Don t Fail to Prepare for Failure Key Issues in Energy Assurance and Cybersecurity and Related NGA Center Activities Governors Energy Advisors Policy Institute June 24, 2016 Washington, DC
Topics Threats and Hazards to the Energy Sector Focus of Past NGA Activities Energy assurance coordination Prolonged and widespread power outages Cybersecurity Potential future work (your input requested!) 2
THREATS AND HAZARDS TO THE ENERGY SECTOR 3
Risks with Direct/Indirect Impact Wind storms Earthquakes Cyberattacks to utility systems Unforeseen spikes in demand Electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) Solar flares and coronal mass ejections (CMEs) Physical attacks to critical infrastructure 4
Hurricane Sandy Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration -- Electricity restored to many in the Northeast but outages persist. November 9, 2012. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8730 (Accessed January 19, 2016) 5
Derecho Storms Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration About Derechos. http://www.spc.noaa.gov/misc/abtderechos/derechofacts.htm#forecasting (Accessed January 19, 2016) 6
Earthquake Hazards in the U.S. Cascadia Subduction Zone New Madrid Fault Source: U.S. Geological Survey. http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/products/conterminous/2014/hazardmap2014_lg.jpg (accessed 1/19/2016). 7
Geomagnetic Storms On March 13, 1989, a severe CME reached Earth, causing all of Quebec, Canada and parts of the northeastern U.S. to lose power. Such events are rare, but when they happen they give little notice and can have widespread impacts. 8
Cyber Attacks: 2015 Ukraine Blackout Energy sector a major focus of cyber attacks control systems and business systems In December 2015, a well-coordinated cyber-attack caused up to 8 utility service territories in Ukraine to lose power and took down multiple systems needed to restore it. While impactful, it is believed that this attack could have been more severe, potentially taking down generators. While more difficult to implement, such an attack could be feasible in the U.S. This incident highlights the vulnerabilities of increasingly digitized transmission and distribution systems. Source: Zetter, Kim. Everything We Know about Ukraine s Power Plant Hack. January 20, 2016. http://www.wired.com/2016/01/everything-we-know-about-ukraines-power-plant-hack/ (accessed 1/21/2016) 9
Physical Attacks: 2013 Metcalf Sniper Attack On April 16 near San Jose, California, wellcoordinated attackers simultaneously took down telephone lines and a PG&E transmission substation. While utilities were able to redirect power and avoid blackouts, repairs to physical infrastructure took 27 days to complete. A larger scale attack could destroy multiple assets and potentially target critical customers. 10
Electric Grid Interdependencies https://2012december21.files.wordpress.com/2009/03/gridinterdependency.jpg 11
Governors The Consequence People Severe power outages can cause a wide array of problems to states, businesses and residents: Lost economic activity Between 2003 and 2012, all weather-related power outages cost the U.S. between $18 and $33 billion annually* SuperStorm Sandy ~ $50B+ Health and safety risks, particularly to vulnerable populations and with extreme temperatures Impaired communications across conventional channels Non-functioning transportation and vehicle fueling infrastructure, impacts to water and wastewater Hampered recovery efforts, particularly in the event of an extreme storm *Source: Executive Office of the President Economic Benefits of Increasing Electric Grid Resilience to Weather Outages (August, 2013) 12
Preparation, Response, and Recovery FOCUS OF NGA ACTIVITIES AND ROLE FOR GOVERNORS 13
Energy Assurance Coordination Multiple state agencies have role in energy assurance Governor s office, including energy advisor and HSA State energy office Public utilities commission Emergency Management agency Others (Nat Guard, DOT) Coordination with other partners critical as well Federal agencies (DOE, DHS/FEMA) Local governments Utilities and local businesses Partnership between NGA EET and HSPS divisions, with support from DOE practicing what we preach! 14
Energy Assurance Coordination May 2015 Learning Lab in Trenton, NJ Six state teams (HI, MD, MI, NC, OK, RI) of energy and homeland security staff came together to hear lessons learned from Hurricane Sandy Teams developed and are now implementing action steps to improve intrastate coordination Key themes for Learning Lab States Creating more robust energy assurance plans Enhancing information collection and response priorities Follow-up Issue Brief sharing lessons learned and state strategies coming September 2016 Webinars: GIS mapping for improved energy assurance planning (May 2016) and microgrids for resilience (August/September) 15
Energy Assurance Coordination NGA also partnering with DOE, NASEO, NARUC, and NEMA to Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinators (EEAC) Program Aim to improve coordination and provide channel for communication within the state and between states and DOE MOU signed between DOE and N-groups earlier this year Each group asked to reach out to their members to update EEAC contact list with coordination among members DOE and NASEO to provide training for new and previous EEAC designees NGA to help with implementation of EEAC program as needed going forward 16
Prolonged & Widespread Power Outages States and utilities have experience addressing power disruptions, but how does that translate to potentially larger events? Four areas for state action: Identify gaps in existing plans Coordinate efforts and clarify roles and responsibilities Clarify and communicate power restoration process Identify alternative communication channels How can quantitative risk analysis help states plan and respond? 17
Prolonged & Widespread Power Outages NGA holding two in-state retreats to discuss state planning and preparedness strategies and where gaps with WI (January) and WA (September) Issue brief on what governors need to know to be prepared and respond in September 18
Cybersecurity NGA released paper in 2014: State Roles in Enhancing the Cybersecurity of Energy Systems and Infrastructure Continuing to work with NGA HSPS division on energy sector/critical infrastructure element of broader cybersecurity efforts (stay tuned for more details) 19
POTENTIAL FUTURE NGA CENTER ACTIVITIES 20
Future Energy Assurance Activities Still discussing possible activities to begin September 2016 Potential activities could include: Joint meetings between energy advisors, homeland security advisors, and/or emergency managers and state energy offices Regional Power Outage Incident Annexes Roadmap for energy emergency Executive Orders State Resiliency Scorecards Your input is appreciated! 21
Thank You! Andrew Kambour Program Director Environment, Energy & Transportation Division (202) 624-3628 akambour@nga.org 22