IBM Education Assistance for z/os V2R1
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1 IBM Education Assistance for z/os V2R1 Items: TLS V1.2 Suite B RFC 5280 Certificate Validation Element/Component: Cryptographic Services - System SSL Material is current as of June 2013
2 Agenda Trademarks Presentation Objectives Overview Usage & Invocation Interactions & Dependencies Migration & Coexistence Considerations Presentation Summary Appendix Page 2 of 48
3 Trademarks See url for a list of trademarks. Page 3 of 48
4 Presentation Objectives At the end of this presentation, you should have an understanding of The System SSL line item enhancements for TLS V1.2 Suite B RFC 5280 Certificate Validation support General System SSL updates How to use the enhancements Understand how these enhancements affect installation and migration Page 4 of 48
5 Overview - TLS V1.2 Problem Statement / Need Addressed: Enable use of TLS V1.2 protocol for SSL sessions Implement Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 based on RFC 5246 Solution: System SSL has been updated to support the TLS V1.2 protocol Addition of 37 new cipher suites for use in SSL sessions. Available in z/os V1.13 APAR OA39422 (PTFs UA66870,UA66871, and UA66872) Benefit: Allows customers to use the latest defined SSL security protocol Augments end to end encryption for data in flight by helping to maintain data privacy and prevent data leakage of sensitive information Allows use of AES-GCM symmetric encryption algorithm Page 5 of 48
6 Overview - TLS V1.2 Benefit (continued) Allows use of SHA-256 and SHA-384 for message authentication Removes dependency on MD5 and SHA-1 Pre-requisite for implementing Suite-B security profile Page 6 of 48
7 Overview - TLS V1.2 TLS V1.2 introduces the following changes to the protocol MD5/SHA-1 Pseudo Random Function (PRF) has been replaced with cipher suite specified PRF s. The default PRF used for TLS V1.2 uses SHA-256 based PRF. Allows for SHA-256 and SHA-384 to be used for the message authentication Provide a method for client s and server s to specify which hash and signature algorithms they will accept. DES (56-bit) and RC2/RC4 (export) suites are not supported. RFC 5288 AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS RFC 5289 TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Page 7 of 48
8 Usage & Invocation - TLS V1.2 Customers must enable the TLS V1.2 protocol for use. This can be done either by: Setting the environment variable to 1, ON, or ENABLED export GSK_PROTOCOL_TLSV1_2=ON Using gsk_attribute_set_enum() API Can either be specified at the TLS environment level or at the connection level rc = gsk_attribute_set_enum(env, GSK_PROTOCOL_TLSV1_2, GSK_PROTOCOL_TLSV1_2_ON); Notes: Using gsk_attribute_set_enum() API will override the environment variable setting If not specified or set to OFF, TLS V1.2 will not be negotiated. Deprecated APIs do not support the TLS V1.2 protocol. Page 8 of 48
9 Usage & Invocation - TLS V1.2 Customers can query the state of the TLS V1.2 enum setting by using the gsk_attribute_get_enum() API rc = gsk_attribute_get_enum(conhandle, GSK_PROTOCOL_TLSV1_2, &tlsprotocol); Customers can also query whether the TLS V1.2 protocol is being used for the newly established connection: rc = gsk_attribute_get_enum(conhandle, GSK_PROTOCOL_USED, &protocolused) Page 9 of 48
10 Usage & Invocation - TLS V1.2 TLS V1.2 RSA, Diffie Hellman ciphers NULL 003B TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 AES-CBC 003C TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA D TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA E TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA F TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA A TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA B TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 Page 10 of 48
11 Usage & Invocation - TLS V1.2 TLS V1.2 RSA, Diffie Hellman ciphers (continued) AES-GCM 009C TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA D TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA E TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA F TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 00A0 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 00A1 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 00A2 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 00A3 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 00A4 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 00A5 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 Page 11 of 48
