Shen Sung-Shiou

Transcription

1 Introduction of Smart Card Shen Sung-Shiou 1

2 History of Smart Cards Plastic Card initially used for Payment issued by Diners Club, Magnetic Stripe Cards (CNS ~6)(1980 s). Visa and Master Card (Plastic Money). Stores data on Magnetic Stripes in machine readable form.. Allows automation.. Minimizes paper utilization.. Data Carrying Capacity Data such a card can carry is approximately 140 bytes.. Security: Low easy read, write. Corruption of Data in magnetic fields. 2

3 Expectation of Smart Card Two ideas lead to Smart Cards: Integrate data storage and arithmetic logic on a single silicon Incorporate such an integrated circuit (IC) into an identification card (ID-1). (Patent filed by German inventors Jurgen Dethloff and Helmut Grotrupp in 1968.) The actual «smart card» patent was filed in France in 1974 by Roland Moreno, who sold the license to Bull.) Expectation Factors: Amount of Data Storage. Prevention of Unauthorized Viewing. Multiple Applications. Life of the Card. Replication. 3

4 What are Smart Cards? (ISO 7816_1~8/ CNS ~6) Smart Cards are plastic cards, usually similar in size and shape to a credit card, containing a microprocessor and memory (which allows it to store and process data) and complying with the ISO 7816 standard for contact operation. Briefly, a Smart Card is a very small computer embedded on a plastic card 4

5 Smart Card Classification Smart Card Components Interface Memory Card Chip Card Contact Card Contactless Card Hybrid/ Dual-Interface Card Optical Card OS Used Java Card Multos Card Global Platforms (GP) 5

6 Component Based Classification Memory Cards (No Processor) Most common and the cheapest. Contain EEPROM, ROM, RAM and Flash. ROM holds card number, card holder name. RAM used for storage temporary data. EEPROM holds data that changes with time, usually application data. E.g. in pre-paid phone card, it holds talk time left. EEPROM can be locked with a PIN. Flash Memory is another category EEPROM. Data required for applications are stored in the memory Areas where used: Pre-paid telephone cards, parking schemes, ticketing, vending machines 6

7 Component Based Classification Reader I/ O Interface Control Logical EEPROM (Application Data) ROM ( Permanent Data) Memory Card Architecture 7

8 Protected memory cards Electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) is divided into two or more areas: One area is accessible when the card is powered up (ATR) Other data are accessible after the card has received a security code (from the cardholder or from the software application), which matches a code held on a card. Access to memory is controlled by the control logic. 8

9 Control Logical A group of memory cards which not only controls access to memory, but also restricts the way in which the external application can read from or write to memory Cards may contain special logic that enables the application to authenticate itself cryptographically by holding a hashed form of the card data which alters as the value decremented E.g., prepaid telephone cards can contain logic to prevent the value from being increased 9

10 Control Logical Irreversible programming: Sometimes the codes themselves are held in the area which is only accessible once, when the card is personalization. When the codes are written, the fuse is blown to prevent them from being altered. Provision against altering: To protect the data against corruption if the card removed prematurely or if power is removed from the card before it completed its transaction Data source from 10

11 Component Based Classification Chip Cards: There are cards that contain a microprocessor. Important components of a Chip Card ROM:Also called the Mask of the card. Holds the Operating System. EEPROM: Holds the application programs and their data. RAM:Used as temporary storage space for variables. Processor: 8 bit processor based on CISC architecture. Moving towards 32 bit due to JavaCards I/O Interface for data transfer to and from the card. 11

12 Component Based Classification Chip Card Architecture Reader I/ O Interface CPU Security Logical EEPROM (Application Data) ROM ( Permanent Data) RAM (Temporary Data) 12

13 Figure source

14 Smart Card Components Microprocessor or the CPU Currently processors are 8 bit, 16 bit, and 32 bit ones with CISC architecture or RISC architecture. Typical Clock Speeds: 5 MHz. (ISO ) Reasons: Lower power consumption. Area limitations. Future: Will slowly move to 32 bit architecture due to JavaCards. 14

