Cryptography: Symmetric Encryption (finish), Hash Functions, Message Authentication Codes
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1 CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy Cryptography: Symmetric Encryption (finish), Hash Functions, Message Authentication Codes Fall 2016 Adam (Ada) Lerner lerner@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner, Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Yoshi Kohno, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials...
2 More Cheating 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
3 More Cheating 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
4 Dirty COW Vulnerability Race condition involving memory mapped files which allows user processes to write to root-owned files 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
5 Dirty COW Fixed commit 19be0eaffa3ac7d8eb6784ad9bdbc7d67ed8e619 Author: Linus Torvalds Date: Thu Oct 13 20:07: GMT This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once (badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug"). 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
6 Dirty COW Vulnerability madvise(map,100,madv_dontneed) write( /proc/self/mem ) Eventually writes to a file in the middle of page table updates, causing inappropriate file overwriting. 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
7 Recap: Block Ciphers Operates on a single chunk ( ) of plaintext For example, 64 bits for DES, 128 bits for AES Each key defines a different permutation Same key is reused for each (can use short keys) Plaintext Key Ciphertext 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
8 Electronic Code Book (ECB) Mode plaintext key key key key key Don t use ECB mode text 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
9 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode: Encryption plaintext Initialization vector (random) key key key key Sent with text text 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
10 CBC Mode: Decryption plaintext Initialization vector key key key key decrypt decrypt decrypt decrypt text 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
11 ECB vs. CBC AES in ECB mode AES in CBC mode Similar plaintext s produce similar text s (not good!) [Picture due to Bart Preneel] 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall 2016 slide 11 11
12 Counter Mode (CTR): Encryption Initial ctr (random) ctr ctr+1 ctr+2 ctr+3 Key Key Key Key pt pt pt pt text 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
13 Counter Mode (CTR): Decryption Initial ctr ctr ctr+1 ctr+2 ctr+3 Key Key Key Key ct ct ct ct pt pt pt pt 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
14 How Can a Cipher Be Attacked? Attackers knows text and encryption algthm What else does the attacker know? Depends on the application in which the is used! Ciphertext-only attack KPA: Known-plaintext attack (stronger) Knows some plaintext-text pairs CPA: Chosen-plaintext attack (even stronger) Can obtain text for any plaintext of his choice CCA: Chosen-text attack (very strong) Can decrypt any text except the target 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
15 Ex: Chosen Plaintext Attacks Let s plan an attack on AF [wikipedia] 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
16 Ex: Chosen Plaintext Attacks This is Midway Island, we re low on supplies [wikipedia] 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
17 Ex: Chosen Plaintext Attacks AF is low on supplies [wikipedia] 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
18 Ex: Chosen Plaintext Attack When the allies planted mines in the ocean, the German Navy would send messages about those locations to warn their ships. [wikipedia] 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
19 Examples of Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Some serious attacks against SSH have been based on Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Example: send chosen text to SSH server, see whether it responds with an error or not. 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
20 Examples of Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Imagine a system with very few commands, e.g., a military system which responds to the commands ( FIRE ) and ( DON T FIRE ). Try sending texts and observe in real life whether the weapon fires or not. The side effects of the command serve as a decryption of your text. 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
21 Very Informal Intuition Minimum security requirement for a modern encryption scheme Security against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) Ciphertext leaks no information about the plaintext Even if the attacker correctly guesses the plaintext, he cannot verify his guess Every text is unique, encrypting same message twice produces completely different texts 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
22 Message Authentication Codes 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
23 So Far: Achieving Privacy Encryption schemes: A tool for protecting privacy. M Encrypt C Decrypt M Alice K K Message = M Ciphertext = C Adversary K Bob K 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