12 Usage & Invocation - TLS V1.2 New ciphers to specify the usage of SHA-256 and SHA-384 hashing with an elliptic curve key exchange AES-CBC symmetric algorithm C023 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 C024 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 C025 - TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 C026 - TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 C027 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 C028 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 C029 - TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 C02A - TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 AES-GCM symmetric algorithm C02B - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 C02C - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 C02D - TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 C02E - TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 C02F - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 C030 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 C031 - TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 C032 - TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 Page 12 of 48
13 Usage & Invocation - TLS V1.2 TLS V1.2 defines a new TLS handshake extension - Signature Algorithms Client can use this extension to indicate to the server which hash/signature algorithm pairs may be used in digital signatures The extension contains an enumerated list in descending order of preference of hash/signature algorithm combinations that the client supports Enumerated Hash Algorithms Numeric Value in parenthesis None (0), MD5 (1), SHA (2), SHA224 (3), SHA256(4), SHA384 (5), SHA512 (6) Note: None is not supported by System SSL Enumerated Signature Algorithms Numeric value in parenthesis Anonymous (0), RSA (1), DSA (2), ECDSA (3) Note: Anonymous is not supported by System SSL Page 13 of 48
14 Usage & Invocation - TLS V1.2 The hash algorithm and signature algorithm enumerations are combined together to make hash/signature algorithm pair. Algorithm MD-5 with RSA SHA-1 with RSA SHA-224 with RSA SHA-256 with RSA SHA-384 with RSA SHA-512 with RSA SHA-1 with DSA SHA-224 with DSA SHA-256 with DSA SHA-1 with ECDSA SHA-224 with ECDSA SHA-256 with ECDSA SHA-384 with ECDSA SHA-512 with ECDSA Enumerated Value (hash and signature algorithm pair) (Not supported in V1.13) 0402 (Not supported in V1.13) Page 14 of 48
15 Usage & Invocation - TLS V1.2 The server uses the signature algorithm pairs it receives from the client to perform additional processing during a TLS V1.2 handshake If the server certificate s key is to be used for generating a digital signature the key algorithm must be present in at least one of the hash/signature algorithm pairs The signatures of each certificate in the server certificate chain that is exchanged during the handshake must be present in the hash/signature algorithm pair list. The servers cipher suite list can only contain ciphers that use a key algorithm present in the clients list of hash/signature algorithm pairs. The first hash/signature algorithm pair in the list that matches the key of the server certificate is used by the server to generate digital signatures during the handshake Page 15 of 48
16 Usage & Invocation - TLS V1.2 The client uses the signature algorithm pairs it receives from the server to perform additional processing during a TLS V1.2 handshake If the client certificate s key is to be used for generating a digital signature the key algorithm must be present in at least one of the hash/signature algorithm pairs The signatures of each certificate in the client certificate chain sent must be present in the hash/signature algorithm pair list. The first hash/signature algorithm pair in the list that matches the key of the client certificate is used by the client to generate digital signatures during the handshake Page 16 of 48
17 Usage & Invocation - TLS V1.2 Customers can specify the supported signature algorithm. This can be done either by: Setting the environment variable export GSK_TLS_SIG_ALG_PAIRS=0201 Using gsk_attribute_set_buffer() API Can either be specified at the TLS environment level or at the connection level rc = gsk_attribute_set_buffer(env, GSK_TLS_SIG_ALG_PAIRS, 0201 ); Notes: Default signature algorithm list Note: 0302 and 0402 are not supported in V1R13 Using gsk_attribute_set_buffer() API will override the environment variable setting Page 17 of 48
