Key Threats Melissa (1999), Love Letter (2000) Mainly leveraging social engineering. Key Threats Internet was just growing Mail was on the verge

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "Key Threats Melissa (1999), Love Letter (2000) Mainly leveraging social engineering. Key Threats Internet was just growing Mail was on the verge"

Esmond Thomas
5 years ago
Views:

4 Key Threats Internet was just growing Mail was on the verge Key Threats Melissa (1999), Love Letter (2000) Mainly leveraging social engineering Key Threats Code Red and Nimda (2001), Blaster (2003), Slammer (2003) 9/11 Mainly exploiting buffer overflows Script kiddies Time from patch to exploit: Several days to weeks Key Threats Zotob (2005) Attacks «moving up the stack» (Summer of Office 0-day) Rootkits Exploitation of Buffer Overflows Script Kiddies Raise of Phishing User running as Admin Key Threats Organized Crime Botnets Identity Theft Conficker (2008) Time from patch to exploit: days Key Threats Organized Crime, potential state actors Sophisticated Targeted Attacks Operation Aurora (2009) Stuxnet (2010) Windows 95 - Windows XP Logon (Ctrl+Alt+Del) Access Control User Profiles Security Policy Encrypting File System (File Based) Smartcard and PKI Support Windows Update Windows XP SP2 Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Data Execution Prevention (DEP) Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) Auto Update on by Default Firewall on by Default Windows Security Center WPA Support Windows Vista Bitlocker Patchguard Improved ASLR and DEP Full SDL User Account Control Internet Explorer Smart Screen Filter Digital Right Management Firewall improvements Signed Device Driver Requirements TPM Support Windows Integrity Levels Secure by default configuration (Windows features and IE) Windows 7 Improved ASLR and DEP Full SDL Improved IPSec stack Managed Service Accounts Improved User Account Control Enhanced Auditing Internet Explorer Smart Screen Filter AppLocker BitLocker to Go Windows Biometric Service Windows Action Center Windows Defender Windows 8 UEFI (Secure Boot) Firmware Based TPM Trusted Boot (w/elam) Measured Boot and Remote Attestation Support Significant Improvements to ASLR and DEP AppContainer Windows Store Internet Explorer 10 (Plugin-less and Enhanced Protected Modes) Application Reputation moved into Core OS BitLocker: Encrypted Hard Drive and Used Disk Space Only Encryption Support Virtual Smartcard Picture Password, PIN Dynamic Access Control Built-in Anti-Virus 4

5 Protect and Manage Threats Protect Sensitive Data Protect Access to Resources

6 Challenges

Universal Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) An interface built on top of and replaces some aspects of traditional BIOS Like BIOS it hands control of the pre-boot

8 Universal Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) An interface built on top of and replaces some aspects of traditional BIOS Like BIOS it hands control of the pre-boot environment to an OS Architecture-independent Enables device initialization and operation (mouse, pre-os apps, menus) Secure Boot, Encrypted Hard Drives, Network Unlock for BitLocker

9 Trusted Platform Module 2.0 Enables commercial-grade security via physical and virtual key isolation from OS TPM 1.2 spec: mature standard, years of deployment and hardening Improvements in TPM provisioning lowers deployment barriers Algorithm extensibility Security scenarios are compatible with TPM 1.2 or 2.0 Discrete or Firmware-based (ARM TrustZone ; Intel s Platform Trust Technology (PTT)) * Microsoft refers to the TCG TPM.Next as TPM 2.0.

10 # Features TPM 1.2/2.0 UEFI BitLocker: Volume Encryption X 2 BitLocker: Volume Network Unlock X X 3 Trusted Boot: Secure Boot X 4 Trusted Boot: ELAM X 5 Measured Boot X 6 Virtual Smart Cards X 7 Certificate Storage (Hardware Bound) X 8 Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) X 9 Visual Studio Compiler X 10 More

12 Training Requirements Design Implementation Verification Release Response

Legacy Boot BIOS OS Loader (Malware) OS Start BIOS Starts any OS Loader, even malware Malware may starts before Windows Modern Boot Native UEFI Verified OS Loader Only OS Start The firmware enforces

14 Legacy Boot BIOS OS Loader (Malware) OS Start BIOS Starts any OS Loader, even malware Malware may starts before Windows Modern Boot Native UEFI Verified OS Loader Only OS Start The firmware enforces policy, only starts signed OS loaders OS loader enforces signature verification of Windows components. If fails Trusted Boot triggers remediation. Result - Malware unable to change boot and OS components

15 UEFI Firmware, Drivers, Applications, and Loaders must be trusted (i.e.: signed) UEFI Database lists trusted and untrusted Keys, CA s, and Image Hashes Secured RollBack feature prevents rollback to insecure version Untrusted (unsigned) Option ROMs (containing firmware) can not run Updates to UEFI Firmware, Drivers, Applications, and Loaders Revocation process for signatures and image hashes UEFI able to execute UEFI firmware integrity check and self-remediate

16 Windows 7 BIOS OS Loader (Malware) 3 rd Party Drivers (Malware) Anti- Malware Software Start Windows Logon Malware able to hide and remain undetected Systems can be compromised before AM starts Windows 8 Native UEFI Windows 8 OS Loader Windows Core, Kernel, Anti- Malware 3 rd Party Drivers Windows Logon Secures Windows system files (e.g.: kernel) and drivers Starts and protects ELAM based AM software Automatic remediation/self healing if compromised

18 PIN and Picture Password Both are easy to use sign in option for Touch devices Picture password offers a secure (blog) personal sign-in experience, easy to remember Length PIN Password (a-z) Password (complex) Picture Password n/a 2, n/a 1,581, ,000 17,576 81,120 1,155,509, , ,976 4,218, ,000 11,881, ,790, ,000, ,915,776 7,128,825, ,000,000 8,031,810, ,489,251, ,000, ,827,064,576 8,995,627,397,120 Account Lockout Policy - Account lockout threshold + Account lockout duration Security Option Policy - Interactive logon: Machine account lockout threshold

19 Wired - Kill the Password: Why a String of Characters Can t Protect Us Anymore Mat Honan addresses have become universal usernames making them a single point of failure Basic personal info is enough to trick customer service agents into revealing more sensitive information Malicious users use information on one service to gain entry into another Hacked accounts enables malicious users to reset your pw on other sites (e.g.: Your investment acct) Easy to deploy and cost effective way to enable strong multi-factor authentication Provides a secure, seamless, and always ready experience for end user

Windows 8 Deployment Best Practices and Lessons Learned. Martin Weber Technology Solution Professional Microsoft Switzerland GmbH

Windows 8 Deployment Best Practices and Lessons Learned Martin Weber Technology Solution Professional Microsoft Switzerland GmbH Preparation is key Application Management Create repeatable, automated