Onion Routing. Submitted By, Harikrishnan S Ramji Nagariya Sai Sambhu J

Similar documents
Onion Routing. 1) Introduction. 2) Operations. by Harikrishnan S (M.Tech CSE) Ramji Nagariya (M.S CSE), Sai Sambhu J (M.Tech CSE).

Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing

ANONYMOUS CONNECTIONS AND ONION ROUTING

Onion Routing. Varun Pandey Dept. of Computer Science, Virginia Tech. CS 6204, Spring

0x1A Great Papers in Computer Security

ENEE 459-C Computer Security. Security protocols (continued)

Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms. EJ Jung

ENEE 459-C Computer Security. Security protocols

2 Application Support via Proxies Onion Routing can be used with applications that are proxy-aware, as well as several non-proxy-aware applications, w

CS526: Information security

Anonymous Communication: DC-nets, Crowds, Onion Routing. Simone Fischer-Hübner PETs PhD course Spring 2012

Protocols for Anonymous Communication

Peer-to-Peer Networks 14 Security. Christian Schindelhauer Technical Faculty Computer-Networks and Telematics University of Freiburg

A Report on Modified Onion Routing and its Proof of Concept

CS 134 Winter Privacy and Anonymity

A SIMPLE INTRODUCTION TO TOR

(12) United States Patent

Network Security: Anonymity. Tuomas Aura T Network security Aalto University, Nov-Dec 2010

THE SECOND GENERATION ONION ROUTER. Roger Dingledine Nick Mathewson Paul Syverson. -Presented by Arindam Paul

Analyzing the Dual-Path Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Approach

Report Documentation Page

scribed below in section 5. 2 Application Support via Proxies Onion Routing can be used with applications that are proxy-aware, as well as several non

Chaum, Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonym, Communications of the ACM, 24:2, Feb. 1981

Simulation on Agent-based Onion Routing Network *

Context. Protocols for anonymity. Routing information can reveal who you are! Routing information can reveal who you are!

Anonymous communications: Crowds and Tor

Network Security: Anonymity. Tuomas Aura T Network security Aalto University, autumn 2015

Definition. Quantifying Anonymity. Anonymous Communication. How can we calculate how anonymous we are? Who you are from the communicating party

Network Security: Anonymity. Tuomas Aura T Network security Aalto University, Nov-Dec 2012

Privacy defense on the Internet. Csaba Kiraly

Security and Anonymity

Achieving Privacy in Mesh Networks

Towards measuring anonymity

Anonymous Routing in Wireless Networks: Onion Routing

Anonymity. Assumption: If we know IP address, we know identity

Analysing Onion Routing Bachelor-Thesis

ANET: An Anonymous Networking Protocol

Data Security for Wireless Mesh Network Using Onion Routing Algorithm Shruti Patil 1, Suvarna Kanakaraddi 2, Chetankumar Patil 3

Dissecting Tor Bridges A Security Evaluation of their Private and Public Infrastructures

Computer Security. 15. Tor & Anonymous Connectivity. Paul Krzyzanowski. Rutgers University. Spring 2017

Private Browsing. Computer Security. Is private browsing private? Goal. Tor & The Tor Browser. History. Browsers offer a "private" browsing modes

CS Paul Krzyzanowski

Deanonymizing Tor. Colorado Research Institute for Security and Privacy. University of Denver

Challenges in Mobile Ad Hoc Network

communication Claudia Díaz Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Dept. Electrical Engineering g ESAT/COSIC October 9, 2007 Claudia Diaz (K.U.

Anonymity With Tor. The Onion Router. July 5, It s a series of tubes. Ted Stevens. Technische Universität München

Design and Analysis of Efficient Anonymous Communication Protocols

Maintaining the Anonymity of Direct Anonymous Attestation with Subverted Platforms MIT PRIMES Computer Science Conference October 13, 2018

CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy. Anonymity Mobile. Autumn Tadayoshi (Yoshi) Kohno

Anonymity and Privacy

Tor: An Anonymizing Overlay Network for TCP

An Empirical Study of an Anonymity Metric for Data Networks. Abinash Vasudevan Bachelor of Engineering Saveetha Engineering College, 2009

Private Web Browsing. Paul F. Syverson, Michael G. Reed, and David M. Goldschlag. Naval Research Laboratory. June 2, 1997.

