PostScript: Danger Ahead?!

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Delphia O’Brien’
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1 PostScript: Danger Ahead?! Andrei Costin Affiliation - PhD student

2 whoami: in-between SW/HW hacker Mifare Classic MFCUK Hacking MFPs (for fun & profit) Holistic Security Interest 1

3 Agenda 1. Quick refresher 2. What about PostScript? 3. So, what and how did you find? 4. Attacks in a nutshell 5. Solutions and conclusions 2

4 MFPs carry large abuse potential 3

5 MFP hacking goes back to the 1960 s The micro -film camera, marked X Patent drawing, 1967 Electronics/hardware hacking Spies in the Xerox machine 4

6 Modern printer hacking goes back almost a decade Initial printer hacks (FX/pH) Broader & deeper printer hacking (irongeek) Revived printer hacking interest This talk focuses mainly on remote code execution inside MFPs/printers 5

7 In 2010 demo d : mapping public MFPs 6

and generic MFP payload delivery using Word http://www.youtube.

8 and generic MFP payload delivery using Word (there are false claims on this discovery) 7

9 and generic MFP payload delivery using Java 8

10 Agenda 1. Quick refresher 2. What about PostScript? 3. So, what and how did you find? 4. Attacks in a nutshell 5. Solutions and conclusions 9

11 PostScript who? It s Adobe s PDF big brother 10

12 PS is build to handle complex processing tasks Graphics & patterns Complex math Web servers Ray-tracing, OpenGL Milling machine XML Parsers 11

13 Then, what exactly is PostScript? PostScript IS NOT just a static data stream like PostScript IS a Dynamically typed & concatenative Stack-based Turing-complete Programming language What does it all mean? Exactly! 12

14 What happens when printing PS? User writes the doc and hits Print PS printer driver transforms it to PS stream for specific device PS data stream on PRN User Opens a PS file from /hdd PC-based PS interpreter processes it PS data stream executes on PC In both cases, PS data stream IS A PS program Program!= static data 13

15 Demo1 Programming language aspect Programming languages 101: Control statements if/else loop while Simplest DoS attack is an infinite loop!% {} loop 14

16 Demo2 Dynamically typed concatenative" aspect You wonder why your smart IDS/IPS rules stopped working? Here is why: ps_dynamic_statement_construction_and_execution.ps Obfuscation at its best built-into the language! Solution: Bad news: Need dynamic execution sandbox Good news: It s coming up see sandbox slides below 15

17 Demo3 Real world application MSOffice PS crash Submitted to MS Apparently this is not exploitable as in smash stack attacks But it opens an interesting perspective on MS Office 16

18 Demo4 Real world application GhostScript autoprn One got to love custom extensions Sends a print-job stream directly by just opening the file Requires more investigation, but perspective is interesting 17

19 Dynamic document forging/generation + SocEng User computer User printout 18

20 Dynamic document forging/generation + SocEng Computer side SocEng bait Printer/MFP side PS virus 19

21 Where is PostScript? (Vendor-wise view) Applications incorporating the PS interpreter Applications/vendors producing the PS interpreter The PS interpreter specifications and standards 20

22 Where is PostScript? (Role-wise view) 21

23 PostScript Web 2.0 Style PostScript made it into the web as well Around 20+ services found to be vulnerable to various degrees Google was one them -> Got a hall of fame reward Some fun facts Effective for host exploitation and information gathering Some ran GS as root user Some ran GS without dsafer All of them ran vulnerable GS versions Heap and stack overflows and what-not More details to come 22

24 Agenda 1. Quick refresher 2. What about PostScript? 3. What else was found? 4. Attacks in a nutshell 5. Solutions and conclusions 23

25 A PS-based firmware upload was required 24

26 This is too good to be true. VxWorks API /vx*** Debug/QA API /QA*** Logging API /***EventLog Pump PWM /***pumppwm BillingMeters API /***meter*** RAMdisk API /***ramdisk RAM API /***ram*** Flash API /***flash*** 25

27 Memory dumping reveals computing secrets SANS Security Predictions 2012/ The Emerging Security Threat Memory Scraping Will Become More Common 26

28 Admin restriction fail to prevent memory dumping 27

29 Password setup is sniffed by the attacker 1) HTTP GET request password clear text 2) HTTP reply 28

30 Basic auth password can be dumped 1) Authorization: Basic YWRtaW4yO 2) HTTP/ OK 29

31 HTTPS / IPsec secrets are defaulty & leaky 0x

32 Attacker has access to printed document details 31

33 Attacker has access to network topology no-scan 32

34 Attacker has access to BSD-style sockets Two-way BSD-style sockets communication 33

35 Analyzed MFP cannot protect effectively Protection measures Fail / warn / ok Privilege level separation Secure password setup Secure (basic) auth HTTPS, IPSEC secrets protection Network topology protection In-memory document protection Restrict sockets on unprivileged modules 34

36 Plenty of Xerox printers share affected PS firmware update mechanism 35

37 Agenda 1. Quick refresher 2. What about PostScript? 3. So, what and how did you find? 4. Attacks in a nutshell 5. Solutions and conclusions 36

38 Remote attacks can be used to extract data Stage 1 SocEng Stage 2 - Printing Stage 3 Exploiting/spying Sent by Print attachment Malware exploits internal netw. or extracts data Driveby print Print from web Spool malicious byte stream 37

39 Agenda 1. Quick refresher 2. What about PostScript? 3. So, what and how did you find? 4. Attacks in a nutshell 5. What s next, solutions, conclusions 38

40 Network-wise mitigation solution VLAN1 PCs Print Server PS/PJL-sandboxed VLAN2 PRNs VLAN networks Unsafe print jobs Safe print jobs 39

reporting Wepawet-like, but for PostScript

41 Protocol-wise mitigation solution PostScript/PJL sandbox Secure PostScript Execution/Interpreter Sandbox Set of online/offline tools for analysis & reporting Wepawet-like, but for PostScript related data Subscribe for updates: 40

42 What s next? PS + MSF + FS + Sockets = PWN! 41

43 Solutions Actor Admins Users Suggested actions Disable PS processing on printers Route print-jobs thru sandboxed print-servers Replace PS drivers with PCL ones (well ) Disable Language Operator Authorization Look for security bulletins and patch Sandbox printers in your network Include MFPs in security audit lifecycle Do not print from untrusted sources Be suspicious on PostScript files Vendors Create realistic MFP threat models Do not enable/expose super-apis 42

44 Acknowledgements The Xerox-related PostScript work & research done under support of 43

45 Acknowledgements Thanks to EURECOM for great advise and support for this topic 44

46 Thanks/resources Xerox Security Team Positive responses, active mitigation Insanely large free postscript resources dir Very good postscript resources Very good postscript resources Personal thanks Igor Marinescu, MihaiSa Great logistic support and friendly help 45

47 Take aways MFPs are badly secured computing platforms with large abuse potential Upcoming MFP attack could include viruses in Office and PS documents that extract organization data Securing the MFP infrastructure requires better segmentation, strong credentials, and continious vulnerability patching Check upcoming research papers Check Join: Questions? Andrei Costin 46

PostScript: Danger Ahead?!

PostScript: Danger Ahead?! Andrei Costin Affiliation - PhD student whoami: in-between SW/HW hacker Mifare Classic MFCUK Hacking MFPs (for fun & profit) Holistic Security Interest