18 Interactions & Dependencies - TLS V1.2 Hardware Dependencies None Software Dependencies Requires ICSF HCR77A0 or higher be installed System SSL calls ICSF PKCS # 11 callable services for AES-GCM encrypt / decrypt functions ICSF controls access to the cryptographic services through the CSFSERV resource class. Access is needed to the CSF1SKE, CSF1SKD, CSF1TRC, and CSF1TRD resources. ICSF will determine whether to utilize CPACF hardware to perform AES-GCM encrypt / decrypt functions Exploiters Communication Server's Application Transparent/TLS Any z/os System SSL applications wanting to exploit the TLS V1.2 protocol Page 18 of 48
19 Migration & Coexistence Considerations - TLS V1.2 Toleration APAR available for V1R12 to handle session resumption of SSL sessions from the SYSPLEX session ID cache which use an unsupported TLS protocol version. APAR OA37102 Alters System SSL so that in a SYSPLEX where SYSPLEX session ID caching is enabled, an attempt to resume a SSL session using a unsupported TLS protocol will force a full re-handshake to occur V1R12 PTFs UA66806 and UA66807 Notes: APAR OA39422 has this support built into it for z/os V1R13 TLS V1.2 sessions created on a z/os V1R13 or z/os V2R1 system cannot be resumed on V1R12 and a full re-handshake will be forced. Page 19 of 48
20 Overview Suite B Problem Statement / Need Addressed: Suite B cryptography for TLS V1.2 defines a set of profiles that specify what cryptographic algorithms may be used for key establishment, authentication, and encryption. Solution: System SSL will add functionality to support Suite B compliant profile sessions. Benefit: Customers are able to configure System SSL to restrict the cryptographic algorithms in use to those that comply with Suite B profiles. Support for RFC 5430 in Full Compliant Mode Page 20 of 48
21 Overview Suite B Suite B support in System SSL was implemented at the SSL environment level. All connections within the environment must conform to Suite B requirements. Suite B has defined two profiles. One supporting 128-bit and another 192-bit. When Suite B for TLS is specified, the following restrictions are enforced: TLS V1.2 protocol Symmetric algorithm used by the handshake and application payload is AES- CBC 256-bit or AES-GCM based Secure connection negotiated with ECDH key exchange Certificates used during the handshake are signed with ECDSA Elliptical curves allowed are P-256 and P-384 curves Restrict the client s and server s ability to specify which hash and signature algorithms they will accept. System SSL only supports the compliant profiles. No support for transitional mode. Page 21 of 48
22 Usage & Invocation Suite B Suite B 128-bit Profile The 128 bit profile corresponds to: Elliptical Curve Size of 256 bits (secp256r1) Encryption using AES 128 SHA 256 as the hash algorithm Cipher Suites: C02B - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 C023 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 Signature Algorithm SHA-256 with ECDSA Page 22 of 48
23 Usage & Invocation Suite B Suite B 192-bit Profile The 192 bit profile corresponds to: Elliptical Curve Size of 384 bits (secp384r1) Encryption using AES 256 SHA 384 as the hash algorithm Cipher Suites: C02C - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 C024 -TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 Signature Algorithm SHA-384 with ECDSA Page 23 of 48
24 Usage & Invocation Suite B Customer applications must enable Suite B Profile. This can be done either by: Setting the environment variable GSK_SUITE_B_PROFILE to one of the following values: OFF (default) ALL Example: OR... export GSK_SUITE_B_PROFILE=128 Page 24 of 48
25 Usage & Invocation Suite B Using gsk_attribute_set_enum() API Can be specified at the TLS environment level only GSK_ENUM ID is GSK_SUITE_B_PROFILE Valid GSK_ENUM_VALUE values are: GSK_SUITE_B_PROFILE_OFF GSK_SUITE_B_PROFILE_128 GSK_SUITE_B_PROFILE_192 GSK_SUITE_B_PROFILE_ALL Example: rc = gsk_attribute_set_enum(env, GSK_SUITE_B_PROFILE, GSK_SUITE_B_PROFILE_128); Notes: Using gsk_attribute_set_enum() API will override the environment variable setting If not specified or set to OFF, Suite B will not be enforced Deprecated APIs do not support Suite B Page 25 of 48
26 Interactions & Dependencies Suite B Hardware Dependencies None Software Dependencies Requires ICSF HCR77A0 or higher be installed System SSL calls ICSF PKCS # 11 callable services to perform AES-GCM encrypt / decrypt and Elliptic Curve functions ICSF controls access to the cryptographic services through the CSFSERV resource class. Access is needed to the CSF1SKE, CSF1SKD, CSF1GKP, CSF1GAV, CSF1TRD, CSF1TRC, CSF1PKS, CSF1PKV and CSF1DVK resources ICSF will determine whether to utilize CPACF hardware to perform AES-GCM encrypt / decrypt functions Exploiters Communication Server's Application Transparent/TLS Any z/os System SSL applications wanting to exploit the TLS V1.2 protocol and Suite B Page 26 of 48