15 Smart Card Components ROM: Read Only Memory Used for storing fixed programs. Holds the SCOS (Smart Card Operation System). Typically varies from 16K Bytes to around 200 K Bytes. Occupies the least area. EEPROM: Electrically Erasable Read Only Memory Used for storing data that might change. Similar to a HDD. Holds various applications and their data. Can be read or written to subject to permissions. Typically varies from 2K Bytes to 128 K Bytes depending on need. 15

16 Smart Card Components RAM: Random Access Memory Used as temporary storage. Erased after power off. Typically varies between 256 Bytes to 8k Bytes. I/O Interface: Input Output Interface Controls data flow to and from the card. Flow occurs one bit at a time in a half duplex manner. Typical Data flow rate is 9600 bits/sec. 16

17 Component Based Classification Chip Card Features: Cost: Highly variable, depends on features desired, memory requirements etc. Can house multiple applications. Provide robust security. Almost impossible to crack. Areas where used: Financial Cards, Electronic Purses, Access Control, Travel and Ticketing. 17

18 Interface Based Classification The basis of the methods of their communication and transfer with the reader device. Contact Cards (ISO ~8/ CNS ~6) Require physical contact with reader. (Sliding or Landing) 8 gold plated contacts Asynchronous Transmission, but memory card used synchronous transmission Limitations Contacts get worn out Card Tearing: pull out the card from the reader before the transaction is completed. Electrostatic Discharges 18

19 Pins Arrangement of Contact Card RFU: Reserve Defined by ISO / CNS Bounding Wire Chip Cell 19

20 Smart Card Components for Contact Card Card Body should be :(ISO / CNS ) Resistant to mechanical failure. Able to withstand high temperatures. Cheap Size: 85.6*54*0.76 mm (L*W*H) Material of Card Body : PVC [Poly Vinyl Chloride]: All rounder ABS [Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene]: Brittle but withstands higher temperatures PETP [Poly Ethylene Terephthalate]: High flexibility 20

21 Smart Card Size GSM, ID-000 form ID-1 Unit : millimeter Size are matched to the ID-1 card Smart Card Area Restrictions 25 mm2 21

22 Smart Card Readers The Roles of The Reader The reader is the interface between the card and the application It serves as a translator. It accepts the messages from the card and from the application software or host system. Reader is often called the Interface Device (Read-Write Unit) as it can read as well as write to the card. Readers of two types: Insertion Readers: Cheaper, but manual. [Card Swipe Machine] Motorized Readers: Automatic card capture and release. Costly. [Bank ATM Machines] 22

23 Card Reader Figure source

24 Interface Based Classification Contactless Cards: (RFID Card) ISO : close coupling cards operating at 3 or 5 MHz in up to 1 cm distance.. ISO : contactless proximity cards operating at MHz in up to 5 inches distance. ISO : contactless vicinity cards operating at MHz in up to 50 inches distance No insertion required. Data/Power transfer over RF via antenna inside. Reading Distance: few cms to 10 cms. Used when transaction has to be carried out quickly. Synchronous Transmission 24

25 25 Define by ISO 14443, 15693

26 Interface Based Classification Contactless Cards (cont.) Advantages Higher reliability as lesser moving parts involved. Longer Life, due to lesser wear and tear. Require Lesser Maintenance Disadvantages User Fear: Transaction might get carried out without knowledge. Unsuitable when large data transfer occurs. Time too short Used in: Transport Industry Access Control Wherever transaction time is low. 26

27 Interface Based Classification (cont.) Hybrid or Combo Cards Cards which can be used as either Contact Cards or as Contactless Cards One card contains two chips and no interact between two chips. Ways this can be done: Card could have two interfaces: One for contact readers, other for contactless readers. A contact card can be slipped into a pouch which has battery and antenna and can communication with a contactless reader. The contactless chip is used for application that require fast transaction time and the contact chip is used for application that require high security Not too prevalent, might be used in future when multi application cards are introduced. 27

28 Interface Based Classification (cont.) The Dual Interface card A microprocessor card with two interfaces: contact and contactless. Based on a single chip allowing access to both interfaces. A single component with single embedding and personalization processes Offers more services than full contactless cards and hybrid cards (link between the contact and the contactless interfaces) Same technical performances and same security (RSA algorithm) as for contact cards Sharing of the same application with the two interfaces, useful for electronic purse Card content checking 28

