C UAxS Workshop conclusions Old Dominion University, Norfolk, 11 Dec 14

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Transcription:

Supreme Allied Commander Transformation C UAxS Workshop conclusions Old Dominion University, Norfolk, 11 Dec 14 Major Jean-Claude Deskeuvre, BEL A CUAxS PM 5-Feb-15 1

Outline Reminder of the objectives Results & Summary COI approach Way Ahead 2

Objectives 1/2 Update the situational awareness about UAxS in four dimensions (Ground, Air, Sea and C3IS for the data link). The level of autonomy has to be considered. Develop a common understanding around the autonomous concept and the unmanned idea Identifying the threats associated with UAxS Considering the adequate counter-measures in all aspects of the threat To examine the ways for solutions taking into consideration already existing capabilities 3

Objectives 2/2 To examine the multi-dimensional character of the CUAxS problem, meaning to consider the existing operational approaches, the legal environment and the ethic perspective linked to the use of these capabilities To provide a list of recommendations for the way forward; whether that be through development of doctrine or specific capabilities in order to achieve an agile response to the crises and consequences of a mostly unpredictable and changing environment. 4

Threats Surveillance Reconnaissance Passive camouflage, deception, detection, recognition camouflage, deception, detection, recognition Intelligence gathering Deception, signature reduction Attack Deception, camouflage, detection Countermeasures Active Destroy, Electronic warfare, blinding, neutralization (disabling) Destroy, Electronic warfare, blinding, neutralization (disabling) Destroy, Electronic warfare, counter intelligence, signature reduction Implementation Lasers, (non) kinetic weapon systems, conventional weapons, other UAxS, sensors, EMP effects, cyber defence Lasers, (non) kinetic weapon systems, conventional weapons, other UAxS, sensors, EMP effects, cyber defence Lasers, (non) kinetic weapon systems, conventional weapons, other UAxS, physical and cyber protection (guards, isolation of systems) Destroy, Electronic warfare, Lasers, (non) kinetic weapon systems, conventional weapons, other UAxS, different prioritization of the responses Way Ahead enhance laser technology, control of EMP enhance laser technology, control of EMP enhance laser technology, control of EMP, techniques of isolation establish a prioritization of the Cmeassures depending on the scenario Mass Attack (swarm) camouflage, deception, detection, recognition CBRN Deception, detection, preventive measures Destroy, Electronic warfare, blinding, neutralization (disabling) Lasers, kinetic weapon systems, conventional weapons, UAxS swarm, sensors, EMP effects, cyber defense Preventive measures, CBRN measures, control take over, advanced sensors, early electronic counter measures detection coupled with destruction, interception examine the last resort response taking more risks very specific response, prevention is very critical Deception detection smart sensors, AxS action sensors, autonomous systems, analysis tools, counterdeception, virtual critical thinking, validation tool, GPS alternative solution GPS alternatives, validation process, virtual critical thinking Jamming Spoofing Taking control Human Factor electronic protective measures transmission security, detection of spoofing, transmission security, detection destroy network protection technological supremacy, destroy, self destruction, denial of service need to know, critical thinking, adaptive doctrines Training and education, procedures, skillsets, situational awareness Interception transmission security network protection encryption frequency hopping, Lasers, (non) kinetic weapon systems, conventional weapons, other UAxS, use of different frequency bands, anti-jamming procedures, GPS alternative solution Encryption, analysis and validation tools, GPS alternative solution, recording tactical networking, all the weapons ROE, procedures, combination human/systems Enhance existing or already mentioned measures Log book recording enhance technology and establish an efficient networking establish policy for human/systems interaction Proliferation of AxS legal regulations active control, counter swarming, flexible and real ENHANCEMENT time counter capability Interaction with existing systems public awareness, license to kill, no enter zones, registration harmonization of rules radar with very low altitude detection, existing ground surveillance, missile defense, detection of slow vehicle (G,A,S), kill control stations, introduce virus in the algorithm integration and interoperability

COI way ahead NATO Core team MCDC: Campaign of 2015-2016 Experimentation in support of the project Examine how, when and with whom Participation of Academia and Industry Collaboration with Nations and interested partners 7

Way ahead End of the workshop: summary January 15: document with main ideas and conclusions of the workshop Pending the evolution of the COI after the workshop, organize a next forum/workshop with specific identified aspects

Thank you for your participation and see you next time 9