Security Mechanism of Electronic Passports. Petr ŠTURC Coesys Research and Development

Transcription

1 Security Mechanism of Electronic Passports Petr ŠTURC Coesys Research and Development

2

3

4

5

6 Smartcard CPU 16/32 bit 3.57MHz (20MHz) 1.8 / 3/ 5 V ROM kb RAM 1-8 kb EEPROM 8-128kB

7 Contactless communication Not RFID! f = MHz Near-field range <10cm (300/2πf) Power via induction Signal via modulation ISO 14443

8 Contactless communication

9 Threats vs. security mechanisms epassport with Biometric Data

10 ICAO Security Mechanisms

11 Time in second Execution time in ms Time in ms RSA vs. ECC Comparison on same chip of signature operation Comparison on same chip of verification operation RSA CRT mode RSA standard mode ECC RSA verify ECC verify Key size (equivalent RSA) Key size( equivalent RSA) Comparison on same chip of key generation RSA key generation 30 ECC key generation ECC wins the signature and Key generation match. RSA wins the verification match but ECC stays reasonable Key size( equivalent RSA) ECC : 113ms and 147 ms WARNING: Results are chip dependant

12 Passive Authentication (PA)

13 Document Signer Features: Keypair generation, CSR generation (ASN.1 templates, crosssignatures), Certificate storage SOD generation (from ASN.1 templates) Key selection strategies (explicit selection, round-robin, optimal, ) Multiple domains Connector for Coesys Prod Manager Management GUI modularity Supported crypto: SW (RSA, RSA-PSS, ECC) Luna 3000 HSM (RSA, RSA-PSS, ECC ) KMS (RSA, RSA-PSS)

14 UK e-passport attack

15

16 ICAO PKD

17 Active Authentication (AA) Accessible memory Inspection System e-passport CPU READ AA PUB KEY SEND RND NOUNCE Protected memory ANSWER SIGNED NOUNCE GET AA PRIV KEY VERIFY

18 Active Authentication - issues EF.COM not in SOD Challenge semantic Active authentication gives non-repudiation (possibility to track the passport holder and have a proof) Passport receives random string r from a terminal and respond with signature S(Kpr, r) where Kpr is passport s private key. Terminal can hide a meaning into the random r (e.g. r = date time location) Can be solved by Chip Authentication (part of EAC)

19 Basic Access Control (BAC) Inspection System MACHINE READABLE ZONE (MRZ) PASSPORT NR. DATE OF BIRTH DATE OF EXPIRY SHA-1 K SEED (for K ENC ) (for K MAC ) SHA-1 K ENC/MAC = 3DES KEY (16 BYTES) NOT USED (4 BYTES)

20 Basic Access Control (BAC) Accessible memory K ENC + K MAC Protected memory KEY K ENC e-passport CPU SECURE CHANNEL 3DES encryption + MAC KEY K MAC Inspection System

21 Basic Access Control - Detailed Inspection System E-Passport GET_CHALLENGE() RND.ICC Generate random number for challenge RND.ICC Generate random number RND.IFD and keying material K.IFD S=RND.IFD RND.ICC K.IFD E_IFD=E[K ENC ](S) M_IFD=MAC[K MAC ](E_IFD) MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATE(E_IF D M_IFD) Check M_IFD Decrypt E_IFD Check that RND.ICC from S is the correct value Generate keying material K.ICC epassport Chip Check M_ICC Decrypt E_ICC Check that RND.IFD from R is the correct value E_ICC M_ICC 21 R=RND.ICC RND.IFD K.ICC E_ICC=E[K ENC ](R) M_ICC=MAC[K MAC ](E_ICC)

22 Belgian passport attack

23 Extended Access Control (EAC)

24 Accessible memory Chip Authentication (CA) Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DH or ECDH) e-passport CPU Protected memory Secure channel (3DES + MAC) Ephemeral Static (EC)-Diffie-Hellman Chip: Chip individual static key pair Public Key stored in the DG14(signed) Private Key stored in secure memory Terminal: Ephemeral key pair dynamically chosen by the terminal ECDH (224Bit) asymmetric key agreement 3DES (112Bit) symmetric encryption / integrity protection Inspection System

25 Chip Authentication - Detailed Inspection System E-Passport Read Chip Authentication public key of the ICC (PK ICC ) and domain parameters D ICC from the EF.DG14 Generate ephemeral key pair PK IFD, SK IFD READ_BINARY() PK ICC,D ICC MSE_SET_KAT(PK IFD ) K=KA(SK IFD, PK ICC, D ICC ) K=KA(SK ICC, PK IFD, D ICC )

26 Terminal Authentication (TA) Accessible memory CVCA Present certificate(s) e-passport CPU VERIFY Send RND challenge Challenge signed by private key RSA or ECDSA VERIFY Inspection System Problem! Verify cert = signature + expiration + revocation

27 Terminal Authentication Detailed Inspection System E-Passport READ_BINARY() Read CVCA references EF.CVCA MSE_SET_DST PSO_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE Set the reference to the public key Verify certificate Set the reference to the public key MSE_SET_AT GET_CHALLENGE R ICC Calculate signature S IFD = Sign( SK IFD, ID ICC R ICC H(PK IFD )) EXTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE Verify signature

28 EAC Cross-certification

29 Certificate renewal CVCA DV IS Examples of validity periods: CVCA certificate : 2 years DV Certificate : 3 months IS Certificate : 1 month Machine Readable Travel Documents Extended Access Control

30 Extended Access Control v2 a.k.a 3 rd generation e-passport

31 PACE v2 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment

32 Benin 2010 Training of operators