29 Interface Based Classification Optical Card ISO/IEC 11693:1994(E) -- Defines the general characteristics of optical cards such as card construction, materials, exact dimensions, and certain other characteristics that have been determined to be common to all types of optical cards regardless of the recording method used. ISO/IEC :1994(E) -- Defines the physical characteristics of optical cards, that use the Linear Recording method, such as height, width, thickness, and durability. 29

30 Interface Based Classification Optical Card (cont.) ISO/IEC : 1994(E) -- Defines the dimensions and location of the accessible optical area on optical cards. ISO/IEC DIS Defines the logical data structures for optical cards that are necessary to allow compatibility and interchange between systems that use the Linear Recording method. ISO/IEC : 1994(E) -- Defines the optical characteristics, such as illumination source, beam diameter, reflectivity, and contrast, for optical cards. 30

31 OS Based Classification Smart Card Operating Systems (SCOS) are placed on the ROM and usually occupy 16kB in 1994, to more than 200kB in SCOS handle: File Handling and Manipulation. Memory Management. Data Transmission Protocols. Security (managing cryptographic algorithms) Controlling the execution of commands Applications 31

32 OS Based Classification Various SCOS available are: Cyberflex StarCOS MultOS CardOS MFC Java GP MasterCard plan to implement Debit and Credit on Chip on the Multos open platform card. 32

33 Open Platform Software Framework Note: Virtual Machine (VM) 33

34 Smart Card Manufacturing Process Understanding how micro-modules are made Stages in the Manufacture of a Smart Card Chip Process Administrative and procedural controls. Administrative and procedural controls help ensure that no one person will be able to obtain all the information needed to fraudulently create a card. 34

35 Stages in the Manufacture of a Smart Card 35

36 Smart Card Manufacturing Process Chip Specification Microcontroller type (e.g. 6805,8051) Co-processor (e.g. for public key cryptography) Mask ROM size RAM size Non volatile memory type (e.g. EEPROM, Flash) Non volatile memory size Clock speed (external, and optionally internal) Electrical parameters (voltage and current) Communications parameters (synchronous, asynchronous) Reset mechanism Sleep mode (low current standby operation) 36

37 Smart Card Manufacturing Process Card specification The specification of a card involves parameters that are common to many existing applications using the ISO ID-1 card. Card dimensions Chip location (contact card) Card material (e.g. PVC, ABS) Printing requirements Magnetic stripe (optional) Signature strip (optional) Hologram or photo (optional) Embossing (optional) Environmental parameters 37

38 Smart Card Manufacturing Process Mask ROM Specification The developed code is given to the supplier who incorporates this data as part of the chip manufacturing process. 38

39 Smart Card Manufacturing Process Application Software Specification It clearly specific to the particular application. The application code could be designed as part of the mask ROM code but the more modern approach is to design the application software to operate from the PROM non volatile memory. 39

40 Smart Card Manufacturing Process Application load The application is to be placed in the EEPROM memory of the IC. This is accomplished by using the basic commands contained in the operating system in the mask ROM. 40

41 Smart Card Manufacturing Process Card Personalization At this stage the security keys will probably be loaded into the PROM memory. 41

42 Smart Card Manufacturing Process Application Activation The final operation in the manufacturing process is to enable the application for operation. Again this is an integral part of the overall security process. 42

43 Chip Fabrication 43

44 Chip Fabrication- Wafer Sawing Writing the chip number etc. into EEPROM when on-wafer test Cutting silicon wafer into individual chips. During the previous step, electrical test, defective chips are marked with an ink drop. Protection the inside attack disabled test pins, referred to as "blowing the fuses". The manufacturers do not provide their technical design to potential customers; rather, they provide only the set of commands that the chip operating system can execute. 44

