Spy vs. Spy: Rumor Source Obfuscation

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Transcription:

Spy vs. Spy: Rumor Source Obfuscation Peter Kairouz University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Joint work with Giulia Fanti, Sewoong Oh, and Pramod Viswanath

Some people have important, sensitive things to say. Political activism

Personal confessions Others have less important, but sensitive things to say.

Existing anonymous messaging apps

Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary Alice

Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary Alice

Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary Server Alice

Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary Server Alice

Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary Server Alice centralized networks are not truly anonymous!

Compromises in anonymity anonymity loss extends beyond the network

Distributed messaging Bob Mary Alice

Distributed messaging Bob Mary Alice

Distributed messaging Bob Mary Alice what can an adversary do?

Adversarial model Craig Bob Mary David Alice

Adversarial model Craig Bob Mary David Alice

Adversarial model Craig Bob Mary David Alice

Adversarial model Craig Bob Mary David Alice the adversary can figure out who got the message

Information flow in social networks G is the graph representing the social network

Information flow in social networks Alice

Information flow in social networks Alice passes the message to her neighbors

Information flow in social networks her neighbors pass the message to theirs

Information flow in social networks the message spreads in all directions at the same rate

Information flow in social networks the message spreads in all directions at the same rate

Information flow in social networks the message spreads in all directions at the same rate

Information flow in social networks this spreading model is known as the diffusion model

Adversary s observation can the adversary locate the message author?

Concentration around the center the message author is in the center with high probability

Rumor source identification high likelihood low likelihood diffusion does not provide anonymity [Shah, Zaman 2011]

Our goal Probability of detection diffusion 1 N T adaptive diffusion log N T N T : expected number of nodes with the message at time T

Main result: adaptive diffusion

Main result: adaptive diffusion

Main result: adaptive diffusion

Main result: adaptive diffusion

Main result: adaptive diffusion

Main result: adaptive diffusion

Main result: adaptive diffusion

Main result: adaptive diffusion

Main result: adaptive diffusion high likelihood low likelihood provides provable anonymity guarantees!

let s start with line graphs Line graphs

Line graphs: diffusion T = 0 the message author starts a rumor at T = 0

Line graphs: diffusion T = 1 with probability α, the left (right) node receives the message

Line graphs: diffusion T = 1 the node to the right of the author receives the message

Line graphs: diffusion T = 2 the rumor propagates in both directions at the same rate

Line graphs: diffusion T = 2 the rumor propagates in both directions at the same rate

Line graphs: diffusion T = 3 α is independent of time or hop distance to message author

Line graphs: diffusion T = 3 diffusion on a line is equivalent to two independent random walks

Adversary s observation 1 2 3 4 5 N = 5 nodes with the message can the adversary locate the message author?

Maximum likelihood detection 1 2 3 4 5 Likelihoods 1 N T /2 N T v the node in the middle is the mostly likely author

Maximum likelihood detection 1 2 3 4 5 Likelihoods 1 NN/2 T N T v Probability of detection 1 N T

Line graphs: adaptive diffusion 2 1 0 1 2 consider a line graph

Line graphs: adaptive diffusion 2 1 0 1 2 T = 0 node 0 starts a rumor at T = 0

Line graphs: adaptive diffusion 2 1 0 1 2 1/2 1/2 T = 1 with probability 1/2, the left (right) node receives the message

Line graphs: adaptive diffusion 2 1 0 1 2 T = 1 right node 1 receives the message

Line graphs: adaptive diffusion 2 1 0 1 2 1/3 2/3 T = 2 hop distance to message author probability of passing message: α = h+1 T+1 elapsed time

Line graphs: adaptive diffusion 2 1 0 1 2 T = 2 right node 2 receives the message

Line graphs: adaptive diffusion 2 1 0 1 2 1/4 3/4 T = 3 hop distance to message author probability of passing message: α = h+1 T+1 elapsed time

Line graphs: adaptive diffusion 2 1 0 1 2 T = 3 left node 1 receives the message

Adversary s observation 2 1 0 1 2 N T = 4 nodes with the message can the adversary locate the message author?

Maximum likelihood detection 2 1 0 1 2 Likelihoods adaptive diffusion diffusion k 1 N T /2 N T

Maximum likelihood detection 2 1 0 1 2 Likelihoods adaptive diffusion diffusion k 1 N T /2 N T Probability of detection 1 N T

what about d-regular trees? d-regular trees

d-regular trees: diffusion likelihoods concentrate heavily around the center

d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion

d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion initially, the source is also the virtual source

d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion at T = 1, the author selects one neighbor at random

d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion the author passes h = 1 and T = 2 to the chosen neighbor at T = 1, the author selects one neighbor at random

d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion the chosen neighbor becomes the new virtual source

d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion at T = 2, the virtual source passes the message to all her neighbors

d-regular trees : adaptive diffusion as T transitions from even to odd, the virtual source has two options: keeping the virtual source token passing the virtual source token

Symmetry properties the graph is always symmetric around the virtual source

Keeping the virtual source token adaptive rate virtual source token is kept with probability α = d 1 T d 1 2 h 1 1 T 2 +1 1

Keeping the virtual source token happens in T = 3 and T = 4 all leaf nodes with the message pass it to their neighbors

Passing the virtual source token new virtual source current virtual source selects one of its neighbors at random

Passing the virtual source token previous virtual source passes h = 2 and T = 4 to new virtual source

Passing the virtual source token happens in T = 3 and T = 4 new virtual source passes the message to its neighbors which in turn pass it to their neighbors

Adversary s observation can the adversary locate the message author?

Maximum likelihood detection high likelihood low likelihood all nodes except for the final virtual source are equally likely

Main Theorem 1. We spread fast: N T d 1 T 2 2. All nodes except for the final virtual source are equally likely to be the source, hence P v ML = v = 1 N T 1 3. The expected distance between the estimated and true source is at least T 2.

General graphs adaptive diffusion for general graphs?

Simulation results: Facebook graph Probability of detection adaptive diffusion 1 N T bound likelihoods can be approximated numerically number of nodes with the message

Extensions and related work Theoretical Adversaries with timing information Peer-to-peer dynamic networks Hiding relays Multiple message sources Systems Cyber-bullying detection Anonymous video sharing Message caching Bootstrapping contacts