Spanish Nuclear Security Reactor Oversight Process (SISC)
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1 1 Spanish Nuclear Security Reactor Oversight Process (SISC) Sistema Integrado de Supervision de Centrales Nucleares Antonio Pérez Báez
2 2 Intro 6 NPP (8 Reactors) PWR & BWR Fuel Factory Low & Medium Rad Waste CSN is the only CA in Safety & Radiation Protection In Security MIR & MINETUR In 2006 CSN Confidential Security Prescriptive Regulation DBT was approved by 2015 Currently there are Private Security Guards in site and Responde Forces outside, Goverment has just approved to have them inside
3 3 What is the SISC? It is a powerful TOOL used by CSN to CONTROL Nuclear Facilities PERFORMANCE
4 4 What is the SISC? It is a 4 steps PROCESS: 1. To get INFORMATION about that FUNCTIONING: Security INSPECTIONS PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
5 5 What is the SISC? It is a 4 steps PROCESS: 1. To get INFORMATION about that FUNCTIONING 2. To ASSESS these 2 INPUTS Significance Determination Process
6 6 What is the SISC? It is a 4 steps PROCESS: 1. To get INFORMATION about that FUNCTIONING 2. To ASSESS these 2 INPUTS 3. To NOTIFY the results to the Operator 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Quarter Information Collected Information Notified
7 7 What is the SISC? It is a 4 steps PROCESS: 1. To get INFORMATION about that FUNCTIONING 2. To ASSESS these 2 INPUTS 3. To NOTIFY the results to the Operator 4. To ESTABLISH Regulatory ACTIONS: ENFORCEMENT Action Matrix
8 8 Before starting, let s revise 1.OBJECTIVES of Physical Protection System (PPS) are PREVENTING: RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE Malicious act against the NPP to cause RADIOACTIVE RELEASE THEFT ON NUCLEAR MATERIALS
9 9 Before starting, let s revise 2. The 3 important FUNCTIONS in a PPS are: DETECION & ASSESSMENT of the alarms DENY or DELAY the access of the adversaries to get the target RESPONSE to & NEUTRALIZE the threat
10 10 Before starting, let s revise 3. The Nuclear Regulatory PROCESS is based on: ASSESSING the Official DOCs to grant the License INSPECTING to check in situ REMOVING, Requesting CONDITIONS or GRANTING the LICENSE
11 11 SISC 1 st STEP: Getting Information. INSPECTIONS 1. ANNUAL SECURITY INSPECTION PLAN: 1 Attribute: Physical Protection SYSTEM PT.XII.01 Equipment performance, Testing & Maintenance PT.XII.03 Nuclear Security Training & Exercises 2 Attribute: Control Access PROCEDURES PT.XII.02 Protected Area Access Control PT.XII.04 Owner-Controlled Area Access Control PT.XII.05 Vital Area Security Systems & Access Control 3 Attribute: RESPONSE to the THREATS PT.XII.06 Protective Strategy
12 12 SISC 1 st STEP: Getting Information. PIs 2. Operators SENDS every QUARTER PERFORMANCE INDICATORS. Information of: 1. Nº of HOURS with IDS & TV were OUT of service 2. False Alarms RATES 3. ERRORS in accessing to VITAL AREAS 4. Nº of HOURS of TRAINING & EXERCISES accomplished
13 13 SISC 2 nd STEP: Reviewing Information From the INSPECCIONS: FINDINGS are deficiencies identified The SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION PROCESS is a tool to categorize the IMPORTANCE of those findings GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW or RED Depending of nº of deficiencies, the Security area where happened, the vulnerability which produce to PPS, the amount of time without fixing PERFORMANCE INDICATORS have values to establish the thresholds or ranges to be categorized from GREEN to RED Inside CSN there is a CATEGORIZATION COMITEE who takes into account the Inspection REPORT ok F F F F
14 14 3 rd STEP: Notify RESULTS to OPERATORS SISC CALENDAR: 1 st Month 2 nd Month 3 rd Month 4 th Month 5 th Month 6 th Month 10 st days: Inspection Report 21 st days Reception of PI In 6 weeks: SDP By 6 th Letters to the NPP By the end of the following Quarter CONFIDENTIAL LETTERS will be sent to the Operators The SISC process gives the Operator the chance to reply and defend that RESULTS The SISC RESULTS about Safety and Radiation Protection are published in the of course nothing about SECURITY
15 15 4 rt STEP: ENFORCEMENT ACTION MATRIX Licensee Response Regulatory Response Degraded Strategic Area Repetitive Degration UNACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE RESULTS GREEN 1 WHITE 2 WHITES or 1 YELLOW SEVERAL YELLOW or 1 RED LETTERS DSN SIGNS QUARTER RESULT LETTERS DSN SIGNS the ASSESSMENT REPORTS MEETINGS NONE CSN BRANCH CHIEF or DEPUTY with LICENSEE DPR & DSN REVIEW & SIGN the ASSESSMENT REPORTS DPR DIRECTOR with LICENSEE MANAGER LETTER TO REQUEST SETTING UP CORRECTION ACTIONS COMMISION INVOLVEMENT LICENSEE ACTIONS CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION with CSN OVERSIGHT CUMULATIVE ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION with CSN OVERSIGHT URGENT CORRECTION PLAN CSN ACTIONS NONE SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION and DICUSSIONS ORDER TO MODIFY, SUSPEND or REVOKE AUTHORITATION
16 16 Security FINDINGS: DATA BASE Security Guard did not search the vehicle at the PA Entrance Security Order XX, Section Date, Inspector X, Procedure X TV Cam did not cover the whole zone Security Order XX, Section Date, Inspector X, Procedure X Underground penetration without IDS and TV cams Security Order XX, Section Date, Inspector X, Procedure X
17 17 Example: Inspection Security Findings in st Quarter 2 nd Quarter 3 rd Quarter 4 th Quarter NPP 1 0 NPP 2 4 NPP 3 3 NPP 4 2 NPP NPP NPP 6 had another WHITE FINDING, went to YELLOW Column DEGRADED SECURITY
18 IF 3 IF 4 IF 1 IF Example: Security Performance Indicators Managment 0,000 0,005 0,010 0,015 0,020 0,025 0,0015 PI 1 Nº HOURS IDS TV OUT OF SERVICES 0,0042 Período 0,0066 0,0099 0,030 3T/2011 4T/2011 1T/2012 2T/2012 BLANCO IF 1 > 0,08 VERDE IF 1 0,08 0 0,4 0,8 1,2 1,6 PI 2 FALSE ALARMS RATE 0,71 1,27 Período 0,92 0,53 2 3T/2011 4T/2011 1T/2012 2T/2012 AMARILLO IF 2 4 BLANCO 1,5 IF 2 <4 VERDE IF 2 < 1,5 0,00 5,00 10,00 15,00 20,00 25,00 PI 3 ACCESS CONTROL VITAL AREAS Período 4,57 2,88 2,13 AMARILLO IF 3 5 BLANCO 2 IF 3 < 5 VERDE IF 3 < 2 30,00 3T/2011 4T/2011 1T/2012 2T/2012 PI 4 TRAINING T/2011 4T/2011 1T/2012 2T/2012 Período VERDE IF 4 80% BLANCO 60% IF 4 > 80% AMARILLO IF 4 < 60%
19 19 Conclusions SISC identifies DEFICIENCIES and requests CORRECTIVE ACTIONS according to their importance to fix them SECURITY PERFORMANCE at Spanish NPP has been IMPROVED progressively since CSN runs the SISC
20 20 Thank you for your attention
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