TEEP BOF Architecture. Mingliang Pei 28 th March IETF 98 th, Chicago

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "TEEP BOF Architecture. Mingliang Pei 28 th March IETF 98 th, Chicago"

Transcription

1 TEEP BOF Architecture Mingliang Pei 28 th March IETF 98 th, Chicago

2 Ecosystem TEE Providers Device Manufactures Trusted App Managers (TAMs) Service Providers (SPs) 1!n Hardware Manufacturers Device Manufacturer CAs Cer>fica>on Authori>es (CAs) 2

3 OTrP Design Choices Uses asymmetric keys and PKI Manufacturer-provided keys and trust anchors Enables aiestajon between TAM and TEE-device JSON-based messaging between TAM and TEE Messages for aiestajon Messages for security domain management and TA management Use JOSE (JSON signing and encrypjon specificajons) CBOR alternajve spec available. OTrP Agent in REE relays message exchanges between a TAM and TEE Device has a single TEE only 3

4 CAs issue cerjficates to OTrP actors (TEE, TAM, SP) TAM and TEE exchange messages An OTrP Agent relays the OTrP message between TAM and TEE. The communicajon between Rich App to TAM is up to SP and TAM. Device Open Trust Protocol (OTrP) Overview Secure World Normal World Trusted App Client App TAM SDK TSM Service Providers (SP) Trusted OS OTrP Agent OS Hardware Platform Certification Authorities for Devices Certification Authorities for TSM and SP App Developer/ Service Provider Trusted Application Manager TEE Vendor Open Trust Protocol

5 OTrP Agent Responsible for roujng OTrP Messages to the appropriate TEE Most commonly developed and distributed by TEE vendor Implements an interface as a service, SDK, etc. 5

6 Keys Certificate Authority Service Provider TAM Device TEE Keys CA Certificate SP Key pair and Certificate TAM Key pair and Certificate TEE Key pair and Certificate TFW Key pair and Certificate (optional) Trust Anchors Trust Anchors: trusted Root CA list of TEE certificates Trust Anchors: trusted Root CA list of TAM & TFW Usage * Key pair and Certificate: used to issue certificate * Key pair and Certificate: used to sign a TA * Key pair and Certificate: sign OTrP requests to be verified by TEE * Key pair and Certificate: device attestation to remote TAM and SP. * Key pair and Certificate: evidence of secure boot and trustworthy firmware * AIK: ADesta>on Iden>ty Key, TFW: Trusted Firmware * SP AIK in runtime for use by SP (encrypt TA data / verify)

7 Proposed Scope PKI Certification Authority Certification Authority Device Software OTrP Agent Client App OTrP TEE TAM Service Provider Device Hardware Platform OTrP Message OTrP Agent API Certificate Enrollment API Implementation Specific API

8 EnJty RelaJonships 8

9 Protocol Flow Security of the Operation Protocol is enhanced by applying the following three Measures: ü Verifies validity of Message Sender s Certificate ü Verifies signature of Message Sender to check immutability ü Encrypted to guard against exposure of Sensitive data TAM Client App TEE Phase#1 Device Attestation Operation request triggered and verify Device state information Request to TSM for TA installation Send [GetDeviceState] to TEE Return DSI as a response to [GetDeviceState] Phase#2 Prerequisite operation (if Security domain doesn t exist where the TA should be installed) Send [CreateSD]to create SD where the TA will be installed Send other prerequisite commands (if necessary) ü Create new SD Phase#3 Perform Operation requested by SP or Client Application Send [installta] with encrypted TA binary and its data ü Decrypt TA binary and its personal data. ü Install TA into target SD. ü Store personal data in TA s private storage.

10 Discussion Thank you! 10

11 APPENDIX 11

12 JSON Message Security and Crypto Algorithms Use JSON signing and encrypjon RFCs RFC 7515, JSON Web Signature (JWS) RFC 7516, JSON Web EncrypJon (JWE) RFC 7517, JSON Web Key (JWK) RFC 7518, JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) Supported encrypjon algorithms A128CBC-HS256 A256CBC-HS512 Supported signing algorithms RS256 (RSA 2048-bit key) ES256 (ECC P-256) 12

13 OTrP Agent API interface IOTrPAgentService { String processmessage(string tsminmsg) throws OTrPAgentException; String gettainformation(string spid, String taid, byte[] nonce); public class OTrPAgentException extends Throwable { private int errcode; 13

14 OTrP OperaJons and Messages ü Remote Device Attestation Command DescripJons GetDeviceState Retrieve informajon of TEE device state including SD and TA associated to a TAM ü Security Domain Management Command DescripJons CreateSD Create SD in the TEE associated to a TAM UpdateSD Update sub-sd within SD or SP related informajon DeleteSD Delete SD or SD related informajon in the TEE associated to a TAM ü Trusted Application Management Command DescripJons InstallTA Install TA in the SD associated to a TAM UpdateTA Update TA in the SD associated to a TAM DeleteTA Delete TA in the SD associated to a TAM

15 OTrP JSON Message Format and ConvenJon { <name>[request Response] : { "payload": "<payload contents of <name>tbs[request Response]>", "protected":"<integrity-protected header contents>", "header": <non-integrity-protected header contents>, "signature":"<signature contents>" For example: - CreateSDRequest - CreateSDResponse 15

