Automotive Cybersecurity: Why is it so Difficult? Steven W. Dellenback, Ph.D. Vice President R&D Intelligent Systems Division

Transcription

1 Automotive Cybersecurity: Why is it so Difficult? Steven W. Dellenback, Ph.D. Vice President R&D Intelligent Systems Division

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3 Cybersecurity is not one Entry Point

4 Four Major Aspects of Cybersecurity How Can Someone Gain Unauthorized Access? What Could They do if They Gained Access? How Can We Detect Unauthorized Access? What Can be Done in Response to an Attack?

5 How Do Cyber Attacks Occur: Physical access Intercept internal Signals Serial Cellular CAN Wireless attacks Cellular WiFi Bluetooth Software attacks Reverse Engineering Fuzzing Configuration Analysis Design Review

6 Cars are becoming complex (and Connected Vehicle is only part of it) 1965: No computers No software : Up to ~200 computers Consider TPMS are 4 computers and wireless >100 million lines of code LTE (or similar) enabled vehicles are becoming commonplace

7 Today s Vehicles are Systems of Systems (by many vendors)

8 Connected Automated Vehicle (CAV) Cybersecurity A connected automated vehicle is a system of systems its NOT just one connection Not from ONE company / manufacturer Suppliers change: in mid-stream / repairs Where is the responsibility for cybersecurity: Standards Network Vehicle Etc. CV is not just DSRC There are MANY entry points into a CAV environment

9 Challenges with Connected Vehicles Recent attacks on Connected Vehicles: Jeep Cherokee: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway With Me in It GM OnStar: This Gadget Hacks GM Cars to Locate, Unlock, and Start Them Tesla Model S: Researchers Hacked a Model S, But Tesla s Already Released a Patch Impact of these attacks: Erodes public trust Raises awareness improves security practices Not a setback for DSRC

10 Security is a Balance How much do you want to pay for security? Usually not a lot until you are compromised Like all technology solutions, a balance has to be reached based on funding, accessibility and reality Every organization has to decide the level of acceptable risk

11 Consider a CAV Environment For Connected Vehicle to be successful it must be integrated into the transportation infrastructure, and general consensus that AVs need CV to be viable

12 Cybersecurity touch Points: Need to worry each of these Field network Bluetooth Wireless networks Wired networks Vehicles Any device that is connected to one of the above

13 What s the Problem? Problem? How to apply conventional penetration testing methods to autonomous vehicle technology? Why address it now? Autonomous Technology is transitioning out of the lab and into the streets. Proactively address security to avoid patching in later. What can we do right now? Evaluate sensors Influence vendors Develop requirements Generate discussion

14 Types of Challenges Experimental - Just trying to make it work Focused on meeting basic performance Security seen as hindrance to prototyping Operating in controlled environment Worry about it later Garbage In = Garbage Out Sensor data only as good as the source Making assumptions about sensor performance based on limited testing Sensor perception, sensitivity, and ranges highly variable Fusing data sources is difficult Different units, manufacturers, libraries Correlating objects between sensor types Response magnitude may vary for materials/shapes

15 Types of Challenges Each sensor from a different manufacturer Sometimes a sensor is a composition from even more suppliers Technology layering and abstraction results in compounding corner cases Each sensor an embedded system Firmware updates Debug ports, flash memory, configuration files Multiple suppliers / vendors Constantly evolving sensor set Likely different than previous sensor or different manufacturer Start security assessment all over again

16 Lifecycle Security ISO (Road Vehicles Functional Safety) / J3061 (Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems) Process: Security Requirements Development Risk Modeling Asset Tracking Secure Over-the-Air Update Sensor Security Secure Code Practices Penetration Testing Coding Analysis Secure Interface Design

17 Its Complex Source: Ford Motor Company

18 Connected Vehicle Environment Potential Attacks Injecting bad data that is then communicated over trusted comms Using comms or physical means to hack vehicle and control it or obtain trusted security credentials Flood DSRC safety & control channels Spoofing, jamming, or subtle skew of GPS signal Use roadway infrastructure to infiltrate TMC network Simulate vehicles that will trigger safety apps. Tough to detect if sensors are occluded Hack RSE and alter SPAT/MAP messages Broadcast incorrect messages to/from Vulnerable Road Users

19 Questions? Steven W. Dellenback, Ph.D. Vice President R&D Intelligent Systems Division