point and click interface Sophisticated target selection (per country, owner, device type, etc.) Integrated vulnerability and exploit database Direct access to network informations (ping, whois, reverse DNS) Seamless integration of further data sources Social networks What could it look like? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
88 Joint Data Integration and Information Easy to use point and click interface Sophisticated target selection (per country, owner, device type, etc.) Integrated vulnerability and exploit database Direct access to network informations (ping, whois, reverse DNS) Seamless integration of further data sources Social networks Current geopolitical informations What could it look like? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
89 Joint Data Integration and Information Easy to use point and click interface Sophisticated target selection (per country, owner, device type, etc.) Integrated vulnerability and exploit database Direct access to network informations (ping, whois, reverse DNS) Seamless integration of further data sources Social networks Current geopolitical informations Network perimeters What could it look like? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
90 Joint Data Integration and Information Easy to use point and click interface Sophisticated target selection (per country, owner, device type, etc.) Integrated vulnerability and exploit database Direct access to network informations (ping, whois, reverse DNS) Seamless integration of further data sources Social networks Current geopolitical informations Network perimeters Flow of IP packets What could it look like? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
91 Joint Data Integration and Information Easy to use point and click interface Sophisticated target selection (per country, owner, device type, etc.) Integrated vulnerability and exploit database Direct access to network informations (ping, whois, reverse DNS) Seamless integration of further data sources Social networks Current geopolitical informations Network perimeters Flow of IP packets Direct execution of exploits What could it look like? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
92 Joint Data Integration and Information Easy to use point and click interface Sophisticated target selection (per country, owner, device type, etc.) Integrated vulnerability and exploit database Direct access to network informations (ping, whois, reverse DNS) Seamless integration of further data sources Social networks Current geopolitical informations Network perimeters Flow of IP packets Direct execution of exploits Up to your imagination... What could it look like? SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
93 Joint Data Integration and Information SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
94 The End Thank you for your attention. SCADACS, ICS on the Internet, PHDays
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