16 OTrP JSON Sample Message: GetDeviceState { "GetDeviceStateTBSRequest": { "ver": "1.0", "rid": "<Unique request ID>", "Jd": "<transacjon ID>", "ocspdat": "<OCSP stapling data of TSM cerjficate>", "icaocspdat": "<OCSP stapling data for TSM CA cerjficates>", "supportedsigalgs": "<comma separated signing algorithms>" { "GetDeviceStateRequest": { "payload":"<base64url encoding of the GetDeviceStateTBSRequest JSON above>", "protected": "<BASE64URL encoded signing algorithm>", "header": { "x5c": "<BASE64 encoded TSM cerjficate chain up to the root CA cerjficate>", "signature":"<signature contents signed by TSM private key>" 16

17 OTrP Sample Message: CreateSD Request { "CreateSDTBSRequest": { "ver": "1.0", "rid": "<unique request ID>", "Jd": "<transacjon ID>", // this may be from prior message "tee": "<TEE roujng name from the DSI for the SD's target>", "nextdsi": "true false", "dsihash": "<hash of DSI returned in the prior query>", "content": ENCRYPTED { // this piece of JSON data will be encrypted "spid": "<SP ID value>", "sdname": "<SD name for the domain to be created>", "spcert": "<BASE64 encoded SP cerjficate>", "tsmid": "<An idenjfiable airibute of the TSM cerjficate>", "did": "<SHA256 hash of the TEE cert>" 17

18 OTrP Sample Message: CreateSD Response { CreateSDTBSResponse : { ver : 1.0, status : <operajon result>, rid : <the request ID received>, Jd : <the transacjon ID received>, content : ENCRYPTED { reason : <failure reason detail>, // opjonal did : <the device id received from the request>, sdname : <SD name for the domain created>, teespaik : <TEE SP AIK public key, BASE64 encoded>, dsi : <Updated TEE state, including all SD owned by this TSM> 18

Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) and the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP) Hannes Tschofenig and Mingliang Pei 16 th July IETF 99 th, Prague

Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) and the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP) Hannes Tschofenig and Mingliang Pei 16 th July IETF 99 th, Prague Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) and the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP) Hannes Tschofenig and Mingliang Pei 16 th July 2017 -- IETF 99 th, Prague 2 What do we mean by security? Communication Security Aims

More information

What is JOSE. Jim Schaad Co-chair JOSE August Cellars. Friday, March 15, 13

What is JOSE. Jim Schaad Co-chair JOSE August Cellars. Friday, March 15, 13 What is JOSE Jim Schaad Co-chair JOSE August Cellars 1 Overview Use JSON for data structure representations Try and meet the goal of easy to implement and use Allow for complex uses Allow for arbitrary

More information

Digital Certificates Demystified

Digital Certificates Demystified Digital Certificates Demystified Ross Cooper, CISSP IBM Corporation RACF/PKI Development Poughkeepsie, NY Email: rdc@us.ibm.com August 9 th, 2012 Session 11622 Agenda Cryptography What are Digital Certificates

More information

A Proposed Standard for Entity Attestation draft-mandyam-eat-00. Laurence Lundblade. November 2018

A Proposed Standard for Entity Attestation draft-mandyam-eat-00. Laurence Lundblade. November 2018 A Proposed Standard for Entity Attestation draft-mandyam-eat-00 Laurence Lundblade November 2018 1 EAT Overall System Entity (e.g., Chip, Device ) Immutable private key for signing. Stored securely on

More information

Intended status: Standards Track January 13, 2015 Expires: July 17, 2015

Intended status: Standards Track January 13, 2015 Expires: July 17, 2015 JOSE Working Group M. Jones Internet-Draft Microsoft Intended status: Standards Track January 13, 2015 Expires: July 17, 2015 Abstract JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-40 The

More information

JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-01

JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-01 JOSE Working Group M. Jones Internet-Draft Microsoft Intended status: Standards Track March 12, 2012 Expires: September 13, 2012 JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) draft-ietf-jose-json-web-s-01 Abstract The JSON

More information

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: 7518 Category: Standards Track May 2015 ISSN:

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: 7518 Category: Standards Track May 2015 ISSN: Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Jones Request for Comments: 7518 Microsoft Category: Standards Track May 2015 ISSN: 2070-1721 Abstract JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) This specification registers cryptographic

More information

python-jose Documentation

python-jose Documentation python-jose Documentation Release 0.2.0 Michael Davis May 21, 2018 Contents 1 Contents 3 1.1 JSON Web Signature........................................... 3 1.2 JSON Web Token............................................