CISC859: Topics in Advanced Networks & Distributed Computing: Network & Distributed System Security. A Brief Overview of Security & Privacy Issues

Host Website from Home Anonymously

Karaoke. Distributed Private Messaging Immune to Passive Traffic Analysis. David Lazar, Yossi Gilad, Nickolai Zeldovich

Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router. Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, Paul Syverson

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS: PRACTICAL REVOCATION AND KEY ROTATION

Anonymous Communication and Internet Freedom

CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security

CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security. Spring 2008 Lecture 23

surveillance & anonymity cs642 computer security adam everspaugh

Anonymity With Tor. The Onion Router. July 21, Technische Universität München

2 ND GENERATION ONION ROUTER

How Alice and Bob meet if they don t like onions

Anonymity on the Internet. Cunsheng Ding HKUST Hong Kong

Analysis of an Anonymity Network for Web Browsing

Survey on Traffic Pattern Discovery System For MANETs

Social Networking for Anonymous Communication Systems: A Survey

Port-Scanning Resistance in Tor Anonymity Network. Presented By: Shane Pope Dec 04, 2009

Putting the P back in VPN: An Overlay Network to Resist Traffic Analysis

BCA III Network security and Cryptography Examination-2016 Model Paper 1

Anonymous Communications

Design and Implementation of Privacy-Preserving Surveillance. Aaron Segal

Features of a proxy server: - Nowadays, by using TCP/IP within local area networks, the relaying role that the proxy

06/02/ Local & Metropolitan Area Networks. 0. Overview. Terminology ACOE322. Lecture 8 Network Security

Analyzing Tor s Anonymity with Machine Learning. Sanjit Bhat, David Lu May 21 st, 2017 Mentor: Albert Kwon

Avoiding The Man on the Wire: Improving Tor s Security with Trust-Aware Path Selection

VAST: Versatile Anonymous System for Web Users

The Tor Network. Cryptography 2, Part 2, Lecture 6. Ruben Niederhagen. June 16th, / department of mathematics and computer science

Rendezvous Tunnel for Anonymous Publishing

Introduction to Computer Security

Anonymous Communication and Internet Freedom

Lecture 13: Routing in multihop wireless networks. Mythili Vutukuru CS 653 Spring 2014 March 3, Monday

Lecture Nov. 21 st 2006 Dan Wendlandt ISP D ISP B ISP C ISP A. Bob. Alice. Denial-of-Service. Password Cracking. Traffic.

CE Advanced Network Security Anonymity II

Anonymous communication with on-line and off-line onion encoding

Security in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks. Wormhole Attacks

Efficiency Optimisation Of Tor Using Diffie-Hellman Chain

anonymous routing and mix nets (Tor) Yongdae Kim

(In)Security of Java SecureRandom Implementations

Low Latency Anonymity with Mix Rings

Addressing Privacy: Matching User Requirements with Implementation Techniques

Defining and Mitigating Cyber Risks to Reap the Benefits of IIoT

Distributed Systems. Lecture 14: Security. Distributed Systems 1

Protocols using Anonymous Connections: Mobile Applications. Paul F. Syverson, David M. Goldschlag, and Michael G. Reed. Naval Research Laboratory

The New Cell-Counting-Based Against Anonymous Proxy

Anonymity C S A D VA N C E D S E C U R I T Y TO P I C S P R E S E N TAT I O N BY: PA N AY I OTO U M A R KO S 4 T H O F A P R I L

Onion services. Philipp Winter Nov 30, 2015

Distributed Systems. Lecture 14: Security. 5 March,

Transcription:

Onion Routing Submitted By, Harikrishnan S Ramji Nagariya Sai Sambhu J

Motivation Public Network Encryption does not hide Routing Information Traffic Analysis Who is Talking to Whom? by analyzing the traffic pattern instead of data that is sent. Reveals Identities.

Motivation(contd.) Anonymity may be desired. Existence of Inter company collaboration. Email users do not want to disclose whom they are contacting to Rest of World etc..

Motivation(contd.) Need For System that is Complicates traffic analysis. Separates Identification from Routing. Also supports many different applications.