45 Chip Fabrication (cont.) Die Bonding Gluing the chip into the cavity located on the film, ensuring proper physical and electrical connection. Wire Bonding Electrically connecting the chip's bonding pads and the contacts on the micro-module using gold wires. Potting Protecting the chip and wires with a drop of epoxy resin, ensuring the physical durability of the micro-module. 45

46 Chip Fabrication (cont.) Grinding Grinding the micro-module to the proper thickness prior to embedding. Electrical Electrical Testing *. Sample testing of the micro-module prior to embedding. *. As a final step in the production process, the chip module is initialized. Initialing EEPROM --- be changed to user mode --- programmed to contain the directory and file structure. --- Issuer Identification Number are loaded 46

47 Visual Inspection Chip Fabrication (cont.) Verifying that all products comply with visual and physical specification All the preceding phases have to use transport code to authenticate against the inside attacks. 47

48 Chip Fabrication (cont.) Card Molding *.Injection of ABS plastic material to form the body of the card. Offset Printing Printing of an image on the card Grinding The micro-module cavity is machined to specific dimensions. 48

49 Chip Fabrication (cont.) Embedding & Test Embedding: the module is inserted and glued in the cavity. The company that performs the embedding function does not have access to the secret cryptographic keys with which the chip is protected. Test coding: an electrical test is carried out and the embedded module is encoded. 49

50 Plug In Chip Fabrication (cont.) Cutting to plug-in format for mobile phones. Final Quality Control Guarantee that the finished product complies with customer specifications. 50

51 Chip Fabrication (cont.) Personalization *. Graphic and electric personalization according to customer specifications *. Personalization --- a security process --- the final round of cryptographic processing load the application PIN, issuer and cardholder data onto a smart card. --- only accept encrypted data for loading data, which has been encrypted using the card cryptographic keys. --- contains a Message Authentication Code (MAC), to provide data integrity. Packing 51

52 Smart Card Personalization Personalization : The process of populating persistent memory (EEPROM) with cardholder unique data For a multi-application card, the Primary IC personalizer is the one under the control of the Issuer for personalizing (at least) the Card Manager with the final keys which all belong to the Issuer. For instance, to personalize the Visa Smart Debit Credit (VSDC) Application 52

53 Personalization Step For efficient personalization, the data used in personalization should be prepared ahead of time. Documents: - Issuer Public Key Certificate - Issuer Public Key Remainder - Issuer Public Key Exponent - Signed Static Application Data. This data is created by signing data associated with a specific cardholder account 53

54 Personalization Step (cont.) Unique Derived Key (UDK), used to authenticate the card. This key and the following two keys are derived from separate master keys. The derivation is based on the primary account number (PAN) and the PAN sequence number. These three keys are normally transported to the personalizer under a key exchange key (KEK) MAC Derived Key, used in script processing ENC Derived Key, used in script processing Off-line PIN. The PIN is normally transported under a KEK which may be a different KEK than the one used for the DES keys. 54

55 Personalization Step (cont.) The following master keys will be needed for personalization of a full VSDC system on an Open Platform card: * KMC key : This key is used to derive the Card Manager keys used to install the VSDC applet. This key is also used to derive the PSK key and to place the PSK into the applet. * Master Derivation Key (MDKauth): MDKauth used to derive the VSDC authentication key. The authentication key is sometimes called the unique derived key (UDK). * Master Derivation Key (MDKmac): MDKmac used to derive the VSDC MAC key used during script processing. * Master Derivation Key (MDKenc): MDKenc used to derive the VSDC encryption key used during script processing. Normally, these last three keys will not be derived by the IC personalizer, but by the Application Provider during data preparation. 55

56 Smart Card Personalization Flow Chart Calculation of Cryptograms (Card & Host cryptogram) Verify the card cryptogram Yes, External Authenticate, (PSK, Host cryptogram) Calculation of Cryptograms Verify the Host cryptogram 56

57 Install Personalization Steps Summary Select VSDC Initialize Update External Authenticate, at this point the VSDC application does not have personalization key so the authentication is done with the Card Manager keys Put Key, to place VSDC Personalization Secret Key (PSK) into the application 57