More information

Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol

Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol Digital Certificate and PKI a public-key certificate is a digital certificate that binds a system entity's identity to a public key value, and possibly to additional

More information

SHAKEN - Secure Handling of Asserted information using tokens. August 2015

SHAKEN - Secure Handling of Asserted information using tokens. August 2015 SHAKEN - Secure Handling of Asserted information using tokens August 2015 1 Current Status The current STIR IETF working group is focused on 4474bis which defines a signing mechanism for validating a calling

More information

Recommendations for TEEP Support of Intel SGX Technology

Recommendations for TEEP Support of Intel SGX Technology Recommendations for TEEP Support of Intel SGX Technology Overview of SGX & Selected TEEP Topics David M. Wheeler david.m.wheeler@intel.com 1 Apologies If you are really interested in the details of SGX

More information

SSH Communications Tectia SSH

SSH Communications Tectia SSH Secured by RSA Implementation Guide for 3rd Party PKI Applications Last Modified: December 8, 2014 Partner Information Product Information Partner Name Web Site Product Name Version & Platform Product

More information

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Category: Informational May 2015 ISSN:

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Category: Informational May 2015 ISSN: Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M Miller Request for Comments: 7520 Cisco Systems, Inc Category: Informational May 2015 ISSN: 2070-1721 Abstract Examples of Protecting Content Using JSON Object

More information

Using Cryptography CMSC 414. October 16, 2017

Using Cryptography CMSC 414. October 16, 2017 Using Cryptography CMSC 414 October 16, 2017 Digital Certificates Recall: K pub = (n, e) This is an RSA public key How do we know who this is for? Need to bind identity to a public key We can do this using

More information

Princess Nora Bint Abdulrahman University College of computer and information sciences Networks department Networks Security (NET 536)

Princess Nora Bint Abdulrahman University College of computer and information sciences Networks department Networks Security (NET 536) Princess Nora Bint Abdulrahman University College of computer and information sciences Networks department Networks Security (NET 536) Prepared by Dr. Samia Chelloug E-mail: samia_chelloug@yahoo.fr Content

More information

Digital it Signatures. Message Authentication Codes. Message Hash. Security. COMP755 Advanced OS 1

Digital it Signatures. Message Authentication Codes. Message Hash. Security. COMP755 Advanced OS 1 Digital Signatures Digital it Signatures Offer similar protections as handwritten signatures in the real world. 1. Difficult to forge. 2. Easily verifiable. 3. Not deniable. 4. Easy to implement. 5. Differs

More information

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: ISSN: May 2015

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: ISSN: May 2015 Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: 7516 Category: Standards Track ISSN: 2070-1721 M. Jones Microsoft J. Hildebrand Cisco May 2015 JSON Web Encryption (JWE) Abstract JSON Web Encryption

More information

Attestation Service for Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX): API Documentation. Revision: 3.0

Attestation Service for Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX): API Documentation. Revision: 3.0 Attestation Service for Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX): API Documentation Revision: 3.0 1 1 Abbreviations... 4 2 Attestation Service for Intel SGX... 5 Supported environments... 5 Authentication...

More information

Connecting Securely to the Cloud

Connecting Securely to the Cloud Connecting Securely to the Cloud Security Primer Presented by Enrico Gregoratto Andrew Marsh Agenda 2 Presentation Speaker Trusting The Connection Transport Layer Security Connecting to the Cloud Enrico

More information

Beyond TrustZone Security Enclaves Reed Hinkel Senior Manager Embedded Security Market Develop

Beyond TrustZone Security Enclaves Reed Hinkel Senior Manager Embedded Security Market Develop Beyond TrustZone Security Enclaves Reed Hinkel Senior Manager Embedded Security Market Develop Part2 Security Enclaves Tech Seminars 2017 Agenda New security technology for IoT Security Enclaves CryptoIsland

More information

SSL/TLS & 3D Secure. CS 470 Introduction to Applied Cryptography. Ali Aydın Selçuk. CS470, A.A.Selçuk SSL/TLS & 3DSec 1

SSL/TLS & 3D Secure. CS 470 Introduction to Applied Cryptography. Ali Aydın Selçuk. CS470, A.A.Selçuk SSL/TLS & 3DSec 1 SSL/TLS & 3D Secure CS 470 Introduction to Applied Cryptography Ali Aydın Selçuk CS470, A.A.Selçuk SSL/TLS & 3DSec 1 SSLv2 Brief History of SSL/TLS Released in 1995 with Netscape 1.1 Key generation algorithm

More information

Windows IoT Security. Jackie Chang Sr. Program Manager

Windows IoT Security. Jackie Chang Sr. Program Manager Windows IoT Security Jackie Chang Sr. Program Manager Rest Physical access to a device will not give access to data Data & Control Execution Data owner has full control over data processing Motion Transport

More information

PyJWT Documentation. Release José Padilla

PyJWT Documentation. Release José Padilla PyJWT Documentation Release 1.6.1 José Padilla Apr 08, 2018 Contents 1 Sponsor 3 2 Installation 5 3 Example Usage 7 4 Command line 9 5 Index 11 5.1 Installation................................................

