GICNT- Nuclear Detection Working Group Magic Maggiore Ispra 28 March 2017 Expert support and Reach back activities Thierry PELLETIER Nuclear Security Division Safety and Security department International Atomic Energy Agency
Scope IAEA and Nuclear Security Expert Support for Nuclear Security: Technical support Scientific support Mobile Support and Home based Support Challenges International Support
International Atomic Energy Agency Specialised agency within UN system Created in 1957 by international treaty 168 Member States (Feb. 2016) IAEA Policy Making Bodies General Conference Representatives of 168 Member States Board of Governors Representatives of 35 Member States 3
IAEA Establishments and Staff Headquarters in Vienna 4 Regional Offices Tokyo, Toronto, Geneva, New York 5 Research Laboratories Director General & ~2300 Staff Members 6 Departments Technical Cooperation Nuclear Energy Nuclear Science and Applications Safeguards Nuclear Safety and Security Management
The Nuclear security plan In March 2002, the Agency embarked on its first comprehensive programme to combat the risk of criminal or intentional unauthorised acts involving MORC by assisting States in strengthening their nuclear security. Approved by the IAEA Board of Governors, the first three-year plan described a programme of work encompassing Activities in Nuclear Security. - Actually 4 th Nuclear Security Plan
Objective of Nuclear Security Plan to contribute to global efforts to achieve effective security wherever nuclear and other radioactive material is in use, storage and/or transport, and of associated facilities by supporting States, upon request, in their efforts to meet their national responsibilities and international obligations, to reduce risks and to respond appropriately to threats 6
What is Nuclear Security? The prevention of, detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities. Nuclear Security 7 Fundamentals (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20)
Nuclear Security Prevention, Detection and Response Measures Preventive Measures Detection Measures Response Measures Material Origin Material Transport Material Use Material Disposal Material Loss or Theft Nuclear Security Event Material Under Regulatory Control Material Out of Regulatory Control
IAEA - Nuclear Security Division Support to States Development of recommendations and guidelines Evaluation and advisory services Establishment of a National Nuclear Security Regime Human resource development Information services Technical improvements and upgrades 9
Nuclear Security Series Fundamentals (PRINCIPLES) Objectives and principles Basis for Nuclear Security Recommendations Essentials from international instruments Recommendations (WHAT) General approaches, actions, concepts and strategies Applications of Fundamentals Implementing Guides (HOW) Broad guides on how Recommendations to be applied Ways and means for how Recommendations implemented at systems level Technical Guidance Reference Manuals, Training Guides, Service Guides 10
NSS 15 references 5.8. The competent authorities should ensure that the following elements are included in the instrument deployment plan: Establishing systems and procedures for performing initial alarm assessment and other secondary inspection actions such as localization, identification, categorization and characterization of nuclear and other radioactive material, including obtaining technical support from experts to assist in the assessment of an alarm that cannot be resolved on site; 6.18. The State should ensure that the Plan: Describes the roles, responsibilities and procedures for the competent authorities for medical services, handling of hazardous material, radiation protection and safety [10, 11] and other technical support organizations and for nuclear and conventional forensic laboratories.
NSS 21 References Basis for Detection Architecture 2.22. In addition to the expertise that should be available within competent authorities, technical experts, able to provide scientific and engineering expertise on the design of the detection systems and measures, operational concepts and procedures, analysis of data from detection systems and on interdicted material, may be found in academia and national research institutions. These resources may be integrated into the nuclear security detection architecture, provided that the methods of engaging such experts are formalized. 2.23. Technical experts can also assist in the assessment of instrument alarms or information alerts and analysis of trends in the performance of the systems. They can provide this support remotely and/or at the detection site, depending on the national nuclear security detection systems and measures. A State may have specialized tools for data analysis and collection, and may consider allocating resources to further develop these tools to enhance their utility as part of the nuclear security detection architecture.
NSS 21 References Design of the NSDA 3.3. Significant time may be needed to fully implement the technical and operational solutions. While the system is being developed, immediate steps, such as those listed below, may be needed to reduce risks and vulnerabilities: Ensuring timely and reliable technical support from sources of expertise away from the scene of detection to allow front line officers at the scene to consult with experts who can advise on all aspects of detection and assessment; Developing, exercising and evaluating concepts of operation. 3.15. This is the (often remote) capability to assist those at the detection site in the assessment of radiation alarms or information alerts or on the discovery of suspicious or unauthorized material that could be used to manufacture an IND, RED or RDD. Technical support relies heavily on radiation analysts and subject matter experts who can identify specific isotopes and potential threats based on data collected from the detection site, either remotely or in person. International technical support capabilities may be available on request (e.g. through organizations such as the IAEA and other incident reporting channels).
Families of instruments used in Nuclear Security Detection Radiation Portals Monitors Radiation Hazard Assessment Personal Radiation Detectors (Pagers) Contamination Monitors Localization Gamma Search Devices Neutron Search Devices Categorization Radioisotope Identifiers (RID)
Initial Assessment of alarm NSS15 Every alarm or alert must be assessed and adjudicated
Radiological Crime Scene management
Role of Expert Support Expert support includes capabilities to assist in the assessment of radiation alarms, information alerts or during response to crime scene management. Expert support can include radiation analysts, physicists, engineers, and other subject matter experts with relevant expertise who may have access to better equipment and technologies Functions may include: Analyzing a spectrum and identifying radionuclides and threats Determining the outcome of an instrument alarm Determining the validity of an information alert Confirming a nuclear security event and managing the response. 18
Expert support Technical Scientific
On Scene
Home based
FORENSICS Laboratories
Reachback The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or resources, or equipment from organizations that are not forward deployed.
Reachback for Nuclear Security Equipment Supporting facilities Supervision Detection and response to Coordination Nuclear Security Event Scientific support Advices
Challenges Chain of Custody Timeless Information security Awareness on Operating condition Accuracy
International Reachback
IAEA Support - IEC ICSANT:UN International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism A/CPPNM: Article 5 - International cooperation, assistance obligations. Coordination of assistance
Thank you! Thierry PELLETIER Nuclear Security Division Safety and Security department International Atomic Energy Agency T.Pelletier@iaea.org