27 Overview - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation Problem Statement / Need Addressed: Enhanced SSL certificate validation is needed to support RFC 5280 Need ability to perform certificate validation to the root CA certificate when certificates reside in a SAF key ring Need support for more secure DSA keys Solution: Enhanced certificate validation to Support certificates and certificate validation as defined by RFC 5280 Allow end-user to configure how certificate validation to the root CA certificate occurs Added support for DSA 2048-bit keys Benefit: Customers will be able to use industry standard specifications for certificate validation Exploit features provided through the new certificates Continue to support certificates defined by RFCs 2459 and 3280 Page 27 of 48
28 Overview - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation Benefit (continued) Certificates in SAF key rings can be validated just like certificates that reside in a PKCS#11 token or key database file DSA 2048-bit keys provide more secure connections Page 28 of 48
29 Overview - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation Using the RFC 5280 Certificate validation, the customer can: Utilize certificates following the standard defined in RFC 5280 Control level of certificate validation Value: Customers are able to specify a more current and secure validation mode 2459 Only -- Existing 2459, 3280, and Only -- Existing 5280 Only -- New Enhanced support for certificate and CRL extensions to provide a more secure X.509 environment. Added internationalization support when validating certificate chains Enhance certificate validation for certificates that reside in a SAF key ring. The customer can: Validate to the trust anchor certificate Existing (Default) Validate to the root CA certificate New Page 29 of 48
30 Usage & Invocation - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation There are now 4 possible certificate validation modes: GSK_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE_ANY validate according to RFC 2459, if that fails validate according RFC 3280, and if that fails validate according to RFC 5280 GSK_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE_2459 validate according to RFC 2459 GSK_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE_3280 validate according to RFC 3280 GSK_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE_5280 validate according to RFC 5280 (NEW) Page 30 of 48
31 Usage & Invocation - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation The validation mode can be set through: gsk_attribute_set_enum() API environment variable GSK_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE or on the validatation_mode parameter on the gsk_validate_certificate_mode() API call Notes: Certificate and CRL validation mode defaults to the validation mode ANY Deprecated APIs can exploit through environment variables. Page 31 of 48
32 Usage & Invocation - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation For SSL/TLS exploiters, certificate validation mode can be defined by: Setting environment variable export GSK_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE=5280, 3280, 2459 or ANY Using gsk_attribute_set_enum() (SSL environment level only) rc = gsk_attribute_set_enum (env, GSK_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE, GSK_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE_5280); or GSK_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE_3280); or GSK_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE_2459); or GSK_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE_ANY); Using validation_mode parameter on gsk_validate_certificate_mode() Page 32 of 48
33 Usage & Invocation - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation SAF Key ring certificate chain validation behavior can be set through: gsk_attribute_set_enum() API New environment variable GSK_CERT_VALIDATE_KEYRING_ROOT or on the new validate_root parameter on the gsk_validate_certificate_mode() API call Notes: Has no effect on certificate validation with certificates in key database files or PKCS #11 Tokens (validation always done to root). Only applies at the SSL environment level not just at the SSL connection level Page 33 of 48
34 Usage & Invocation - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation SAF Key ring certificate chain validation behavior can be set through: Setting environment variable export GSK_CERT_VALIDATE_KEYRING_ROOT=ON or OFF ON (1) Validate SAF key ring certificates to the root CA OFF (0) Validate SAF key ring certificates to the intermediate trust anchor (Default same as today) Using gsk_attribute_set_enum() (SSL environment level only) rc = gsk_attribute_set_enum (env, GSK_CERT_VALIDATE_KEYRING_ROOT, GSK_CERT_VALIDATE_KEYRING_ROOT_ON); or GSK_CERT_VALIDATE_KEYRING_ROOT_OFF); Page 34 of 48