More information

Introducing Hardware Security Modules to Embedded Systems

Introducing Hardware Security Modules to Embedded Systems Introducing Hardware Security Modules to Embedded Systems for Electric Vehicles charging according to ISO/IEC 15118 V1.0 2017-03-17 Agenda Hardware Trust Anchors - General Introduction Hardware Trust Anchors

More information

Lecture Embedded System Security Trusted Platform Module

Lecture Embedded System Security Trusted Platform Module 1 Lecture Embedded System Security Prof. Dr.-Ing. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi System Security Lab Technische Universität Darmstadt (CASED) Germany Summer Term 2015 Roadmap: TPM Introduction to TPM TPM architecture

More information

Lecture Secure, Trusted and Trustworthy Computing Trusted Platform Module

Lecture Secure, Trusted and Trustworthy Computing Trusted Platform Module 1 Lecture Secure, Trusted and Trustworthy Computing Trusted Platform Module Prof. Dr.-Ing. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi System Security Lab Technische Universität Darmstadt Germany Winter Term 2016/17 Roadmap: TPM

More information

1) Revision history Revision 0 (Oct 29, 2008) First revision (r0)

1) Revision history Revision 0 (Oct 29, 2008) First revision (r0) To: INCITS Technical Committee T10 From: David L. Black, EMC Email: black_david@emc.com Date: October 29, 2008 Subject: SPC-4: Digital Signature Authentication (08-423r0) 1) Revision history Revision 0

More information

Lecture Secure, Trusted and Trustworthy Computing Trusted Platform Module

Lecture Secure, Trusted and Trustworthy Computing Trusted Platform Module 1 Lecture Secure, Trusted and Trustworthy Computing Trusted Platform Module Prof. Dr.-Ing. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi System Security Lab Technische Universität Darmstadt Germany Winter Term 2017/18 Roadmap: TPM

More information

Security in NVMe Enterprise SSDs

Security in NVMe Enterprise SSDs Security in NVMe Enterprise SSDs Radjendirane Codandaramane, Sr. Manager, Applications, Microsemi August 2017 1 Agenda SSD Lifecycle Security threats in SSD Security measures for SSD August 2017 2 SSD

More information

Atmel Trusted Platform Module June, 2014

Atmel Trusted Platform Module June, 2014 Atmel Trusted Platform Module June, 2014 1 2014 Atmel Corporation What is a TPM? The TPM is a hardware-based secret key generation and storage device providing a secure vault for any embedded system Four

More information

An Introduction to Trusted Platform Technology

An Introduction to Trusted Platform Technology An Introduction to Trusted Platform Technology Siani Pearson Hewlett Packard Laboratories, UK Siani_Pearson@hp.com Content What is Trusted Platform technology and TCPA? Why is Trusted Platform technology

More information

TO: FROM: DATE: SUBJECT: Revisions General 2.1 The Mismatch does

TO: FROM: DATE: SUBJECT: Revisions General 2.1 The Mismatch does TO: FROM: T10 Membership Paul A Suhler, Quantum Corporation David Black, EMC DATE: 22 October 2008 SUBJECT: T10/08-46r1, SPC-4: Correction to IKEv2-SCSI Certificate Request Payload 1 Revisions 0 Initial

More information

CSE543 - Computer and Network Security Module: Trusted Computing

CSE543 - Computer and Network Security Module: Trusted Computing CSE543 - Computer and Network Security Module: Trusted Computing Professor Trent Jaeger CSE543 - Introduction to Computer and Network Security 1 What is Trust? 2 What is Trust? dictionary.com Firm reliance

More information

PKI Trustpool Management

PKI Trustpool Management PKI Trustpool Management Last Updated: October 9, 2012 The PKI Trustpool Management feature is used to authenticate sessions, such as HTTPS, that occur between devices by using commonly recognized trusted

More information

Autokey Version 2 Specification

Autokey Version 2 Specification Autokey Version 2 Specification draft-sibold-autokey-00 Authors: Dr. D. Sibold PTB, Stephen Röttger IETF 85, Atlanta, USA, November 4 9, 2012 Introduction Scope: Autokey V2 shall provide Authenticity of

More information

Overview! Automated Certificate Management (ACME) Protocol! IP-NNI Task Force! Mary Barnes - iconectiv!

Overview! Automated Certificate Management (ACME) Protocol! IP-NNI Task Force! Mary Barnes - iconectiv! Overview! Automated Certificate Management (ACME) Protocol! IP-NNI Task Force! Mary Barnes - iconectiv! ACME Overview! ACME is a protocol being developed in IETF for Automated Certificate Management.!

More information

Secure digital certificates with a blockchain protocol

Secure digital certificates with a blockchain protocol Secure digital certificates with a blockchain protocol Federico Pintore 1 Trento, 10 th February 2017 1 University of Trento Federico Pintore Blockchain and innovative applications Trento, 10 th February

More information

THE FUTURE OF AUTHENTICATION FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS

THE FUTURE OF AUTHENTICATION FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS THE FUTURE OF AUTHENTICATION FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS FIDO ALLIANCE WEBINAR MARCH 28, 2017 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE FIDO ALLIANCE ANDREW SHIKIAR SENIOR DIRECTOR OF MARKETING MARCH 28, 2017 2 THE FACTS ON

More information

Provisioning secure Identity for Microcontroller based IoT Devices

Provisioning secure Identity for Microcontroller based IoT Devices Provisioning secure Identity for Microcontroller based IoT Devices Mark Schaeffer, Sr. Product Marketing Manager, Security Solutions Synergy IoT Platform Business Division, Renesas Electronics, Inc. May

More information

10/4/2016. Advanced Windows Services. IPv6. IPv6 header. IPv6. IPv6 Address. Optimizing 0 s