58 Personalization Steps Summary (cont.) Append Record, to write the records specified in the Application File Locator (AFL) and the data elements in those records Put Data, to write the data elements not included in the AFL records Put Key, to write the operational keys (authentication, MAC and encryption) into the application. PIN Change/Unblock, to write the off-line PIN into the application 58

59 Personalization Steps Locate the master key (KMC) for the Card Manager and VSDC Applet. The KMC is stored in card. Install & Select VSDC The VSDC application is selected. AID and AFL are sent to Smart Card AID: Application Identifier AFL: Application File Locator 59

60 Personalization Steps (cont.) Initialize Update and Derivation Data - Issue Initialize Update to get the Returned Data (key version number and the derivation data). - Host challenge is sent. - Returned Data * Last two bytes of the AID * IC Fabrication Date two bytes * IC Serial No. four bytes * IC Batch Id two bytes * Key Set Version Number one byte * Key Index one byte * Card challenge eight bytes * Card cryptogram eight bytes 60

61 Personalization Steps (cont.) Name Description Storage/ Lifetime Derivation Method and Data Use KMC Initial Update Master Key Issuer (or Card Enabler) - Security Module Valid until Replace N/A Master key for KDCmac, KDCenc and KDCkek Derive the three Card Manager keys KDCenc, KDCmac and KDCkek Derive the Card Manager session keys KSCenc and KSCmac 61

62 Personalization Steps (cont.) Name Description Storage/ Lifetime Derivation Method and Data Use Initial Card Manager MAC On-card - Derived Key Persistent - (initial KMAC Valid until KDCmacof OP Card Specs). Derived from replaced KMC DES ECB with: 1. Last 2 bytes of AID 2. Chip Id (CSN) 4 bytes 3. F bytes 4. Last 2 bytes of AID 5. Chip Id (CSN) 4 bytes 6. 0F 02 2 bytes Implements Secure Channel Command Authentication and Integrity at IC Personalization site 62

63 Personalization Steps (cont.) Name Description Storage/ Lifetime Derivation Method and Data Use DES ECB with: 1. 4 rightmost bytes of KSCmac Initial Card Manager MAC Session Key. On-card card challenge 2. 4 leftmost bytes of server challenge 3. 4 leftmost bytes of card APDU message authentication challenge 4. 4 rightmost bytes of server challenge 63

64 Name Personalization Steps (cont.) Storage/ Derivation Description Lifetime Method and Data Use KDCenc Initial Card Manager Encryption Derived Key (initial KAUTH,ENC of OP Card Specs). Derived from KMC On-card Persistent - Valid until replaced DES ECB with: 1. Last 2 bytes of AID 2. Chip Id (CSN) 4 bytes 3. F bytes 4. Last 2 bytes of AID 5. Chip Id (CSN) 4 bytes 6. 0F 01 2 bytes 1. Secures card between Card Enablement and Card Personalization sites 2. Implements Secure Channel Mutual Authentication and Command Confidentiality 64

65 Personalization Steps (cont.) Name Description Storage/ Lifetime Derivation Method and Data Use KSCenc Initial Card Manager Encryption Session Key. Derived from KDCenc On-card Transient DES ECB with: 1. 4 rightmost bytes of card challenge 2. 4 leftmost bytes of server challenge 3. 4 leftmost bytes of card challenge 4. 4 rightmost bytes of server challenge 1. Mutual authentication of Card and Server 2. APDU message Encryption This session key is not placed onto the card. 65

66 Personalization Steps (cont.) Name Description Storage/ Lifetime Derivation Method and Data Use Initial Card Manager Key Encryption Derived Key (initial K KEK of KDCkek OP Card Specs). Derived from KMC On-card - Persistent - Valid until replaced DES ECB with: 1. Last 2 bytes of AID 2. Chip Id (CSN) 4 bytes 3. F bytes 4. Last 2 bytes of AID 5. Chip Id (CSN) 4 bytes 6. 0F 03 2 bytes Provides Key Confidentiality-- Encrypt the PSK 66