Onion Routing Limits Network's vulnerability to Traffic Analysis by separating identification from routing. Onion routing provides anonymous connections that are resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis. Instead of containing source and destination information, packets moving along an anonymous connection contain only next hop and previous hop information.

Onion Routing(Contd.) Consist Of two parts Network Infrastructure. Carries Anonymous Connection. Proxy Interface. Uses this connections to applications.

Onion Routing Network Infrastructure.

Network Infrastructure Onion Routers talk to their neighbors. Neighboring Onion Routers are neighbors for onion routing only. Between the Onion Routers the link is encrypted. Anonymous Connection is established through neighboring routers. Each Router Passes Data to one another after applying cryptographic operations.

Onion Routing Proxy Interface W and Z are Proxies

Proxy Interface Onion Routing Proxy has two functions Links Initiator to anonymous connection. Links anonymous connection to Responder. Instead of a single socket connection between an initiator and a responder, onion routing requires a socket connection between the initiator and his proxy, an anonymous connection between the initiator s proxy and the responders proxy, and a socket connection between the responders proxy and the responder.

Routing Phases Define Route. Construct the anonymous connection. Move data through the anonymous connection. Destroy the anonymous connection.

Defining Route The Initiator's Proxy chooses to make anonymous connection through the determined route. Initiator constructs layered data structure called Onion.

Defining Route(Contd.)

Defining Route(Contd.) Onion Each Layer of Onion is intended to a particular Onion Router. Each Layer of Onion is constructed using public key cryptography so only intended onion router can peel it. As data move through the network it appears different to each onion router. Therefore, an anonymous connection is as strong as its strongest link, and even one honest node is enough to maintain the privacy

Construct anonymous connection The Initiator Constructs the onion and sends the onion to the Onion Routers through CREATE command.

Single Onion Layer Format

Steps Done by an Onion Router on CREATE message. Peels off its layer from the Onion. Checks its freshness. Generate keys from the seed. Get the next hop address. Determine the cryptographic operations be done from Back F for backward data transfer and Forw F for forward data transfer. Add a mapping between the anonymous connection id and the keys to used on this connection.

Moving Data Forward Data Sent by Initiator is pre crypted repeatedly by W, applying the inverse of forward crypt operation specified in the onion(of previous phase), inner most first. And send the data using the DATA message. Each of the Onion router removes the crypt information added by initiator by applying the crypt operation using forward key obtained in the first phase.

Moving Data Backward Each of the Onion router crypts the text using backward key obtained in the first phase and send the data using DATA message. Initiator's proxy applies the inverse of backward crypt operation specified in the onion and sends the plain text to Intiator.

The anonymous connection path and the keys used for data transfer is shown

Destroy the anonymous connection Each of the Onion router maintains the details of the keys, the type of encryption used for each of the anonymous connection. So each of these resources should be removed while closing the anonymous connection. Achieved by sending DESTROY message. Upon receipt of a DESTROY command, it is the responsibility of an onion router to forward the DESTROY appropriately and to acknowledge receipt by sending another DESTROY command back to the previous sender.

How to send a reply to the initiator after the connection is destroyed? Keep anonymous connection open?? Or we can use Reply Onions.

Reply Onion An initiator s onion routing proxy can create a reply onion that defines a route back to it. A reply onion can be used by a responder to create an anonymous connection back to the initiator at a later point in time.

Reply Onion Demonstration (Initiator) -- W <----- X <----- Y <----- Z <---- (Responder) W, X, Y, Z are onion routers. Responder sends reply onion to onion routing proxy Z. Z peel off a layer. Gets the key seed intended for itself and an onion to be passed to Y. Y peels of the next outermost layer and gets the keyword for itself and an onion. This process repeats back until it reaches initiator's proxy. This process creates a anonymous connection back to the initiator.

Vulnerabilities Timing Attacks Intersection Attacks Predecessor Attacks

Applications Tor Decoy Cipher

References Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing [Michael G. Reed, Member, IEEE, Paul F. Syverson, and David M. Goldschlag]. Proxies for Anonymous Routing[Michael G. Reed, Paul F. Syverson, and David M. Goldschlag]. Hiding Routing Information[Paul F. Syverson, David M. Goldschlag and Michael G. Reed]. Wikipedia [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/onion_routing]