10/4/2016. Advanced Windows Services. IPv6. IPv6 header. IPv6. IPv6 Address. Optimizing 0 s Advanced Windows Services IPv6 IPv6 FSRM, FCI, DAC and RMS PKI IPv6 IP is the foundation of nearly all communication The number of addresses is limited Technologies like NAT help in addition to enhancements

More information

Firmware Updates for Internet of Things Devices

Firmware Updates for Internet of Things Devices Firmware Updates for Internet of Things Devices Brendan Moran, Milosch Meriac, Hannes Tschofenig Drafts: draft-moran-suit-architecture draft-moran-suit-manifest 1 WHY DO WE CARE? 2 IoT needs a firmware

More information

Department of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Operating Systems Group TRUSTED COMPUTING CARSTEN WEINHOLD

Department of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Operating Systems Group TRUSTED COMPUTING CARSTEN WEINHOLD Department of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Operating Systems Group TRUSTED COMPUTING CARSTEN WEINHOLD THIS LECTURE... Today: Technology Lecture discusses basics in context of TPMs

More information

Lecture 9a: Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) March, 2004

Lecture 9a: Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) March, 2004 Internet and Intranet Protocols and Applications Lecture 9a: Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) March, 2004 Arthur Goldberg Computer Science Department New York University artg@cs.nyu.edu Security Achieved by

More information

Mavenir Systems Inc. SSX-3000 Security Gateway

Mavenir Systems Inc. SSX-3000 Security Gateway Secured by RSA Implementation Guide for 3rd Party PKI Applications Partner Information Last Modified: June 16, 2015 Product Information Partner Name Web Site Product Name Version & Platform Product Description

More information

PKI-An Operational Perspective. NANOG 38 ARIN XVIII October 10, 2006

PKI-An Operational Perspective. NANOG 38 ARIN XVIII October 10, 2006 PKI-An Operational Perspective NANOG 38 ARIN XVIII October 10, 2006 Briefing Contents PKI Usage Benefits Constituency Acceptance Specific Discussion of Requirements Certificate Policy Certificate Policy

More information

Sharing Secrets using Encryption Facility - Handson

Sharing Secrets using Encryption Facility - Handson Sharing Secrets using Encryption Facility - Handson Lab Steven R. Hart IBM March 12, 2014 Session Number 14963 Encryption Facility for z/os Encryption Facility for z/os is a host based software solution

More information

Authorization Aspects of the Distributed Dataflow-oriented IoT Framework Calvin

Authorization Aspects of the Distributed Dataflow-oriented IoT Framework Calvin Master s Thesis Authorization Aspects of the Distributed Dataflow-oriented IoT Framework Calvin Tomas Nilsson Department of Electrical and Information Technology, Faculty of Engineering, LTH, Lund University,

More information

Internet security and privacy

Internet security and privacy Internet security and privacy IPsec 1 Layer 3 App. TCP/UDP IP L2 L1 2 Operating system layers App. TCP/UDP IP L2 L1 User process Kernel process Interface specific Socket API Device driver 3 IPsec Create

More information

Terra: A Virtual Machine-Based Platform for Trusted Computing by Garfinkel et al. (Some slides taken from Jason Franklin s 712 lecture, Fall 2006)

Terra: A Virtual Machine-Based Platform for Trusted Computing by Garfinkel et al. (Some slides taken from Jason Franklin s 712 lecture, Fall 2006) Terra: A Virtual Machine-Based Platform for Trusted Computing by Garfinkel et al. (Some slides taken from Jason Franklin s 712 lecture, Fall 2006) Trusted Computing Hardware What can you do if you have

More information

Demonstration Lecture: Cyber Security (MIT Department) Trusted cloud hardware and advanced cryptographic solutions. Andrei Costin

Demonstration Lecture: Cyber Security (MIT Department) Trusted cloud hardware and advanced cryptographic solutions. Andrei Costin Demonstration Lecture: Cyber Security (MIT Department) Trusted cloud hardware and advanced cryptographic solutions Topic Prerequisites Security concepts Security-related concepts (e.g., entropy) Virtualization

More information

On-board Credentials. N. Asokan Kari Kostiainen. Joint work with Jan-Erik Ekberg, Pekka Laitinen, Aarne Rantala (VTT)

On-board Credentials. N. Asokan Kari Kostiainen. Joint work with Jan-Erik Ekberg, Pekka Laitinen, Aarne Rantala (VTT) On-board Credentials N. Asokan Kari Kostiainen Joint work with Jan-Erik Ekberg, Pekka Laitinen, Aarne Rantala (VTT) SPACE 2012 Chennai, India October 31, 2012 Outline On-board Credentials (ObCs): What

More information

Security Proposal for PMCI Standards and Protocols Architecture for Version 1.0 Release Work in Progress Last Updated: 12/17/2018

Security Proposal for PMCI Standards and Protocols Architecture for Version 1.0 Release Work in Progress Last Updated: 12/17/2018 Security Proposal for PMCI Standards and Protocols Architecture for Version 1.0 Release Work in Progress Last Updated: 12/17/2018 Copyright 2018 DMTF Disclaimer The information in this presentation represents

More information

API Security. PHP Tek Rob Richards

API Security. PHP Tek Rob Richards API Security PHP Tek 2012 Rob Richards rrichards@mashery.com Who am I? Rob Richards Mashery Email: rrichards@mashery.com Twitter: @mashery Slides: www.cdatazone.org WWW Danger! Danger! Traditional Web

More information

EMC Bus-Tech DLm. Secured by RSA Implementation Guide. Partner Information. Last Modified: September Partner Name Web Site.