67 Personalization Secret Key (PSK) PSK is also referred to in other VSDC documentation as the KDCvsdc key. 67

68 Personalization Steps (cont.) Verify the Card cryptogram: KSCenc in triple DES CBC mode with an ICV of binary zeroes Generate the Host cryptogram: KSCenc in triple DES CBC mode with an ICV of binary zeroes Generate a MAC for the External Authenticate command: KSCmac in triple DES CBC mode with an ICV of binary zeroes 68

69 Personalization Steps (cont.) Derive and Put Key for PSK : The PSK must be placed into key index 01 of key set version 01. * Generate a key check value for the PSK * Encrypt the PSK using the KDCkek * Issue Put Key to place the PSK into the VSDC application Issue External Authenticate to finish the mutual authentication: Using PSK The External Authenticate is issued using the host cryptogram and no MAC. After successful authentication, the applet is ready for personalization. 69

70 Append Record Personalization Steps (cont.) Append Record is used to personalize the data in the files and records that are described by the Application File Locator (AFL) and are retrieved by Read Record. Put Data: Put Data is used to add to the applet data elements that are not retrieved by Read Record. Put Key: Put Key is used to add the operational keys to the applet. Change PIN/Unblock: Change PIN/Unblock is used to add the cardholder PIN to the applet. 70

71 Smart Card Standards Standards necessary to encourage interoperability. Main Standards connected to Smart Cards: Hardware/ Software: ISO ~4,8,9 Contactless :ISO 14443, ISO EMV: ISO , EVM Level 1, 2, etc. GSM: GSM interface standard between SIM to Mobile for GSM. 71

72 Smart Card Standards (cont.) ISO 7816 Part 1: (CNS ) Follow on of ISO 7810 Identification cards - Physical characteristics Defines Physical Characteristics of a Smart Card. Physical Dimensions.(85.6 mm*53.98 mm*0.76 mm) Response to X-Rays and UV Light. *. Any protection beyond the ambient UV light level shall be responsibility of the card manufacture. *. Exposure of either side of the card to a dose of 0.1Gy of medium-energy x-radiation of 70 kev to 140 kev shall not cause malfunction of the card. Mechanical Strength. Electrical Resistance of the Contacts. Response to electromagnetic fields and static electricity. 72

73 Smart Card Standards (cont.) ISO 7816 Part 2: Follow on of ISO This document describes: Dimensions of the contacts. (2mm by 1.7 mm) Locations of the contacts. Location of the embossing. Location of the magnetic stripe. The arrangement of the chip. 73

74 Smart Card Standards (cont.) ISO 7816 Part 3: Probably the most important specification document. This document describes: The communication protocol. Functions of various contacts on the smart card. Basic electrical characteristics. Structure of Answer to Reset (ATR). When manufacturers claim to be ISO 7816 compliant, they basically comply with Part I, II and III. 74

75 Smart Card Standards (cont.) ISO 7816 Part 4: This document is really the definition of a file management system and its interaction with a user (Commands). There are four basic concepts of this ISO standard, File structure Message structure Basic commands Command and data transport 75

76 Smart Card Standards (cont.) ISO 7816 part 8: Interindustry commands for a cryptographic toolbox ISO 7816 Part 9: Interindustry commands for card and file management 76

77 Smart Card Standard (cont.) Contactless Standards necessary to encourage interoperability. Main Standards connected to Smart Cards: ISO part 1: Card Body ISO part 2: RF Power and Signal Interface ISO part 3: Initialization and Anti-collision ISO part 4: Protocol 77

78 Smart Card Standards (cont.) EMV (Europay MasterCard Visa) standards address acceptance and interoperability, are developed by ISO. EMV standard is a set of three documents covering: Design Aspects of Smart Cards (EMV Level 1) Design Aspects of Smart Card Terminals (EMV Level 2) Debit/Credit Applications on Smart Cards (EMV Certification and Compliance) The EMV specifications do not fully describe particular payment applications, that being left to individual card associations to define. 78

79 Smart Card Standards (cont.) EMV Application EMV Level 1 Document covers: Physical, Electromechanical Properties, Logical Interface and Transmission Protocols Card Session (Card Perspective: Card size, Chip location, etc.) Similar to ISO 7816 (Part I and II) Answer to Reset and Transmission Protocols. 79