35 Usage & Invocation - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation For CMS exploiters, use gsk_validate_certificate_mode() gsk_status gsk_validate_certificate_mode ( gskdb_data_sources * data_sources, x509_certificate * subject_certificate, gsk_boolean accept_root, gsk_int32 * issuer_record_id, GSKCMS_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE validation_mode, gsk_uint32 arg_count, [GSKCMS_CERT_VALIDATE_KEYRING_ROOT validate_root,]...) The existing validation_mode parameter can be set to: GSKCMS_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE_ NEW GSKCMS_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE_3280 GSKCMS_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE_2459 GSKCMS_CERT_VALIDATION_MODE_ANY Page 35 of 48
36 Usage & Invocation - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation arg_count parameter on the gsk_validate_certificate_mode() API must be set to 1 when validate_root is specified (previously only could be set to 0) validate_root can be: GSKCMS_CERT_VALIDATE_KEYRING_ROOT_ON GSKCMS_CERT_VALIDATE_KEYRING_ROOT_OFF Page 36 of 48
37 Usage & Invocation - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation Certificate Management Services (CMS) APIs updated to support the creation of DSA 2048 bit keys certificate authority and user/server certificates, and the usage of DSA 2048 bit keys. Updated CMS APIs: gsk_make_signed_data_content gsk_make_signed_data_content_extended gsk_make_signed_data_msg gsk_make_signed_data_msg_extended gsk_read_signed_data_content gsk_read_signed_data_content_extended gsk_read_signed_data_msg gsk_read_signed_data_msg_extended gsk_sign_certificate gsk_sign_crl gsk_sign_data gsk_verify_certificate_signature gsk_verify_crl_signature gsk_verify_data_signature gsk_construct_certificate gsk_construct_renewal_request gsk_construct_self_signed_certificate gsk_construct_signed_certificate gsk_create_certification_request gsk_create_database_renewal_request gsk_create_database_signed_certificate gsk_create_self_signed_certificate gsk_create_signed_certificate gsk_create_signed_certificate_record gsk_create_signed_certificate_set gsk_create_signed_crl_record gsk_generate_key_pair gsk_generate_key_parameters Page 37 of 48
38 Usage & Invocation - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation gskkyman has been updated to support creation and management of CA and end entity DSA 2048-bit certificates Old menus Certificate Type 1 - CA certificate with 1024-bit RSA key 2 - CA certificate with 2048-bit RSA key 3 - CA certificate with 4096-bit RSA key 4 - CA certificate with 1024-bit DSA key 5 - User or server certificate with 1024-bit RSA key 6 - User or server certificate with 2048-bit RSA key 7 - User or server certificate with 4096-bit RSA key 8 - User or server certificate with 1024-bit DSA key 9 - CA certificate with an ECC key 10 - User or server certificate with an ECC key Select certificate type (press ENTER to return to menu): 4 New menus Certificate Usage 1 - CA certificate 2 - User or server certificate Select certificate usage (press ENTER to return to menu): 1 Certificate Key Algorithm 1 - Certificate with an RSA key 2 - Certificate with a DSA key 3 - Certificate with an ECC key Select certificate key algorithm (press ENTER to return to menu): 2 DSA Key Size bit key bit key Select DSA key size (press ENTER to return to menu): 2 Signature Digest Type 1 - SHA SHA-256 Select Digest Type (press ENTER to return to menu): 2 Page 38 of 48
39 Usage & Invocation - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation gskkyman utility: Remains a clear key certificate management utility. A PKCS #11 token certificate with a clear private key is allowed full gskkyman functionality. The gskkyman utility provides only limited functionality for PKCS #11 token certificates that have secure private keys. If a PKCS #11 certificate has a secure private key the following functions are allowed: Showing certificate and key information Setting the key as default Exporting a certificate to a file Deleting a certificate and key Changing the label Page 39 of 48
40 Usage & Invocation - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation If a PKCS #11 token certificate has a secure private key then the following functions are NOT permitted: Copying certificate and key to another token Exporting certificate and key to a file Creating a signed certificate and key Creating a certificate renewal request When displaying Token Key Information for a PKCS #11 certificate's private key, the Private key type will indicate if the private key is either Clear or Secure. Page 40 of 48