EMC Bus-Tech DLm. Secured by RSA Implementation Guide. Partner Information. Last Modified: September Partner Name Web Site. Secured by RSA Implementation Guide Partner Information Last Modified: September 2014 Product Information Partner Name Web Site Product Name EMC Formally Bus-Tech www.emc.com Version & Platform Virtuent

More information

Kerberos and Public-Key Infrastructure. Key Points. Trust model. Goal of Kerberos

Kerberos and Public-Key Infrastructure. Key Points. Trust model. Goal of Kerberos Kerberos and Public-Key Infrastructure Key Points Kerberos is an authentication service designed for use in a distributed environment. Kerberos makes use of a thrusted third-part authentication service

More information

Encrypted Object Extension

Encrypted Object Extension Encrypted Object Extension ABSTRACT: "Publication of this Working Draft for review and comment has been approved by the Cloud Storage Technical Working Group. This draft represents a "best effort" attempt

More information

Embedded System Security Mobile Hardware Platform Security

Embedded System Security Mobile Hardware Platform Security 1 Embedded System Security Mobile Hardware Platform Security Prof. Dr.-Ing. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi System Security Lab Technische Universität Darmstadt Germany Summer Term 2017 Acknowledgement This slide set

More information

Embedded System Security Mobile Hardware Platform Security

Embedded System Security Mobile Hardware Platform Security 1 Embedded System Security Prof. Dr.-Ing. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi System Security Lab Technische Universität Darmstadt Germany Summer Term 2016 Acknowledgement This slide set is based on slides provided by

More information

Salesforce1 Mobile Security White Paper. Revised: April 2014

Salesforce1 Mobile Security White Paper. Revised: April 2014 Salesforce1 Mobile Security White Paper Revised: April 2014 Table of Contents Introduction Salesforce1 Architecture Overview Authorization and Permissions Communication Security Authentication OAuth Pairing

More information

PKI Credentialing Handbook

PKI Credentialing Handbook PKI Credentialing Handbook Contents Introduction...3 Dissecting PKI...4 Components of PKI...6 Digital certificates... 6 Public and private keys... 7 Smart cards... 8 Certificate Authority (CA)... 10 Key

More information

Lecture 3 MOBILE PLATFORM SECURITY

Lecture 3 MOBILE PLATFORM SECURITY Lecture 3 MOBILE PLATFORM SECURITY You will be learning: What techniques are used in mobile software platform security? What techniques are used in mobile hardware platform security? Is there a common

More information

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: 8055 Category: Standards Track. January 2017

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: 8055 Category: Standards Track. January 2017 Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: 8055 Category: Standards Track ISSN: 2070-1721 C. Holmberg Ericsson Y. Jiang China Mobile January 2017 Abstract Session Initiation Protocol

More information

Trusted Platform Module explained

Trusted Platform Module explained Bosch Security Systems Video Systems Trusted Platform Module explained What it is, what it does and what its benefits are 3 August 2016 2 Bosch Security Systems Video Systems Table of contents Table of

More information

ARCHITECTURING AND SECURING IOT PLATFORMS JANKO ISIDOROVIC MAINFLUX

ARCHITECTURING AND SECURING IOT PLATFORMS JANKO ISIDOROVIC MAINFLUX ARCHITECTURING AND SECURING IOT PLATFORMS JANKO ISIDOROVIC CEO @ MAINFLUX Outline Internet of Things (IoT) Common IoT Project challenges - Networking - Power Consumption - Computing Power - Scalability

More information

TERRA. Boneh. A virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing. Presented by: David Rager November 10, 2004

TERRA. Boneh. A virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing. Presented by: David Rager November 10, 2004 TERRA Authored by: Garfinkel,, Pfaff, Chow, Rosenblum,, and Boneh A virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing Presented by: David Rager November 10, 2004 Why there exists a need Commodity OS

More information

IEEE Std and IEEE Std 1363a Ashley Butterworth Apple Inc.

IEEE Std and IEEE Std 1363a Ashley Butterworth Apple Inc. apple IEEE Std 1363-2000 and IEEE Std 1363a-2004 Ashley Butterworth Apple Inc. The Titles IEEE Std 1363-2000 - IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography IEED Std 1363a-2004 - IEEE Standard

More information

Configuring SSH with x509 authentication on IOS devices

Configuring SSH with x509 authentication on IOS devices Configuring SSH with x509 authentication on IOS devices Contents Introduction Prerequisites Requirements Components Used Configure Network Diagram Deployment considerations Configurations (Optional) Integration

More information

WHITE PAPER. Authentication and Encryption Design

WHITE PAPER. Authentication and Encryption Design WHITE PAPER Authentication and Encryption Design Table of Contents Introduction Applications and Services Account Creation Two-step Verification Authentication Passphrase Management Email Message Encryption

