Mobile Driver s License Region IV May 24, 2017 Seattle, WA

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Transcription:

Mobile Driver s License 2017 Region IV May 24, 2017 Seattle, WA

Presenter: Loffie Jordaan Senior Project Manager, AAMVA 2

Introduction & background CDS Committee & eid WG What is a mdl? Functional requirements Additional considerations Solution concepts What is happening now: Standardization Hot topics Initiatives (including AAMVA/RDW Proof of Concept)

Joint initiative between: Card Design Standard Committee Interoperability (including DLs) Representing jurisdictional views to other stakeholders (e.g. standards organizations) eid WG Standards for electronic identity mdl a first manifestation AAMVA mdl White Paper

A driver s license stored on or accessed via a device such as a smart phone or tablet One-function wearables (e.g. to prove age) are being discussed

Confirm the mdl holder s identity Convey driving privileges Work off-line Be trusted Work across jurisdictions Support selective information release (by mdl holder) Support remote management (by jurisdiction) Easy to use Acceptable processing time Unattended verification

TSA 600 million + verification actions per year Road stop 26 million + verification actions per year Age verification for alcohol purchases 400 million + verification actions per year Car rental Identification to receive social services Hotel check-in Identification for financial services

Financial Solution cost Reader infrastructure Office processes Systems Outreach/education/training Revenue streams Legal Existing legislation may be inadequate Model legislation available

Operations Remote revocation of privileges Multiple mdls for the same person What happens to released information? Procurement Different needs Shorter lifecycle

Issuing Authority Verifying Entity mdl Reader & infrastructure

Issuing Authority 1 3 Verifying Entity 2 mdl Reader & infrastructure

Standards impacted by: Location of data Container on a phone Get PII from the source Attended vs. Unattended Data exchange protocol Trust model

Data stored on device in a secure container Container security up to the Issuing Authority Reader verifies data authenticity using IA s public certificate Also referred to as the offline model

Data always retrieved from IA; always current No PII on mdl itself Secure tokens used to convey mdl holder s consent to release information to requestor Real-time connection to IA required (i.e. no offline option) (hence also referred to as the online model) IA to maintain a 24/7 real-time interface

Attended: Portrait image ties mdl holder to mdl Standard approach with physical card Comparison typically performed by a human Unattended: Something mdl holder has/knows ties mdl holder to mdl Need first identified by Japan for vending machine use Would allow online use of mdl to confirm identity

Crucial for mdl holder to know who is reading mdl Tap Show barcode on device Subsequent exchange of information via: Barcode Bluetooth NFC Somewhere in the process, mdl holder explicitly identifies information to be shared

Verifier needs something from the IA Needs to establish a relationship, directly or indirectly Needs to establish that the IA is genuine Needs a mechanism for data exchange Container on a phone model Need IA s public certificate Challenge: Confirming origin of public certificate A trusts C because A trusts B and B trusts C Logistics of certificate exchange TBD ICAO: Central PKD Blockchain? Get PII from source model Need address from which to request data Need to prevent honey pot attacks

Now: Offline attended Online attended Basic functionality only Later: Enhancements to attended cases Offline unattended Online unattended

Terminal registration Financial model Unattended use Scope

Revenue possibilities Terminal registration required: Verifying entity can be charged Reader license fee Online: Each read action Terminal registration not required: Charging verifying entity challenging

Privacy (online solution) Terminal registration required: Issuing Authority can track where mdl was read Technical solutions possible to make tracking more difficult Protection by policy Terminal registration not required: Issuing Authority does not know where mdl was read (For online solution, Issuing Authority always knows that a mdl was read)

Registration effort Terminal registration required: Issuing Authority has to register, directly or indirectly, all verifiers (law enforcement, government, private sector, citizens, world-wide) Terminal registration not required: No registration effort

Where can mdl be used? Terminal registration required: Only at registered verifiers Terminal registration not required: Anywhere

Public certificate (trust model) Terminal registration required: Can potentially be exchanged during registration process Terminal registration not required: Verifying entity has to obtain Issuing Authority s public certificate

Liability Terminal registration required: Issuing Authority can potentially held liable if verifying entity misuses information Terminal registration not required: No liability of data misuse on Issuing Authority

Revenue options User pays Per app download Per period of app use (e.g. per year) Verifying entity pays Terminal registration Pay per read (online solution only) License reader

On mdl standardization development path Not part of initial focus

Traditional DL good for: Proving identity Proving age Proving address Conveying driving privileges

mdl additionally good for: Data minimization, mdl holder control Improved data freshness Improved data accuracy Unattended use Coolness

Iowa pilot, RFP VA pilot Studies by other states DVLA (UK) Trafi (Finland) ICAO Vendor solutions AAMVA/RDW proof of concept

Based on AAMVA White Paper Focus on mdl / reader interaction Free participation Goal: Enable an issuing authority to explore mdl/reader interaction operationally Limitations: Does not cover reader / issuing authority interaction Supports 100s of mdl holders, not 1,000s No actual PII allowed (other than image)