Protecting Users by Confining JavaScript with COWL
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1 Protecting Users by Confining JavaScript with COWL Deian Stefan, Edward Z. Yang, Petr Marchenko, Alejandro Russo, Dave Herman, Brad Karp, David Mazières
2 The Web No longer just a way of publishing static content
3 The Web Now app platform; lot of client-side functionality Core reason: Easy to create complex client-side apps Combine code and data from different parties!
4 Many apps handle sensitive data Political views Finances Location info
5 Third-party code? Sensitive data? What do browsers do to ensure that the weather site cannot access my bank statements? weather.com
6 In the beginning: Same-origin Policy Idea: isolate content from different origins Compartmentalize code into contexts (tabs, iframes, ) Disallow cross-origin reads from contexts & servers weather.com weather.com
7 In the beginning: Same-origin Policy Idea: isolate content from different origins Compartmentalize code into contexts (tabs, iframes, ) Disallow cross-origin reads from contexts & servers weather.com weather.com
8 In the beginning: Same-origin Policy Idea: isolate content from different origins Compartmentalize code into contexts (tabs, iframes, ) Disallow cross-origin reads from contexts & servers weather.com weather.com
9 Problems with SOP Not strict enough: can disclose data arbitrarily Third-party code can leak data evil.biz Code runs with authority of page Not flexible enough: can t read cross-origin data No secure third-party mashups! mint.cc hsbc.com
10 Today: SOP + CSP + CORS Content Security Policy: Whitelist origins page can communicate with evil.biz Cross-origin Resource Sharing: Server whitelists origins allowed to read the data mint.cc hsbc.com
11 Today: SOP + CSP + CORS Content Security Policy: Whitelist origins page can communicate with Discretionary Access Cross-origin Resource Sharing: Control Server whitelists origins allowed to read the data
12 DAC is not enough! Forces choice between functionality and privacy E.g., mint.com-like client-side third-party mashup?? mint.cc hsbc.com Privacy: bank doesn t give mint.cc access to data Functionality: bank cedes user data to mint.cc (or worse: user cedes bank credentials)
13 DAC is not enough! Reality: we give up privacy for functionality!
14 DAC is not enough! Third-party mashups Mutually distrusting services mint.cc docs.google.com eff.org hsbc.com Tightly-coupled libraries Libraries with narrow APIs sketchy.ru
15 Third-party code + sensitive data Challenge: allow untrusted code to compute on data E.g., chase wants to use password-strength checker library needs to fetch list of common passwords - Safe to fetch list before looking at password! Need: confinement (MAC) Impose restrictions on how code uses data p4ssw0rd sketchy.ru sketchy.ru
16 Third-party code + sensitive data Challenge: allow untrusted code to compute on data E.g., chase wants to use password-strength checker library needs to fetch list of common passwords - Safe to fetch list before looking at password! Need: confinement (MAC) Impose restrictions on how code uses data p4ssw0rd sketchy.ru sketchy.ru
17 Third-party code + sensitive data Challenge: allow untrusted code to compute on data E.g., chase wants to use password-strength checker library needs to fetch list of common passwords - Safe to fetch list before looking at password! Need: confinement (MAC) Impose restrictions on how code uses data p4ssw0rd p4ssw0rd p4ssw0rd sketchy.ru sketchy.ru
18 Third-party code + sensitive data Challenge: allow untrusted code to compute on data E.g., chase wants to use password-strength checker library needs to fetch list of common passwords - Safe to fetch list before looking at password! Need: confinement (MAC) Impose restrictions on how code uses data p4ssw0rd p4ssw0rd p4ssw0rd sketchy.ru sketchy.ru weak!