More information

Pretty Good Privacy (PGP

Pretty Good Privacy (PGP PGP - S/MIME - Internet Firewalls for Trusted System: Roles of Firewalls Firewall related terminology- Types of Firewalls - Firewall designs - SET for E-Commerce Transactions. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP

More information

Updating OCSP. David Cooper

Updating OCSP. David Cooper Updating OCSP David Cooper Background Concerns raised about text in RFC 2560 being misinterpreted, particularly Section 4.2.2.2 on Authorized Responders Working group agreed to develop an update to RFC

More information

Forensics Challenges. Windows Encrypted Content John Howie CISA CISM CISSP Director, Security Community, Microsoft Corporation

Forensics Challenges. Windows Encrypted Content John Howie CISA CISM CISSP Director, Security Community, Microsoft Corporation Forensics Challenges Windows Encrypted Content John Howie CISA CISM CISSP Director, Security Community, Microsoft Corporation Introduction Encrypted content is a challenge for investigators Makes it difficult

More information

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Extensions

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Extensions : Intellectual Property Rights Notice for Open Specifications Documentation Technical Documentation. Microsoft publishes Open Specifications documentation for protocols, file formats, languages, standards

More information

Key Management and Distribution

Key Management and Distribution Key Management and Distribution Raj Jain Washington University in Saint Louis Saint Louis, MO 63130 Jain@cse.wustl.edu Audio/Video recordings of this lecture are available at: http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-14/

More information

A Blockchain-based Mapping System

A Blockchain-based Mapping System A Blockchain-based Mapping System IETF 98 Chicago March 2017 Jordi Paillissé, Albert Cabellos, Vina Ermagan, Fabio Maino jordip@ac.upc.edu http://openoverlayrouter.org 1 A short Blockchain tutorial 2 Blockchain

More information

Implementing Secure Socket Layer

Implementing Secure Socket Layer This module describes how to implement SSL. The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol and Transport Layer Security (TLS) are application-level protocols that provide for secure communication between a client

More information

Beyond TrustZone PSA. Rob Coombs Security Director. Part1 - PSA Tech Seminars Arm Limited

Beyond TrustZone PSA. Rob Coombs Security Director. Part1 - PSA Tech Seminars Arm Limited Beyond TrustZone PSA Rob Coombs Security Director Part1 - PSA Tech Seminars 2017 Agenda Platform Security Architecture Architecture overview Trusted Firmware-M IoT Threat models & security analyses Summary

More information

PAS for OpenEdge Support for JWT and OAuth Samples -

PAS for OpenEdge Support for JWT and OAuth Samples - PAS for OpenEdge Support for JWT and OAuth 2.0 - Samples - Version 1.0 November 21, 2017 Copyright 2017 and/or its subsidiaries or affiliates. All Rights Reserved. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION... 3

More information

Overview. SSL Cryptography Overview CHAPTER 1

Overview. SSL Cryptography Overview CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 1 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is an application-level protocol that provides encryption technology for the Internet. SSL ensures the secure transmission of data between a client and a server through

More information

Department of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Operating Systems Group TRUSTED COMPUTING CARSTEN WEINHOLD

Department of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Operating Systems Group TRUSTED COMPUTING CARSTEN WEINHOLD Department of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Operating Systems Group TRUSTED COMPUTING CARSTEN WEINHOLD THIS LECTURE... Today: Technology Lecture discusses basics in context of TPMs

More information

Trustzone Security IP for IoT

Trustzone Security IP for IoT Trustzone Security IP for IoT Udi Maor CryptoCell-7xx product manager Systems & Software Group ARM Tech Forum Singapore July 12 th 2017 Why is getting security right for IoT so important? When our everyday

More information

Protection Profile Summary

Protection Profile Summary NIAP Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management (PP_MDM_v2.0) PP link: Summary author: https://www.niap-ccevs.org/pp/pp_mdm_v2.0/ lachlan.turner@arkinfosec.net Date: 26 March 2015 Overview The NIAP

More information

Kurose & Ross, Chapters (5 th ed.)

Kurose & Ross, Chapters (5 th ed.) Kurose & Ross, Chapters 8.2-8.3 (5 th ed.) Slides adapted from: J. Kurose & K. Ross \ Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach (5 th ed.) Addison-Wesley, April 2009. Copyright 1996-2010, J.F Kurose and

More information

Distributed OS Hermann Härtig Authenticated Booting, Remote Attestation, Sealed Memory aka Trusted Computing

Distributed OS Hermann Härtig Authenticated Booting, Remote Attestation, Sealed Memory aka Trusted Computing Distributed OS Hermann Härtig Authenticated Booting, Remote Attestation, Sealed Memory aka Trusted Computing 30/05/11 Goals Understand principles of: Authenticated booting The difference to (closed) secure

More information

How to get a trustworthy DNS Privacy enabling recursive resolver

How to get a trustworthy DNS Privacy enabling recursive resolver How to get a trustworthy DNS an analysis of authentication mechanisms for DNS s Willem Toorop NLnet Labs (presenter) Melinda Shore Fastly Benno Overeinder NLnet Labs DNS over TLS What are the actors, and

More information

Security Requirements for Crypto Devices

Security Requirements for Crypto Devices Security Requirements for Crypto Devices Version 1.0 02 May 2018 Controller of Certifying Authorities Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology 1 Document Control Document Name Security Requirements