80 Smart Card Standards (cont.) EMV Application EMV Level 2 Document covers: Application selection, Data element, Command, etc card security methodologies (static data authentication, dynamic data authentication) Card Holder and Acquirer Interface. Software and Data Management. 80

81 Smart Card Standards (cont.) EMV Application EMV Certification and Compliance Document Covers: Requirements for Card Issuer, Terminal Manufacture, Software System Transaction flow. Exception Handling. If you are really interested check out: 81

82 Smart Card Standards (cont.) SIM: Groupe Special Mobile. Written in two parts. First part deals with functional characteristics of GSM network. Second part deals with characteristics of the SIM Card. 82

83 GSM Smart Card Standards (cont.) GSM 02.09: Security Aspects GSM 02.17: SIM Function Characteristics GSM 02.48: Specification of security mechanisms for the SIM application toolkit, stage 1 GSM 03.48: Specification of security mechanisms for the SIM application toolkit, stage 2 GSM 02.19: All smart card operation systems with executable program code GSM 03.19: Specification detail implementation of a JAVA Card API for SIM base on JAVA Card 2.1 specification 83

84 Smart Card Standards (cont.) GSM GSM 11.11: Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module- Mobile Equipment (SIM-ME) interface GSM 11.12: Specification of the 3 volt Subscriber Identity Module-Mobile Equipment (SIM-ME) interface GSM 11.13: Test Specification for SIM API for Java card GSM : Specification of the SIM Application Toolkit for the Subscriber Identity Module-Mobile Equipment (SIM-ME) interface GSM 11.17: Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) conformance test specification GSM 11.18: Specification of the 1.8 Volt Subscriber Identity Module-Mobile Equipment (SIM-ME) interface 84

85 Smart Card Applications SIM (Subscriber ID module) cards Telephony, GSM, etc Debit/Credit EMV, VISA Electronic Purse Data Base Health Care Loyalty Public Key for IT Access (GemSafe) 85

86 Smart Card Applications Telephony: Most common Smart Card Application. Problems with public telephones using cash. Costly, High Operating Costs, Low Reliability, Exact Change Pre-paid Telephone Card Typical Denominations: $5 - $20. Market: approximately 2000 Million Cards per year. Working Procedure Choices: Memory/Chip Card? Reloadable/Disposable? GSM: SIM card in the Mobile is a Smart Card. Market: approximately 100 Million cards per year. Card can store SMS, phonebook etc. 86

87 Smart Card Applications Financial Applications Electronic Purses Also known as Stored Value Card. Used for smaller purchases. Types: Disposable or Reloadable. Setup usually Card Holder Acquirer Issuer. But Mondex, allows Card Holder Card Holder Transactions Usage and Flow. Credit/Debit Cards Prime Requirement: Fraud reduction in offline mode. Smart Cards allow offline authentication: PIN [Stored on the Card itself] Biometrics 87

88 Smart Card Applications Transport and Related Applications Public Transport Ticketing: Contactless Smart Cards are used. Reloadable. Card with a fixed value purchased, value decreases with every journey. Seoul has issued 1.5 million cards for Public Transport. Railways in Mumbai. Tolling: Contactless cards passed in front of a reader while crossing toll booth. Whenever car crosses a tollgate, value decremented. Parking 88

89 Smart Card Applications Health Care Sector Health Insurance Cards Versichhertenkarte and Sesame Vitale. Close to 100 Million cards issued. Hospitals can read patients details, insurance number etc from the card, but cannot write to it. Reduces paperwork, fraud. Medical Records Used Optical Cards to store patient history. Any clinic can then check patient s past history, X-Ray images, prescriptions etc. 89

90 Trends and Issues Future Trends: With EMV expected to move to Smart Cards by 2004, huge boom expected. Cards will become truly multifunctional. Application Downloading. 90

91 Smart Card Security Smart Card Security Card Body Chip Hardware Operation System Application Passive Protection Active Protection Classification of the smart card security components 91

92 Smart Card Security (cont.) Card Body Security - Signature Panel - Embossing - Hologram - Kinegram (3-D images) -Microtext *. UV or IR Marking *. Visually by Humans 92