41 Interactions & Dependencies - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation Hardware Dependencies None Software Dependencies None Exploiters Any z/os System SSL application using RFC 5280 certificates or certificates that reside in a SAF key ring Page 41 of 48
42 Migration & Coexistence Considerations - RFC 5280 Certificate Validation gskkyman When running the gskkyman program in interactive mode, a series of menus guide you through various tasks, prompting you for each piece of information required to complete the task. In z/os V2R1, some of the existing gskkyman menus have been refined to make the tasks simpler and more intuitive for the user to perform. Installations/products that have created automated scripts to interact with the gskkyman menus will need to modify these scripts to work with the new menus. Documentation that describes the gskkyman menus is updated to describe the new menus. Page 42 of 48
43 Overview - General updates General System SSL release updates: ICSF is now required to be up and running before executing System SSL applications in FIPS mode Will use random number generation and Diffie-Hellman functions from ICSF in this environment If a System SSL application is executing in non-fips mode and ICSF is available, ICSF will be used for random number generation. If ICSF is not available, random number generation will continue to be performed in System SSL's software. Page 43 of 48
44 Interactions & Dependencies - General updates Hardware Dependencies None Software Dependencies Requires ICSF HCR77A0 or higher be installed System SSL calls ICSF PKCS # 11 callable services for random number generation and Diffie-Hellman ICSF controls access to the cryptographic services through the CSFSERV resource class. Access is needed to the CSFRNG, CSF1GKP, CSF1GAV, CSFPGSK, CSF1TRD, CSF1TRC and CSF1DVK resources Page 44 of 48
45 Migration & Coexistence Considerations - General updates 1) CSFSERV resource when running in non-fips mode When it is running a System SSL application in non-fips mode (default mode), System SSL will still attempt to exploit ICSF's random number generation. ICSF's random number generation will allow the application to take advantage of the ICSF software or the Crypto Express3 cards for generating random data. If CSFSERV class is defined and if the user ID that starts the SSL application cannot access the CSFRNG resource of the CSFSERV class, System SSL will not be able to use ICSF and the informational message ICH408I (which indicates insufficient authorization) may be issued to the console. System SSL processing will continue, your application will be using System SSL's random number generation support. Action: Permit application user's to the CSFRNG resource Page 45 of 48
46 Migration & Coexistence Considerations - General updates 2) System SSL when running in FIPS mode will require and exploit ICSF's random number generation and Diffie-Hellman support. Before running the System SSL application in FIPS mode you must ensure that ICSF is running If CSFSERV class is defined, all user IDs that start SSL applications in FIPS mode, invoke the gskkyman utility to manage FIPS key database files, or invoke the GSKSRVR started task in FIPS mode must have access to certain CSFSERV classes. When exploiting Diffie-Hellman Support CSF1TRC, CSF1DVK, CSF1GKP, CSF1GSK, CSF1GAV, CSF1TRD APAR OA40816 on z/os V1R12 and z/os V1R13 assists with helping to find SSL applications running in FIPS mode without ICSF available Page 46 of 48
47 Presentation Summary You should now be able to: Understand the recent changes in System SSL (TLS V1.2, Suite B, crypto algorithms, certificate validation, and general updates) Understand the migration changes (new dependencies on ICSF and gskkyman menu changes) Be able to find any of the above information in the relevant publication(s) Page 47 of 48
48 Appendix Publications z/os Cryptographic Services System Secure Sockets Layer (SC ) Specifications: RFC 5246, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version RFC 5280, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile RFC 5288, AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS - RFC 5289, TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) - RFC 5430, Suite B Profile for Transport Layer Security (TLS) - Page 48 of 48
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