More information

Past, Present, and Future Justin Johnson Senior Principal Firmware Engineer

Past, Present, and Future Justin Johnson Senior Principal Firmware Engineer Dell Firmware Security Past, Present, and Future Justin Johnson Senior Principal Firmware Engineer justin.johnson1@dell.com Dell Security 2 What does BIOS do? Configure and Test System Memory Configure

More information

Public Key Infrastructures. Using PKC to solve network security problems

Public Key Infrastructures. Using PKC to solve network security problems Public Key Infrastructures Using PKC to solve network security problems Distributing public keys P keys allow parties to share secrets over unprotected channels Extremely useful in an open network: Parties

More information

From TPM 1.2 to 2.0 and some more. Federico Mancini AFSecurity Seminar,

From TPM 1.2 to 2.0 and some more. Federico Mancini AFSecurity Seminar, From TPM 1.2 to 2.0 and some more Federico Mancini AFSecurity Seminar, 30.11.2015 The trusted platform module - TPM The TPM (Trusted Platform Module) is both a set of specifications and its implementation.

More information

Configuring Certificate Authorities and Digital Certificates

Configuring Certificate Authorities and Digital Certificates CHAPTER 43 Configuring Certificate Authorities and Digital Certificates Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) support provides the means for the Cisco MDS 9000 Family switches to obtain and use digital certificates

More information

How to Configure S/MIME for WorxMail

How to Configure S/MIME for WorxMail How to Configure S/MIME for WorxMail Windows Phone 8.1 This article describes how to configure S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) for WorxMail Windows Phone 8.1. Note: This feature works

More information

Chapter 8 Web Security

Chapter 8 Web Security Chapter 8 Web Security Web security includes three parts: security of server, security of client, and network traffic security between a browser and a server. Security of server and security of client

More information

PKI Interoperability Test Tool v1.2 (PITT) Usage Guide

PKI Interoperability Test Tool v1.2 (PITT) Usage Guide PKI Interoperability Test Tool v1.2 (PITT) Usage Guide Last updated: September 2010 Table of Contents 1 Introduction... 4 2 Installation... 4 3 Quick Start Guide... 8 3.1 Default settings... 8 4 Menus...

More information

Mobile Devices as Identity Carriers. Pre Conference Workshop October 14 th 2013

Mobile Devices as Identity Carriers. Pre Conference Workshop October 14 th 2013 Mobile Devices as Identity Carriers Pre Conference Workshop October 14 th 2013 Mobile Market Worldwide Smartphones Market by OS (in thousands of units) 1,400,000 1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000

More information

IBM KeyWorks Accelerate Development of your Secure e-business Solutions Sekar Chandersekaran IBM

IBM KeyWorks Accelerate Development of your Secure e-business Solutions Sekar Chandersekaran IBM IBM KeyWorks Accelerate Development of your Secure e-business Solutions Sekar Chandersekaran IBM chanders@us.ibm.com IBM KeyWorks Market Needs History KeyWorks KeyWorks KeyWorks KeyWorks KeyWorks Suite

More information

Send documentation comments to

Send documentation comments to CHAPTER 6 Configuring Certificate Authorities and Digital Certificates This chapter includes the following topics: Information About Certificate Authorities and Digital Certificates, page 6-1 Default Settings,

More information

Designing Network Encryption for the Future Emily McAdams Security Engagement Manager, Security & Trust Organization BRKSEC-2015

Designing Network Encryption for the Future Emily McAdams Security Engagement Manager, Security & Trust Organization BRKSEC-2015 Designing Network Encryption for the Future Emily McAdams Security Engagement Manager, Security & Trust Organization BRKSEC-2015 What Could It Cost You? Average of $0.58 a record According to the Verizon

More information

BlackVault Hardware Security Platform SECURE TRUSTED INTUITIVE. Cryptographic Appliances with Integrated Level 3+ Hardware Security Module

BlackVault Hardware Security Platform SECURE TRUSTED INTUITIVE. Cryptographic Appliances with Integrated Level 3+ Hardware Security Module BlackVault Hardware Security Platform SECURE TRUSTED INTUITIVE Cryptographic Appliances with Integrated Level 3+ Hardware Security Module The BlackVault hardware security platform keeps cryptographic material

More information

The Match On Card Technology

The Match On Card Technology Precise Biometrics White Paper The Match On Card Technology Magnus Pettersson Precise Biometrics AB, Dag Hammarskjölds väg 2, SE 224 67 Lund, Sweden 22nd August 2001 Abstract To make biometric verification

More information

Business Chat Sending Authenticate Messages. June

Business Chat Sending Authenticate Messages. June Business Chat Sending Authenticate Messages June 2018.2 Contents Overview 3 Capabilities... 3 How to Pass Authenticate Data... 3 User Authorization with Safari Password AutoFill... 8 Decrypting the Auth

More information

Making Blockchain Real for Business IBM Blockchain Offering

Making Blockchain Real for Business IBM Blockchain Offering Making Blockchain Real for Business IBM Blockchain Offering Guillaume Hoareau Certified IT Architect Blockchain on IBM z Systems SME V3.5, November 24th Page 1 Linux Foundation s Hyperledger Project Linux

More information