24 Now: Achieving Integrity Message authentication schemes: A tool for protecting integrity. KEY MAC: message authentication code (sometimes called a tag ) KEY message, MAC(KEY,message) Alice message? = Bob Recomputes MAC and verifies whether it is equal to the MAC attached to the message Integrity and authentication: only someone who knows KEY can compute correct MAC for a given message. 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
25 Reminder: CBC Mode Encryption plaintext Initialization vector (random) key key key key text 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
26 CBC-MAC plaintext key key key key TAG 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
27 CBC-MAC plaintext key key key key TAG Not secure when system may MAC messages of different lengths. 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
28 Hash Functions 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
29 Application: Password Hashing Instead of user password, store hash(password) When user enters a password, compute its hash and compare with the entry in the password file System does not store actual passwords! Cannot go from hash to password! Why is hashing better than encryption here? Does hashing protect weak, easily guessable passwords? 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
30 Application: Software Integrity VIRUS goodfile badfile BigFirm The NYTimes hash(goodfile) User Goal: Software manufacturer wants to ensure file is received by users without modification. Idea: given goodfile and hash(goodfile), very hard to find badfile such that hash(goodfile)=hash(badfile) 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
31 Hash Functions: Main Idea x message. x.. x hash function H message digest.. y y bit strings of any length n-bit bit strings Hash function H is a lossy compression function Collision: h(x)=h(x ) for distinct inputs x, x H(x) should look random Every bit equally likely to be 0 or 1 Cryptographic hash function needs a few properties 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
32 Property 1: One-Way The hash should be hard to invert Preimage resistance Let h(x ) = y {0,1} n for random x Given y, it should be hard to find any x such that h(x)=y 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
33 Security Mindset Anecdote A clever example of a one-way function: phone books. 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
34 Security Mindset Anecdote A clever example of a one-way function: phone books. Hash(name) = Phone number of person with that name 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
35 Security Mindset Anecdote Easy to compute forward (phonebook is alphabetical) Hard to invert backward (must search n/2 pages on average to find person by phone number) 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
36 Security Mindset Anecdote 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
37 Property 2: Collision Resistance Should be hard to find x x such that h(x)=h(x ) 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
38 Birthday Paradox Expect birthday collision half the time with a room of only 23 people. Approximate: 50% probability = sqrt(365). Why is this important for cryptography? different 128-bit values Pick one value at random. To exhaustively search for this value requires trying on average values. Expect collision after selecting approximately 2 64 random values. 64 bits of security against collision attacks, not 128 bits. 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
39 Property 2: Collision Resistance Should be hard to find x x such that h(x)=h(x ) Birthday paradox (informal) Let t be the number of values x,x,x we need to look at before finding the first pair x,x s.t. h(x)=h(x ) What is probability of collision for each pair x,x? 1/2 n How many pairs would we need to look at before finding the first collision? O(2 n ) How many pairs x,x total? What is t, the number of values we need to look at? Choose(t,2)=t(t-1)/2 O(t 2 ) 2 n/2 Brute-force collision search is only O(2 n/2 ), not O(2 n ) For SHA-1, this means O(2 80 ) vs. O(2 160 ) 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
40 Property 2: Collision Resistance Should be hard to find x x such that h(x)=h(x ) Birthday paradox means that brute-force collision search is only O(2 n/2 ), not O(2 n ) For SHA-1, this means O(2 80 ) vs. O(2 160 ) 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
41 Property 3: Weak Collision Resistance Given randomly chosen x, hard to find x such that h(x)=h(x ) Attacker must find collision for a specific x. By contrast, to break collision resistance it is enough to find any collision. Brute-force attack requires O(2 n ) time Weak collision resistance does not imply collision resistance. 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
42 Properties of a Cryptographic Hash Function One-wayness Given h(x) Collision resistance Hard to find Weak collision resistance Hard to find 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
43 Properties of a Cryptographic Hash One-wayness Function Given h(x): hard to find x Collision resistance Hard to find x x s.t. h(x) == h(x ) Weak collision resistance Hard to find x x s.t. h(x) == h(x ) for specific, random x 10/26/16 CSE 484 / CSE M Fall
Cryptography: Symmetric Encryption (finish), Hash Functions, Message Authentication Codes
CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy Cryptography: Symmetric Encryption (finish), Hash Functions, Message Authentication Codes Spring 2016 Franziska (Franzi) Roesner franzi@cs.washington.edu
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