19 Isn t confinement a solved problem? Confinement for Haskell Hails Confinement for Java Jif! Change JavaScript to enforce IFC with JSFlow
20 Dev
21 Design constraints Can t expect developers to learn new language Can t touch JavaScript runtime Highly optimized JITs Add 1 instruction on hot path no upstream! Can t radically change the security model Ingrained notion of principals: origins Keep iframes, pages, etc. as security boundaries
22 The good news By accident Web turns out to be a good fit for confinement if you just look at it right
23 The good news Browsers already offer execution contexts Isolation enforced across context boundaries Can enforce MAC at context granularity No need to change language runtime! [BFlow] Can easily add new DOM-level APIs Attach policies to messages [Hails]
24 Confinement with Origin Web Labels (COWL) Key (old) concepts: expressed in practical way? 1. Labels: using origins to specify MAC policies 2. Labeled communication: security across contexts Avoid changing existing communication APIs 3. Privileges: using origins to manage trust
25 Labels Every piece of data is protected by a label Label specifies, in terms of origin(s), who cares about the data E.g., data sensitive to Chase: Label( ) E.g., data sensitive to both Chase and HSBC: Label( ).and( hsbc.com ) hsbc.com p4ssw0rd hsbc.com
26 Label tracking COWL tracks labels at context/server granularity Pages, iframes, workers, servers Messages can be labeled differently from context Both servers & JavaScript can label messages The right way to share sensitive data! public p4ssw0rd
27 Labeled Communication Browser-server communication must respect labels! p4ssw0rd sketchy.ru sketchy.ru
28 Labeled Communication Communication across browser contexts must respect label public sketchy.ru sketchy.ru sketchy.ru
29 Labeled Communication Communication across browser contexts must respect label public sketchy.ru sketchy.ru sketchy.ru
30 Labeled Communication Communication across browser contexts must respect label public sketchy.ru p4ssw0rd sketchy.ru sketchy.ru
31 Adjusting labels to read data Contexts can adopt more restrictive label I.e., add an origin to its label Can then read data from that origin Give up ability to write to contexts without it sketchy.ru public public p4ssw0rd sketchy.ru sketch.ru
32 Adjusting labels to read data Contexts can adopt more restrictive label I.e., add an origin to its label Can then read data from that origin Give up ability to write to contexts without it sketchy.ru public p4ssw0rd public p4ssw0rd sketchy.ru sketch.ru
33 Adjusting labels to read data Contexts can adopt more restrictive label I.e., add an origin to its label Can then read data from that origin Give up ability to write to contexts without it sketchy.ru public public p4ssw0rd p4ssw0rd p4ssw0rd sketchy.ru sketch.ru
34 Adjusting labels to read data Contexts can adopt more restrictive label I.e., add an origin to its label Can then read data from that origin Give up ability to write to contexts without it sketchy.ru public public p4ssw0rd p4ssw0rd p4ssw0rd sketch.ru sketchy.ru
35 Adjusting labels to read data Contexts can adopt more restrictive label I.e., add an origin to its label Can then read data from that origin Give up ability to write to contexts without it sketchy.ru public public p4ssw0rd p4ssw0rd p4ssw0rd sketch.ru weak! sketchy.ru
36 Summary: COWL design Web was made for confinement 1. Origins are a natural way to specify labels 2. Leverage contexts as security boundaries Mixed-granularity: label messages 3. Use origins to express privileges (see paper)
37 What can we do with this?
38 Example: client-side Mint Read-only client-side personal finance service mint.cc hsbc.com Banks can make labeled statements available to Mint Flexibility+Privacy!
39 Example: client-side Mint Read-only client-side personal finance service mint.cc hsbc.com Banks can make labeled statements available to Mint Flexibility+Privacy!
40 Example: client-side Mint Read-only client-side personal finance service mint.cc hsbc.com Banks can make labeled statements available to Mint Flexibility+Privacy!
41 Example: client-side Mint Read-only client-side personal finance service hsbc.com mint.cc hsbc.com Banks can make labeled statements available to Mint Flexibility+Privacy!
42 Example: client-side Mint Read-only client-side personal finance service mint.cc hsbc.com Banks can make labeled statements available to Mint Flexibility+Privacy!
43 Example: client-side Mint Read-only client-side personal finance service mint.cc hsbc.com Banks can make labeled statements available to Mint Flexibility+Privacy!
44 Example: client-side Mint Read-only client-side personal finance service hsb.com mint.cc hsbc.com Banks can make labeled statements available to Mint Flexibility+Privacy!
45 Example: client-side Mint Read-only client-side personal finance service hsb.com mint.cc hsbc.com Banks can make labeled statements available to Mint Flexibility+Privacy!
46 We built it
47 Implementations DOM-level API for both Firefox and Chromium No changes to JavaScript engines Maintain existing communication APIs For each page COWL only enabled on first use of API Gecko and Blink: roughly 4K lines of C++ each
48 Evaluation: Performance Overhead of securing a mashup service? Overhead of compartmentalization? Will adding COWL slow the existing Web?
49 Evaluation: Performance Worst-case Overhead of (loopback, securing a trivial mashup app service? code) end-to-end Overhead of page compartmentalization? load: roughly 16% [16ms]! Will adding COWL slow the existing Web? For real apps: relative overhead is small!
50 Evaluation: Applicability Third-party mashups Mutually distrusting services mint.cc docs.google.com eff.org hsbc.com Tightly-coupled libraries Libraries with narrow APIs sketchy.ru
51 Deployability High degree of backward compatibility Does not affect pages that do not use COWL API Reuse existing concepts (origins, contexts) Expect it to be friendly to developers Implementations possible for major browsers Changes don t touch JavaScript engine
52 Limitations & future work Covert channels Malicious code may still covertly leak data COWL enforces MAC in addition to existing DAC Compartmentalization Cannot just label and run existing apps Compartmentalizing applications requires thought
53 Related work Coarse-grained confinement: BFlow Mainly concerned with untrusted code COWL also handles the mutually distrusting case Fine-grained confinement: JSFlow Better fit for tightly-coupled libraries New semantics, 100x slowdown
54 Conclusion Today: give up privacy for flexibility Modern web apps need to compute on sensitive data DAC is crucial, but insufficient! COWL: confinement for client-side code Naturally extends the existing web model Achieves both flexibility and privacy without slowdown
55 Thanks!
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