Overview of nicter - R&D project against Cyber Attacks in Japan -

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1 Overview of nicter - R&D project against Cyber Attacks in Japan - Daisuke INOUE Cybersecurity Laboratory Network Security Research Institute (NSRI) National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT) nicter video à DAEDALUS video à 1

2 Outline of NICT Mission As the sole national research institute in the information and communications field, we as NICT will strive to advance national technologies and contribute to national policies in the field, by promoting our own research and development and by cooperating with and supporting outside parties. Japan Standard Time and Space Weather Forecast services Collaboration between Industry, Academic Institutions and Government Budget (FY 2011): approx Billion Yen (300 Million Euro) Personnel: 843 Researchers: 517 PhDs: 410 (as of April 2011) Interaction with National ICT Policy R&D carried out by NICT s researchers R&D assistance to industry and academia Promotion of ICT businesses Growth of Japanese Economy Safety and Security for a more convenient life Contribution to solve major problems of the global community 2

3 What we are fighting against? Malware short for malicious software designed to disrupt or deny operation, gather information that leads to loss of privacy or exploitation, gain unauthorized access to system resources, and other abusive behavior. (from Wikipedia) Virus Bot Worm 3

4 Overview of the project nicter = Network Incident analysis Center for Tactical Emergency Response Target: Integrated analysis of security threats in large scale networks - What happens on the Internet? - What is the root cause? Strategy: Network monitoring + Malware analysis nicter Operation Room 4

5 System Overview MacS: Macro analysis System Bot Virus Darknet Traffic Visualization Tiles Atlas Cube Analysis Engine! Worm Phenomena NemeSys: Network and malware enchaining System IHS: Incident Handling System Report Government! Root Cause Correlation Engine Analysis Work Bench Incident Alert Internet Service Providers (ISPs) Malware Samples MicS: Micro analysis System Code Analyzer Behavior Analyzer! Honeypot End Users 5

6 System Overview Bot Virus Darknet Traffic MacS: Macro analysis System Visualization Analysis Engine Tiles Atlas Cube! Worm 190,000 darknet (dark IP addresses) 5,000 samples can be analyzed per day Malware Samples Phenomena Root Cause NemeSys: Network and malware enchaining System MicS: Micro analysis System Code Analyzer Correlation Engine 30 seconds for a correlation analysis IHS: Incident Handling System Analysis Work Bench Behavior Analyzer Report Incident Alert Government! Internet Service Providers (ISPs)! Honeypot End Users 6

7 What is Darknet? Darknet: Unassigned IP addresses space and they are not connected to the real servers/pcs. Types of packets arrived to the darknet: Scans and attacks by malwares Backscatter (reflection of DDoS attack) Miss configurations/mistakes It is very useful to observe the serious attacks behavior over the Internet. Darknet 7

8 Atlas: Geographical Traffic Visualization Shows geographical positions of a packet s src and dst from the IP addresses in real-time Each packet is represented by a rocket traversing from source to destination The color of the rocket indicates the type of packet The altitude of the rocket is in proportion to its dst port number UDP TCP SYN TCP SYN/ACK TCP Other ICMP 8

9 Cube: 3D Traffic Visualization Shows comprehensive traffic animation in real-time Each packet is represented by a thin rectangle The rectangle is placed on the source plane according to its src IP addr and port number It glides to the destination plane taking about six seconds The position it reaches is according to its dst IP addr and port number Source IP Address Src Plane UDP TCP SYN TCP SYN/ACK TCP Other ICMP Source Port Number Destination IP Address 9

10 Tiles: Host-based Behavioral Analysis Engine One tile illustrates behavior of an attacking host in 30 sec. Each behavior is automatically categorized and stored in a DB. Unknown attack pattern can be detected. 10

11 NemeSys: Macro-Micro Correlation Analysis Scan from a certain host NemeSys Profiler Profile parameter 1 parameter 2 parameter 3 parameter 4 Correlator MicS DB (malware database) PF of MW 1 parameter 1 parameter 2 parameter 3 parameter 4 PF of MW 2 parameter 1 parameter 2 parameter 3 parameter 4 PF of MW 3 parameter 1 parameter 2 parameter 3 parameter 4 PF of MW 4 parameter 1 parameter 2 parameter 3 parameter 4 PF of MW 5 parameter 1 parameter 2 parameter 3 parameter st Candidate

12 Result of Real-time Correlation Analysis 12

13 - nicter real-time alert system - DAEDALUS (Direct Alert Environment for Darknet And Livenet Unified Security) Daedalus Ikaros 13

14 Goal and Mechanism of DAEDALUS Goal: Utilize the darknet monitoring results for securing the livenet. Mechanism: if (nicter receives packets from a cooperative organization) alert; 14

15 System Overview Organization A nicter Organization C : Livenet : Darknet 15

16 Internal Darknet Alert Organization A nicter Organization C : Livenet : Darknet : Infected Host 16

17 External Darknet Alert Organization A Darknet Traffic nicter Organization C : Livenet : Darknet : Infected Host 17

18 DAEDALUS viz 18

19 Yet Other Emerging Threats Drive-by Download SNS Malware Targeted Attack Threats on IPv6 Network etc 19

20 Conclusions We are conducting R&D to investigate practical Cybersecurity technologies. We still need new frameworks to observe, analyze and respond to the emerging threats. International collaboration is crucial for developing state-of-the-art Cybersecurity technologies. 20

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