93 Chip Hardware Smart Card Security (cont.) *. Passive Protection - Isolation the computer used design the IC chip from network - Insider management *. Active Protection - sensor or protective covering - Unique chip number 93

94 Smart Card Security (cont.) Operation System and Applications *. The development tools, such as compilers and simulators, are software packages whose proper operation must be verified in dedicated tests. *. Removing development-commands, debugging points, and test points from program. *. The special tests for the absence of such commands are performed during smart card completion. *. Programmer should never work alone on a project. *. There is never any single person who knows everything. 94

95 Attacks Well-know Attack *. Tampering Attack *. Side-Channel Attack *. Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) 95

96 Tampering Attack Attacks (cont.) - Manipulating the microcontroller (chip die) with a laser cutter. - Tapping the bus using microprobes - Manipulating the microcontroller (chip die) using forcouce ion beam( FIB) - Erasing the EEPROM using UV light 96

97 Side-Channel Attacks * Timing Attack Attacks Related to the processing time of cryptographic algorithm * Simple Power Analysis and Differential Power Analysis (SPA/DPA) Power consumption is depended on the processed data. *. Electromagnetic Wave: Electronic device characteristic M Timing Power consumption En(.) EM Wave C De(.) M Ks Ks 97

98 Timing Attack Attack (cont.) Attacks are presented which can exploit timing measurements from vulnerable systems to find the entire secret key. Die-Hellman and RSA private-key operations consist of computing R =y x mod n, where n is public and y can be found by an eavesdropper. Attacker s goal: to find x (secret key) 98

99 Attack (Timing Attack) Let S 0 = 1 For k = 0 upto w-1 If (bit k of x) is 1 then Let Else Let Let Sk ENDFor. Return R k = R = ( S k k S k 2 +1 = Rk mod n y) mod n Note: x is w bits length 99

100 Attack (Timing Attack) Preventing the Timing Attack *. Balanced execution time - can t design platform-independent algorithms - All operation takes as long as slowest one *. Adding random delay *. Blinding signature techniques Algorithm specific 100

101 Attack (cont.) SPA/DPA *. To measure a circuit's power consumption *. Simple Power Analysis (SPA): It involves directly interpreting power consumption measurements collected during cryptographic operations. SPA trace showing an entire DES operation. 101

102 Attack (cont.) Differential Power Analysis (DPA) *. The DPA selection function D(C; b; Ks) Ks: guessed sub-key; b : computing the value of bit 0 b < 32 of the DES intermediate L at the beginning of the 16th round for ciphertext C Note that if Ks is incorrect, evaluating D(C; b;ks) will yield the correct value for bit b with probability P = 1/2 for each ciphertext. 102

103 Attack (cont.) If Ks is incorrect, T i [j]: Power consumption curve traces for i th data at time j 103

104 Attack (cont.) DPA traces, one correct and two incorrect, with power reference. 104

105 Attacks (cont.) Countermeasure to SPA/DPA Reducing power variations (shielding, balancing) Randomness (power, execution, timing) + counters on card Algorithm redesign (non-linear key update, blinding) Hardware redesign (decouple power supply, gate level design) 105

106 EM Wave Attacks Attack (cont.) Direct emanations caused by current flows in circuit Unintentional emanations caused by electrical/ electromagnetic coupling between components in close proximity Some can be detected with antennas from a distance. Best results if chip is decapsulated from packaging Contain more information than power leakage, resistant to countermeasures. 106

107 Countermeasures Attack (cont.) Redesign circuits to prevent unintentional emissions Shielding Costly, increase device footprint Introduce EM noise Can be averaged out 107

108 Fault Attack Attacks (cont.) Single innocent faults can have large security implications. *. Faults can be induced, ex. bit controls ciphertext or plaintext output. - Flip bit with power surge, radiation, laser etc - Engineering criteria (e.g. FIPS140-1) generally prevent such simple attacks. Differential Fault Attack (DFA) *. Switching off the supply voltage *. Stopping the clock 108

109 Attacks (cont.) Countermeasure to Fault Attacks *. detect supply voltages and clock speeds 109

110 Thanks! 110